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Chapter One - Introduction and Theoretical Framework 
Introduction 
The objective of this study is to analyse the contemporary political role of Christianity in the 
Middle East. This will be achieved by focusing on the office of the patriarch. In most of the 
Eastern Christian churches, the patriarch is widely accepted as the spiritual head of the 
community and, throughout the centuries, this authority has often been translated into 
temporal power. Although other communal actors have challenged the dominant position of 
the patriarch, this dual role as spiritual and civil leader provides resources which can be used 
to strengthen the claim to be the political representative at the expense of lay rivals. The case 
studies selected for this project - the Coptic Orthodox and the Maronite churches - share 
several key characteristics. Firstly, both evoke a distinct identity on the basis of faith yet are 
directly linked to a specific homeland - Egypt and Lebanon respectively. In contrast to 
spiritual leaders of communities which are not concentrated in one particular country, the 
Coptic Orthodox and Maronite patriarchs have the potential to become involved in national 
affairs if desired. Secondly, both communities have pressing if different concerns as 
indigenous Christians in a turbulent regional environment dominated by another religion - 
Islam. The vast majority of these relate to the position of the community in the homeland. 
Thirdly, both communities have recently experienced widespread expansion outside the 
traditional territory in the Middle East. This allows an examination of the impact this growth 
has had on both the church and community at home and abroad. Fourthly, since becoming 
the head of each church, Patriarch Shenouda III, Coptic Orthodox Patriarch of Alexandria and 
all Africa and Patriarch Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir, Patriarch of Antioch and all the East of the 
Maronites, have proven to be charismatic and influential figures in church and national 
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affairs. They have clearly played significant parts in relations between the community and 
state in the decades since their election to office. Finally, the two case studies have been 
selected as they best represent the potential of Christian communities to have a political role 
inthisregion. VAiile the Copts constitute only a small proportion (5-10% depending on the 
identity of the source) of the Egyptian population, they are still the largest Christian 
community in the Middle East, numbering around 5-6 million! In contrast, the Maronites 
are a small community in terms of size. It is estimated that there are no more than 600,000 
Maronites in Lebanon. Yet within Lebanon, they still make up over 20% of the population, 
offering them a chance to have a significant impact on national affairs. 2 This study proposes 
that the patriarch exercises a political role because of his position as the head of the 
community. The authority and tradition of the office is constantly invoked to reinforce this 
position. In the contemporary period, this can be attributed to the desire to fill the leadership 
vacuum which exists amongst Christians in the Middle East. 
In the twenty-first century, studies on Middle East Christians can offer a useful insight into 
some of the issues that have become priority areas in world politics e. g. democratization, 
development, security and terrorism. Although the Christian communities in the Middle East 
may be small in size (especially relative to the Muslim majority), they still represent an ideal 
opportunity to examine the policies adopted towards non-Muslims in countries where Islarn is 
the dominant religion. On the one hand, where conviviality is discovered, these examples 
can provide lessons for communal relations between members of the two faiths in other 
geographical areas. In particular, some argue that throughout the ages, Middle East 
Christians have occupied a unique position in acting as a bridge between the Western and 
Islamic worlds. 3 In the present climate of distrust and suspicion, global actors are in great 
need of this service. The scant knowledge of policymakers and relatively few academic 
contributions on these communities highlights the need for this type of work to be undertaken. 
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On the other hand, examples of tense relations between Muslims and Christians demonstrate 
that misunderstandings and ignorance can easily deteriorate into a situation where violence 
and conflict is common. In turn, this leads to instability in the specific country and often has 
repercussions both on the wider region and on international politics. In some cases, this can 
attract outside interest in the fate of the Christian communities. Again, informed decisions 
are crucial to ensure that any intervention is not harmful to these communities or interfaith 
relations. 
It is hoped that this study will complement the few existing resources on the political role of 
the Christian communities in the contemporary Middle East. In order to do so, an 
interdisciplinary approach has been adopted in acknowledgement of the contribution of 
several disciplines, most notably political science, international relations, history, theology 
and sociology. One of the key aims is to add a new area and context to the general debate on 
the role of religion and politics in the twenty-first century. The Middle East has frequently 
been used as a case study of the political role of Islam. By examining non-Muslim 
communities in this environment, the research hopes to indicate to what extent centuries of 
Islamic rule have affected the ability of religious leaders (of any faith) to influence political 
affairs in the region. 
This study is also expected to demonstrate the close links between the political and cultural 
roles of the religious institutions in this environment. In the Middle East region, religious 
identity is acknowledged as an important aspect of society. The churches can be considered 
as the guardians of the faith and identity of the community. In one sense, this emphasises the 
differences between Christian communities and the Muslim majority. Yet, in many cases, a 
sense of belonging to the individual state, in particular close attachment to its history and 
subsequent development, allows the church to reinforce national identity and loyalty to the 
state. Thus, it is necessary to examine the connection between communal and national 
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identity and the factors which contribute to the decision of the church hierarchy to promote 
these links. Consequently, identity politics is a key research area that will be covered in thiss 
work. 
Finally, it is hoped that this study will illustrate that Middle East Christians can be 
examined without focusing on their status as minorities. It is not intended that the research 
should be added to minority studies literature. As will be detailed in the literature review 
below, several works have used this approach. While this may be useful in depicting the 
problems faced by some Christians, it does not allow an adequate exploration of the 
attachment to the nation state as citizens which is held by many Christians. Another major 
problem with the minorities approach is that the concept is extremely controversial in the 
region. This is partly due to difficulties in reaching consensus on the definition. Chitham. 
defines a minority as a "group of people who are in some way different from and dominated 
by the people around them". 4 This vague description would certainly include the Christians 
of the Middle East. However, the term tends to have a more overt political meaning in the 
region. The minority discourse is often perceived as harmful to national interest as emphasis 
on religious identity can undermine other collective identities and also invite interference 
from outside interests. Furthermore, many Christians would also reject the minority term 
because it does not give adequate recognition to their historical involvement in the region and 
sense of belonging to the nation state. Consequently, in this work, the Christians of the 
selected case studies are described as "communities" not "minorities". This indicates that 
they are different from the group(s) in the country or region which can be considered the 
majority but work within the national framework to attain their political rights as citizens, 
rather than seeking distinctive rights as minorities. 
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Key Definitions 
Before commencing this study, it is necessary to clarify key definitions. Firstly, one must 
determine what Eastern Christianity means. Initially, these churches were created as a 
consequence of the spread of the gospel from Jerusalem after the death of Christ. The 
division of the Roman Empire in 395 into two parts had a similar effect on the universal 
church. 5 The See of Rome was recognised as the head of the church in the Western Empire. 
In the East, three sees were influential - Alexandria, Antioch and Constantinople, the latter 
becoming predominant as it was also the seat of the emperor. Consequently, the term Eastern 
Christianity refers to the numerous branches of the Christian faith that can be traced from the 
churches formed within the historical borders of the Byzantine Empire. This includes 
denominations on both sides of the theological divide after the Council of Chalcedon in 45 1. 
Two of the communities associated with specific Eastern Christian rites are the focus of this 
thesis - the Coptic Orthodox and the Maronites. Although the historical origins of these 
groups will be traced in the next chapter, it is helpful to provide a brief overview of the 
contemporary situation. The term Copt merely refers to the national identity of this 
community as it is derived from the Greek for Egypt - aigyptos .6 According to the 
government census, roughly 8% of the Egyptian population are Copts (five - six million). 
This issue has proven controversial as academic research suggests that they are only ý% of the 
population while expatriates claim probably inflated statistics of 15-20%. Regardless of the 
exact amount, there is no doubt that the Copts are the largest Christian community in the 
Middle East. They reside in all of the Egyptian regions and although there is a high 
concentration of Copts in Assiut and Minya provinces in Upper Egypt, they are not a majority 
in any area. Copts are still located in rural areas but many have been affected by the trend in 
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Egyptian society of migration to the cities. Furthermore, Copts are found in all social 
classes. Hence, in these ways, there are no obvious differences between Egyptian Copts and 
Muslims. However, a distinct Coptic identity remains strong. According to Pennington, 
97 "being a Copt is a characteristic virtually nobody who is born one casts aside'. This identity 
is often accentuated by using obvious Christian names and the tattooing of a cross on the right 
wrist. There is only one communal institution which includes the entire Coptic community 
and that is the subject of this study- the Coptic Orthodox Church. Itcanbetermeda 
national church in the sense that the vast majority of Egyptian Christians belong to it and 
there are few adherents outside the country who are not of Egyptian heritage. 
As with the Coptic community, there is wide debate over the actual size of the Maronite 
community in Lebanon. The only official figures available for all the Lebanese confessions 
are from the 1932 census. It is estimated that the Maronite community has declined to 
around 22% (around 600,000) and is no longer the largest confessional group in Lebanon. 8 
Yet due to the historic relationship between the Maronites and Mount Lebanon, it would be 
expected that they will continue to have a significant interest and influence on national affairs. 
Unlike Egypt, there are areas in Lebanon that can be identified as predominantly populated by 
members of specific groups. This was reinforced by events during the civil war which led to 
the division between so-called "Muslim" West Beirut (although Lebanese from all faiths 
continued to live there) and "Christian" East Beirut. While Maronite Christians can be found 
in many parts of Lebanon, they tend to be concentrated in residential areas such as Achrafiyeh 
and Gemmayze in Beirut and in the traditional refuge of Mount Lebanon including towns and 
villages in the following districts - Kesrouan, Jbeil and Metn. Similar to the Copts, 
Maronites can be found in both rural and urban areas and arc spread over a wide range of 
social classes. In a country where the political system is based on religious affiliation, it is 
unsurprising that confessional identity remains strong. Again, the Maronite Church is the 
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only credible institution which can unite the entire community. Although it is intricately 
linked to Lebanon, it does not enjoy dominance over the vast majority of the Lebanese 
Christian population as exercised by the Coptic Orthodox Church. Instead, several other 
Christian communities of varying strengths, are found in Lebanon e. g. Greek Orthodox, 
Greek Catholic and the Armenian Apostolic Church. However, the Maronite Church has 
long been the defender of the community and it is this role which will be examined in later 
chapters. 
Approaches to the study of Christianijy in the Middle East 
Research material on this field can generally be divided into the following categories - 
those which address the church from a historical and/or theological aspect, those which look 
at the community in the context of Christian-Muslim relations, often set within a minority 
discourse and finally, a small but growing proportion which analyse the political role of 
Christian institutions in the region. Three important sources which mostly fulfil all these 
categories by providing a general survey of Christianity in the Middle East can be identified. 
Jean-Pierre Valognes in Vie et Mort des Chr6tiens d'Orient (1994) provides an in-depth 
discussion on the general situation facing Christians in the region by using a helpful structure 
which allows him to focus not only on the different denominations but also on the 
communities in each country. The edited volume by Andrea Pacini, Christian Communities 
in the Arab Middle East: the Challenge of the Future (1998) offers an overview of the 
Christian communities in the entire region, identifying several challenges including the 
political situation, socioeconomic developments and emigration. Another edited work by 
Anthony O'Mahony, Eastern Christianily: Studies in Modem HistoIL Religion and Politics 
(2004) accentuates the need for an interdisciplinary approach to this subject in order to 
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achieve a true understanding of the situation of contemporary Christianity in the Middle East 
today. 
Material from the first category mentioned above focuses primarily on the history, faith and 
rite of the different churches within Eastern Christianity. On the Coptic Orthodox Church, 
the numerous works authored by the late Otto Meinardus cover in great detail the life of the 
church and its members e. g. Christian Egypt: Faith and Life (1970), Christian Egypt: 
Ancient and Modem (1977) and Two Thousand Years of Coptic Christiani1y (1999). Matti 
MoosainTheMaronitesinHisto (1986) presents a detailed account of the relationship 
between the church and the community throughout the ages. The second category examines 
the attempt of Christian communities to participate in the politics and society of the region. 
The Copts in EMtian Politics (1986) by B. L Carter depicts the various approaches 
employed by the Coptic community to achieve this aim of full equality with their Muslim 
compatriots. Walid Phares in Lebanese Christian Nationalism: The Rise and Fall of an 
Ethnic Resistance (1995) explores the activities of the Maronites - the only Christian 
community in the region to achieve access to state power until their political demise from the 
civil war period onwards. In some literature, the Christian communities are perceived as 
minorities living in a region dominated by another religion - Islam. For example, the study 
edited by Ofra Bengio and Gabriel Ben-Dor, Minorities and the State in the Arab World 
(1999) includes a chapter each on the Coptic Orthodox in Egypt and the Maronites in 
Lebanon. 
The final category examines the relationship between the churches and their relevant 
communities, suggesting that in some cases, the church hierarchy exercise temporal as well as 
spiritual authority. In Christians versus Muslims in Modem Eg3mt: the CentuOL-Lon 
Struggle for Coptic Egualit (2003), SS Hasan provides a fascinating account of the 
contemporary Coptic Orthodox Church illustrating the influence enjoyed by the church 
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hierarchy, especially Pope Shenouda, over the community. The unpublished Ph. D thesis by 
David Kerr, The Temporal Authori! y of the Maronite Patriarchate 1920-1958 :A Study in the 
Relationship of Religious and Secular Power (1973) makes crucial observations about the 
political role of the Maronite patriarch which are still relevant today. While works on these 
issues are increasing, this area of study is still severely under researched. The majority of the 
literature on these communities in the present day tends to focus on specific aspects e. g. 
communal relations in Egypt or the consequences of the Lebanese civil war on the Maronites. 
On the whole, references to the role of the church hierarchy in the community dwell on the 
spiritual dimension. Due to the sensitive nature of the subject area, some sources lose 
credibility as a result of partiality towards a certain group or vision of the future situation of 
the Christian communities. 
This study aims to redress some of these gaps. Firstly, it is hoped to achieve an accurate 
depiction of the situation of Christian communities in the Middle East, specifically the Coptic 
Orthodox and Maronites. In order to do so, the role of the church hierarchy must be 
analysed. This work seeks to develop further the contributions of the literature placed in the 
third category, focusing primarily on the political role of the patriarch in these Eastern 
Christian traditions. Recognition of fundamental changes such as emigration and the growth 
of the diaspora must also be examined in this context. Furthermore, there has been little 
attempt to connect this example of politicised religion to the wider issues concerning relations 
between religion and politics. By using this as a theoretical framework, it is hoped that 
Christianity in the Middle East can be rightfully introduced in to this ongoing debate. 
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Backaround to the Stud 
The discussion concerning the "appropriate" place of religion in the political sphere has 
raged for centuries yet still fails to provide a clear-cut answer acceptable to all. Views are 
varied and divergent. Following the ideas inherent in the Enlightenment which blamed 
religious institutions for the ruinous European wars of the past, some stress that religious 
beliefs prove only to be destructive. Religion has been relegated to the private sphere by 
those determined to keep it fully separate from politics. In contrast, believers of many faiths 
argue that their religion provides guidance for all aspects of life including the political arena. 
In some cases e. g. Islam, this is in the form of laws which must be adhered to. They also 
suggest that the loss of religious involvement in political affairs leads to a growing tendency 
to focus on individual gains rather than the welfare of the entire community, resulting in 
inequality, violence and lack of respect for others. 
According to the main tenets of the secularization thesis, the social significance of religion 
was expected to decline with the advent of modernization. As the modernization process was 
regarded as universal, secularization would affect all countries and regions. Yet, a glance at 
global politics from the late twentieth century onwards does not appear to correspond to this 
view. A few select examples include the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution, the US Christian 
Right movement in the United States, the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party which 
formed the Indian government from 1999 until 2004 and Islamic and Jewish militants in the 
Middle East. Those who hold that interaction between religion and politics leads only to 
violence and destruction can find plenty of evidence in the post-Cold War era. During this 
period, many conflicts have had religious connotations e. g. Northern Ireland, the Middle East, 
Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Kashmir and Sudan. 9 Actors in these conflicts frequently use 
religious beliefs and institutions as a means of legitimation. The use of an absolute message, 
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the identification of the enemy as evil and the ability to motivate adherents by appealing to a 
divine authority can lead to prolonged conflict, justify inhumane acts and provide severe 
obstacles to lasting peace. 
Yet not all involvement of religion in politics leads to conflict. Bruce suggests that moral 
authority, lack of self-interest, use of symbolism and the ability to be "honest brokers", allow 
religious actors to make a positive contribution to the political environment. 10 They can 
inspire and in some cases lead the opposition against repressive and authoritarian states. 
Liberation theology can be deemed an "extreme" illustration. A less controversial but 
equally significant example is the Zimbabwean Bishop of Bulawayo Pius Ncube who speaks 
out publicly against the policies of President Robert Mugabe. Hence in recent times, 
religious institutions have clearly been involved in campaigns for democracy e. g. Catholicism 
in Latin America and Poland while individuals have played key mediating roles including 
Mahatma Gandhi, Archbishop Tutu and Dr Martin Luther King Jnr. 11 Thegrowing 
significance of human rights and social justice in the international arena - important elements 
in many faiths - also ensures that religious actors feel compelled to participate in these 
matters. Islamic movements stress the importance of social justice and highlight the 
suffering of fellow Muslims in conflict zones such as Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir, West Bank 
and Gaza. 12 Statements from the Vatican, World Council of Churches and various national 
churches offer a critical voice on contemporary political issues ranging from globalization to 
conflict. Although there is no guarantee that other political actors will heed these appeals, 
this still illustrates the willingness of religious institutions to undertake one of their traditional 
political roles - the articulation of the concerns of the weak. From this discussion, it is clear 
that the political role of religion is "double-edged" - it can be the source of division or in 
contrast, serve to integrate society and uphold values. 13 Casanova summarises the 
contradictory attributes of religion, "religion showed its Janus face, as the carrier not only of 
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exclusive, particularist, and primordial identities but also of exclusive, universalist, and 
transcending ones". 14 
In the geographical area selected for this study - the Middle East - the social significance of 
religion remains strong in the twenty-first century. As the region is predominantly Muslim, 
Islarn remains influential in the political systems of many states. In several countries, the 
sharia (Islamic law) is enshrined in the constitution as a key source of legislation while in 
Iran, clerics occupy several key positions in the political system. Islamist movements such as 
the Muslim Brotherhood aim to participate in the electoral system while almost all political 
actors emphasise their Islamic credentials in order to gain legitimacy. The Middle East is 
also the birthplace of two other world faiths - Judaism and Christianity. Judaism continues 
to be intricately linked with national politics in Israel. Unsurprisingly in a state which was 
founded as a homeland for the Jewish people, religious parties have an influential role. The 
future of important Jewish sites such as the Temple Mount area has an impact on the peace 
process between Israel and the Palestinians. Regarding Christianity in the Middle East, any 
political role is normally confined to issues concerning the holy places in Jerusalem. In the 
past, these were addressed exclusively by the Vatican and several Western states. These 
actors have now been joined by representatives of the different denominations situated in the 
Holy Land. However, the political role of Christianity in the region does not need to be 
restricted to this aspect. The indigenous Christian communities in different states in the 
region also interact with political actors. By focusing on the Coptic Orthodox and Maronite 
communities, this study intends to demonstrate an alternative political role of Christianity in 
the Middle East. Before the political role of the two patriarchs can be explored, one must 
examine theoretical approaches to the relationship between religion and politics. 
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Approaches to the study of Religion and Politics 
The secularization thesis has long been the dominant theory in the social sciences in 
conceptualising the relationship between religion and politics. This approach can be divided 
into two strands. According to the Weberian perspective, the exposure of religion to reason 
erodes the power and influence of religious institutions. My thesis concentrates on the 
second strand which explains secularization as a consequence of functional differentiation. 
Originating in the work of Durkheim, the loss of the social role of religious institutions due to 
the fon-nation of specialized organizations would eventually lead to the decline of mass 
participation in organized religion. Karol Dobbelaere tenris this process "laicization" and 
explores the impact this had on religious institutions in his article, "Secularization :A Multi- 
Dimensional Concept" (1981). While remaining a proponent of the functional differentiation 
approach, he stresses that laicization will not necessarily follow a uniforin pattern but may 
vary depending on the cultural context. Steve Bruce has authored numerous books on 
secularization. In Religion and Modernization (1992), he suggests that the social significance 
of religion declines due to three aspects of the modernization process. These are social 
differentiation, societalization and rationalization. Similar to Dobbelaere, Bruce is also 
willing to accept that in certain circumstances namely cultural defence and cultural transition, 
religious institutions may retain short-term relevance. Expanding on this, Jose Casanova in 
Public Religions in the Modem World (1994) examines the different sub-theories of the 
secularization thesis, demonstrating that the deprivatization of religion is a recurrent theme 
despite the secularization process. 
However, traditional secularization theories have recently come under attack in the social 
sciences. Global events highlight that religious values and organizations are still prominent 
in many societies. Thus, several propositions have been developed to provide an explanation 
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for the continued role of religion in politics. The crisis of state thesis provides an explanation 
for the apparent absence of the secularization process in parts of the developing world. 
Several states have delivered neither economic development nor meaningful political 
participation. In some cases, governments have failed in their basic duty to provide security 
to their citizens. These problems are considered to allow religious institutions to remain at 
the heart of society. Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart in their influential contribution to this 
field, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide (2004), argue that there is a direct 
correlation between feelings of insecurity and the significance of religious beliefs and 
institutions. The effects of the globalization process on the developing world have also raised 
questions regarding the role of religion. It is argued that globalization stimulates local 
identities and can revitalize religious institutions which are seen to be the main representatives 
of indigenous culture. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1998) 
by Samuel Huntington is renowned for its claims that culture has become a major feature of 
the post-Cold War era, leading to the predominance of civilizations primarily identified by 
religious values at the potential expense of the nation state. The economic rational choice 
model can also contribute to this debate. Proponents of this theory propose that the 
modernization process is irrelevant concerning religious vitality. In "A Supply-Side 
Reinterpretation of the "Secularization" of Europe" (1994), Rodney Stark and Laurence 
lannaccone argue that instead of a decline in demand, the significance of religious beliefs and 
institutions varies due to changes on the supply-side. All four theories will now be examined 
in relation to the Coptic Orthodox and Maronite communities. However, it is suggested that 
this study will demonstrate that the crisis of state theory provides the most accurate 
explanation for the political role of the church, symbolised through the office of the patriarch. 
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Theoretical Framework 
Theojy One - The Secularization Thesis 
In the social sciences, the secularization thesis has long been regarded as the predominant 
theory in explaining the relation between religion and politics in modem society. Since the 
1970s, confusion over the central claims of this theory has resulted in strong criticism. 
However, it is by no means certain that there is a shared consensus on what secularization 
theory actually entails. Wilson emphasises the dangers of approaching the debate on the 
assumption that all participants agree on key concepts. 15 Casanova attempts to distinguish 
between the concept of "secular" and the actual theory of secularization. He traces the 
historical meaning from Canon Law where a religious person who returned to the world was 
deemed secular. Secularization was first used to describe the process of state control over the 
money, land and wealth of the church after the Protestant Reformation. According to 
Casanova, the term is now used when referring to the transferral of something from its 
traditional position in the religious sphere to the secular sphere. 16 
In his work exploring if one secularization paradigm exists or if there are several, 
Tschannen concludes that the key feature uniting all proponents of the theory is the belief that 
differentiation of institutions has occurred. 17 This proposition rests on the assumption that 
religious institutions were originally involved in almost all activities in society e. g. 
governance, labour, education, health as well as spiritual matters. Due to modernization, a 
process of laicization occurred which allowed new secular institutions to form and provide 
services in one particular field. This meant that the church as an institution was left solely 
with its primary duties i. e. attending to the spiritual needs of society rather than material ones. 
According to Dobbelaere, "As a consequence religion became an institution among other 
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institutions, and the Church an organisation among others". ' 8 According to the Weberian 
view, scientific knowledge in conjunction with industrialization and the modernization 
process offered the masses alternatives to the other-world explanations of events given by 
religious leaders. Furthermore, Berger suggests that the Judeo-Christian religious tradition, 
particularly Protestantism, actually encouraged the secularization process as these faiths 
distinguish the sacred sphere from the secular. 19 The Protestant Reformation can be viewed 
as extremely destructive to the political power of religion. This process undermined the unit, 
and the universal claims of the one Church and as a result, destroyed the medieval Christian 
system. This desacralised idea of the world allowed the two main spheres of modem society 
- states and markets - to gain dominance at the expense of religion. 
20 The Westphalian 
Settlement of 1648 aimed to end the destructive religious wars by adopting the principles of 
state sovereignty and endorsing the separation of religion and politics. 21 The rise of the 
modem capitalist economy changed the structure of social relations from local community to 
society where emphasis was placed on the individual rather than collective. Bruce argues 
that as religion draws its strength and resources from the community, the eclipse of the 
community has an adverse effect on religion. 22 By the nineteenth century, in Europe at least, 
religious institutions were perceived as having lost their dominance in the economic, political 
and social spheres. Thus, the core secularization thesis claims that due to this process of 
modernization, the social significance of religious authority has declined in modem society. 
Several other propositions are also associated with this theory. Casanova categoriscs these 
ideas into two subtheories - the decline of religious beliefs and practices and the privatization 
of religion. Inherent in Enlightenment thought was the belief that when confronted with 
rationalism, religion would lose its appeal to the individual. A combination of scientific 
breakthroughs and mass education would provide alternative explanations for events rather 
than those offered by religious institutions which tended to concentrate on mystic elements. 
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Following this approach, an accusation frequently levelled at the secularization approach is 
that it assumes that if religious beliefs remain at all, they will be extremely peripheral. There 
is a notion of a so-called Golden Age that existed in medieval Europe when society could be 
perceived as "religious" in contrast to today. An explanation given for this decline is the 
close connection between church and state which adversely affected the legitimacy of the 
religious institutions. The contrasting religious vitality in the United States is ascribed to the 
historical separation of church and state. It is clearly difficult to find an agreed method to 
measure this apparent decline of religious beliefs and practices. Membership, Sunday School 
attendance and financial contributions are often used but there is no consensus on a ranking 
system. It would appear that, particularly in Western Europe, secularization has occurred in 
what Bruce calls visible terms i. e. there has been a decline in involvement in religious 
institutions, the influence of these institutions and the popularity and effect of religious 
beliefs. 23 Yet, a sense of religious identity still appears to exist. However, as explored 
earlier, in order for the secularization thesis to be valid, it is not necessary for religious beliefs 
to become extinct, merely that religious institutions no longer have significant influence on 
other spheres. 
Casanova's final category is the privatization of religion i. e. its relegation to the private 
sphere. Beyer defines this "to mean that traditional religion was now primarily the concern 
of the individual and had therefore lost much of its "public" relevance". 24 This theory of 
privatization has been challenged by the apparent resumption of a public role by religion. 
Casanova suggests that deprivatization is an equally valid possibility, where religion has 
refused to accept the marginal role allocated to it. 25 A major problem with the privatization 
theory is the assumption that the correct place of religion is in the private sphere. Drawing 
on Enlightenment thought, religion is seen as a private matter because freedom of conscience 
is viewed as the first fundamental freedom immune from government intervention. The idea 
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of a clear separation between public and private is also a contentious issue. While this may 
be possible in theory, it is much more difficult to attain in reality. Instead, all the spheres 
tend to influence and affect each other, often sharing a symbiotic relationship. According to 
Beyer, "institutions in the public sphere have privatized features and those in the private 
sphere have public ones". 26 However, many of the activities undertaken by religious 
institutions tend to be campaigns in aid of "secular" causes e. g. combating poverty, ending 
conflict etc. Wilson suggests that this indicates that religious institutions have "given up on 
prayer alone" and are willing to use a variety of means to achieve these different goals. 27 
Involvement in the political sphere also affects the religious movement. As Casanova states, 
"The more religion wants to transform the world in a religious direction, the more religion 
becomes entangled in "worldly" affairs and is transformed by the world". 28 Hence, this 
increased public role for religion can in fact, be seen as contributing towards secularization. 
Once again, it is important to note that the secularization thesis does not assert that 
privatization of belief must occur or that it is irreversible. 
Unsurprisingly, representatives of many of the world faiths have been amongst the main 
critics of the secularization thesis. One point of contention is that key ideas are shaped by the 
Enlightenment critique of religion. The overwhelming assumption of this period was that the 
power of religious institutions would erode once their beliefs were exposed to reason. 
Modernization tended to be equated with secularism and backward traditionalism with 
religion. This approach was continued by later thinkers such as Marx who described religion 
as a "sigh of the oppressed creature" -a consolation to the suffering experienced by the 
masses. 29 Hence, most religions tend to reject aspects of secularization which are traced 
directly to the hostile ideas of some liberal thinkers. 
Furthermore, although the secularization thesis may appear to provide an accurate account 
of the declining role of religion in political matters in Europe, this does not seem to have been 
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replicated in other parts of the world. Yet as many believe that modernization has occurred 
on a global scale, one would consequently expect the secularization process to be universal. 
One of the faiths which challenge this assumption is Islam. Indeed, Zebiri states that 
Muslims see secularism as a Christian/Western phenomenon. It is argued that some 
characteristics of Christianity including monasticism, a clear division between the possessions 
of God and Caesar and the division of the community into clergy or laity, combined with the 
historical context of religious intolerance and hostility to intellectual discoveries has left it 
susceptible to the secularization process. In contrast, Islam is not affected by these problems 
as the sharia the Islamic legal code regulates all aspects of life and does not recognise the 
separation of politics and religion. 30 Consequently, Muslims tend to reject any 
modernization process which includes this separation. Yet in reality, this apparent duality of 
religion and politics can be disentangled. Although the Prophet Mohammed established both 
religious and political communities, it does not necessarily follow that these are the same 
entity. 31 An-Naim argues that the concept of the Islamic state can be contested as it is not a 
theocracy but instead the human interpretation of divine sources. "It is, rather, a human 
attempt to apply religious values to political, social and economic affairs". 32 Islamic history 
also shows a clear divide between political rulers and the caliphate, which was often 
manipulated to suit the needs of rulers. If based solely on the belief that there is no 
separation of religion and politics, claims that Islam unlike Christianity is not susceptible to 
the secularization process may turn out to be mistaken. However, it is clear that this view is 
widely held in contemporary Muslim society and is frequently used to explain why the 
secularization thesis seems to be confined to the Christian West. 
If, as the proponents of the secularization thesis believe, Christianity is powerless when 
confronted by the secularization process, can there be any alternative to churches losing social 
significance? Unlike Islam and Judaism, Christianity does not have a rigid and coded 
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religious law that governs the conduct of believers. Instead, the teaching of Jesus, "Give to 
Caesar what is Caesar's, and to God what is God's", (Matthew 22: 2 1)33 is seen to indicate that 
Christianity can co-exist with any political system as long as the practice of the faith is not 
threatened. Furthermore, Bruce argues that the early Christian experience of persecution 
under the Roman Empire allowed Christianity to accept the separation of church and state. 34 
Yet, not all branches of Christianity have shared the same experiences as the Western 
churches. Eastern Christianity underwent a very different historical process - one which 
denied it political power but allowed it to remain a key aspect of identity for Middle East 
Christians. Christianity in the Middle East enjoyed only a short period of power - when it 
was declared the official religion of the Roman Empire in the fourth century until the Arab 
Conquest in the early seventh century. 35 Even during this time, the damaging theological 
splits meant that many of the Christians in the Middle East did not associate their church with 
the ruling Byzantine power. Instead, those opposed to the teachings of the Council of 
Chalcedon were frequently persecuted. The Arab conquest effectively halted the ability of 
Eastern Christianity to seek political power as the new empire was based on another religion - 
Islam. The separation from the Western church was so severe that Gregory III argues that 
Middle East Christians could be called the Church of Islam, in the sense that their historical 
experience was very much entwined with the history of the Islamic empires. 36 Even during 
periods when Western Christianity was able to regain a foothold in the region, this did not 
translate into political power for the Eastern churches. For example, during the Crusader era, 
only those Christians who favoured Rome experienced any benefits from the change of 
rulers. 37 The short-lived success of the Crusader Kingdoms meant that the history of 
Christianity in the Middle East was essentially one of religious communities living under a 
political system based on the values of another overtly political religion. 
20 
The millet system used by Islamic rulers to govern non-Muslims, allowed the Eastern 
churches to retain control over all aspects of life for their communities. Individuals were 
only recognised by the state through their belonging to a group. The ethnic groups 
categorised by their religion were defined as millet. The term strictly meant nation but did 
not have any political connotations, instead being used as an organisational structure. 38 
Originally, three millet were formed - Muslim, Christian and Jewish. The patriarch was the 
natural choice to be the head of the Christian group. However in keeping with the dhimmi 
system, the Muslim millet was by far the dominant one. Eastern Christians never 
experienced the absolute political power enjoyed by Westem Christianity in medieval Europe. 
Even in the case of the Maronites who gained access to political office, this was still in 
coexistence with Muslims. Thus, they had no possibility of attaining the extent of state 
power acquired by the church in Europe and thus escaped the consequent revolt against the 
church state system. There has been debate within the Christian communities over the 
political role of the church hierarchy but the privatization of the Christian faith in the Middle 
East did not occur as was widely experienced in the West. Instead, patriarchs from some 
traditions were able to retain aspects of civil authority over their communities e. g. jurisdiction 
over personal status courts and recognition as the spokesman for the group in representing 
their interests to the ruling authorities. 
The uneven process of modemisation in the Middle East has not been accompanied by a 
clear separation of religion and politics. Concerning the two case study countries, certainly 
neither Egypt nor Lebanon can be defined as theocracies. Both goverriments exist separately 
from religious institutions and mostly consist of lay figures. Clearly, religious leaders, 
regardless of affiliation, cannot be categorised as actors within the ruling political system in 
the sense that they are not invited to take policy decisions on all goveniment matters. Any 
political involvement takes place because of their role as leader of a religious community. 
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Yet, it is doubtful if this represents a secular state and society as exists in the West. For 
example, the Egyptian constitution clarifies that the Islamic sharia law is "the principle 
source of legislation" and that Islam is the official state religion. 39 The government also 
appoints key Islamic representatives such as the Grand Sheikh of al-Azhar (an extremely 
important and prestigious post in Sunni Islam) and the Mufti of Egypt and finances Islamic 
institutions. In Lebanon, the independent state has been unable to foster a sense of Lebanese 
identity which is robust enough to overcome confessional allegiance. Government and 
public service posts continue to be allocated according to confession rather than ability. 
Clearly in this region, the social significance of religion has remained steadfast. On the other 
hand, the representative role of church leaders was clearly challenged in the twentieth century. 
In Egypt, the success of the Wafd in the political system adversely affected the political 
power of the church. In Lebanon, Christians were able to participate fully in the political 
system and were allocated political posts unprecedented in the region. Yet when these so- 
called "secular" means of representation failed, an element of deprivatization occurred, 
allowing the Coptic Orthodox and Maronite churches to rejuvenate their political role. 
The secularization thesis is still helpful when examining the political role of religion in the 
Middle East. It can be argued that the modernization process is still ongoing in the region. 
In the West, the same process evolved gradually over many centuries until a clearly secular 
state emerged. According to Thomas, one of the conditions required to achieve this was to 
dispossess Christianity of its public features. "This invention of religion as a set of privately 
held doctrines or beliefs, was necessary for the rise of the modem state as well as the 
development of modem international society". 40 In the developing world, modernisation and 
consequently secularization was expected to happen almost overnight. The fact that it has 
not does not mean that it will never occur. The continual presence of religion in the political 
sphere is ascribed to a backlash to modernization (as suggested by the globalization thesis 
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discussed below). In this sense, no region or religion is perceived as immune to the process. 
Again Thomas argues that after this transitional period to a modem society when all the 
benefits of modernization are experienced, Islam, just like Christianity, will undergo changes 
and eventually, become privatized. 41 This change in environment would also impact on the 
traditional temporal power of the Christian churches in the region. In this context, a secular 
political system would be able to fulfil all the needs of the population, leaving religious 
institutions to concentrate exclusively on spiritual matters. Another possibility is that the 
modernization process in this region has resulted in enough differentiation of the spheres to 
deprive religion, notably Islam of the political power enjoyed by religious leaders in the past. 
Religious institutions have been challenged in the political and economic arenas. As outlined 
above, the decline of religious beliefs or the privatization of religion are not compulsory 
components of the secularization thesis. There is no reason why one society which has 
experienced secularization must necessarily resemble another society in the same position. 
This leads to the first hypothesis. 
Using the secularization thesis, it might be expected that the political role ofthe patriarch 
would decline with a corresponding increase in the benefits derivedfrom the modernization 
process. If these benefits have not been widely experienced, the secularising impact is likely 
to be minimal, thus allowing the patriarch to retain his historical role as the spiritual and 
civil representative ofthe community. 
Theojy Two - The "Crisis of State" Thesis 
Religion is often perceived as becoming politicised when there is a crisis of state. 
Increasing awareness of the limits of modernisation and subsequent disenchantment has 
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resulted in questions of meaning and identity being given as much importance as material and 
economic issues. This affects both the developed and developing world. To many, Western 
society has become synonymous with violence, poverty, injustice and the breakdown of the 
family. In fact, Huntington states that the West is seen as "materialistic, corrupt, decadent, 
and immoral". 42 To those in the developing world, this situation is often ascribed to the 
consequences of secularisation. This argument states that in their societies, religion acts to 
unite the community and provide social order, avoiding the problems experienced in the 
West. 43 
Yet, it is clear that the developing world also suffers from a crisis of state although this 
takes a different form from those experienced in more developed countries. The failure to 
deliver development and democracy is widespread, particularly in Muslim countries. 
Economic development has failed to keep up with population growth, leading to increasing 
domestic inequality. The state tends to be bureaucratic, inefficient and unable to respond to 
these problems. Modernization has not resulted in the expected benefits. According to 
Murden, "For far too many Middle Easterners, modernization meant an urban experience of 
poverty, underemployment, poor housing and services, and few prospects". 44 This social 
crisis has been coupled with the failure to provide political participation. Instead, these states 
are often characterised. by authoritarianism, patrionionialisin and corruption. 
Norris and Inglehart expand on these ideas in their hypothesis of secularization based on 
Existential Security. 45 They argue that individuals expect the provision of "human security" 
to be a key achievement of the state. Human security is defined as the lack of immediate risk 
to personal safety e. g. violence, natural/mamnade disasters, disease and poverty. In poorer 
states, a significant proportion of the population are vulnerable to these threats. However, in 
post-industrial societies, conditions greatly improve as even the most vulnerable groups in 
society are covered to some extent by health and social services. While economic 
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development is a prerequisite to attain this level of human security, industrialization alone is 
not enough. Without the transition to a post-industrial phase, socioeconomic inequalities 
pose an extremely visible threat to stability. Norris and Inglehart demonstrate that there is a 
general correlation between the removal of immediate risks and the decline of religiosity in a 
specific society. This fits into the Weberian view of the secularisinginfluence of wealth. 
However, this trend can also be halted or reversed if threats re-emerge e. g. natural disasters. 
Applying this approach to the Middle East, most countries have experienced aspects of 
modernization. However, it has proved an uneven process and served to heighten 
socioeconomic inequality. The perception of vulnerability remains strong whether from 
violence or, more frequently, poverty. While the modernization process may have a mixed 
record, the region has clearly not reached the postmaterialist phase. The transition to a 
capitalist economy concentrating on the individual rather than the community has not 
occurred to the same extent as in the West. As religion tends to draw support from the 
community, it is unsurprising that religion continues to enjoy social significance in this 
society. In contrast to the numerous ideologies championed by regimes, religious institutions 
have remained steadfast and provided enduring values. According to Dark, "Religious 
beliefs, and values are usually among those most deeply held, and most formative in the 
actions of individuals" . 
46 Disillusionment with the products of modernization can be 
regarded as a key factor behind the general religious revival in the Middle East. People have 
turned to an indigenous and authentic identity which offers answers to the many concerns 
faced by them. Throughout this Muslim majority region, the response of many Muslims has 
been to support religious movements which proclaim that Islam can provide a solution to 
these ills. The success of these organisations in fulfilling the duties of the state e. g. social 
and welfare services ensures that politicised religion is seen as a viable alternative to the 
existing discredited policies. 
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The crises detailed above affect all citizens of the region, regardless of religious affiliation. 
For Christians, the failure of Arab nationalism to deliver its promises once in power was 
especially significant, as they had long depended on this route to attain equality. Instead, 
little progress towards full citizenship was made. Coupled with the failure to provide 
material benefits, Christian backing for the ideology they had long supported began to wane. 
The growth of political Islam as the main opposition to existing regimes heightened 
perceptions of vulnerability, e. g. increased communal tension, the potential curtailment of 
rights under an Islamic regime. With few alternatives, Christians, like their Muslim 
compatriots, have also turned to a religious institution to provide comfort during this difficult 
period. While certainly not a return to Christianity as the Middle Eastern Christian 
population has always retained its religious identity, it is evident that some communities 
expect the church to adopt a pro-active role regarding their concerns. Aware of the situations 
faced by their adherents, many of the Eastern churches have been able to step into the vacuum 
left by the failure of the state to meet the needs of its people. On a practical level, church 
organisations, like Islamist movements, have continued to provide social services for their 
communities e. g. schools, hospitals, employment aid and charity. The lack of political 
representation has also offered an opportunity for church leaders to undertake a more overt 
political role by acting as the main representatives of their community to the government and 
society in general. The increased role of Eastern churches in politics does not have the same 
aims as Islamic revival movements. Rather than wishing to seize power or change the 
fundamental values of society, the core aim of this political activism is to articulate the rights 
and needs of the Christian communities. Similarly, the churches in the Middle East have a 
more ambiguous relationship with the West than Islam, especially those communities that 
share links with Western Christianity e. g. the Eastern Catholic churches. 
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Regarding the selected case studies, it is clear that both Egypt and Lebanon are experiencing 
crises of state which have particular resonance for the Coptic and Maronite communities 
respectively. The inability of the Egyptian government to tackle socioeconomic problems 
combined with the general feeling among Copts of alienation from political participation are 
factors which can be seen as contributing towards the strength of the Coptic Orthodox Church 
as the leading communal institution. Under Patriarch Shenouda, various trends can be noted 
- the expansion of the church social network, emphasis on Coptic identity and participation 
confined to church activities. Feelings of insecurity are also heightened with each new 
incident of Christian-Muslim tension. Unlike Egypt, Lebanon has never enjoyed what could 
be termed a strong state. In fact, Lebanon experienced the ultimate crisis of state - civil war. 
Although the Maronite Church as an institution was also perceived as weak during the 
conflict years, unlike the state, it has recovered its legitimacy under Patriarch Sfeir. While it 
has expanded into social work, the main role of the Maronite Church in the post-war era has 
been to provide guidance to the apparently leaderless Christian, especially Maronite 
community. Ongoing instability in the country since the assassination of former Prime 
Minister Rafiq al-Hariri has increased feelings of vulnerability especially amongst Christians 
who have been the primary targets of the series of bomb attacks in Lebanon during 2005. 
The Lebanese confessional system also serves to accentuate religious ties in the political 
sphere, thus ensuring that religious identity remains a key factor. 
According to the crisis ofstate approach, in this context ofa 'failed environment", it would 
be expected that Christian institutions wouldfill the vacuum left by the state by addressing 
spiritual andpractical concerns through theirpositions asprotectors of Christian identity 
andprovidersofservices. The easing ofthe multiple political, socioeconomic and security 
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crises affecting the region would be likely to create an environment where secular lay 
leadership could re-emerge at the expense of the patriarch. 
Theojy Three - The Globalization Thesis 
The ongoing multilayered process of globalization can also be held accountable for the 
continuance of politicised religion, especially in the developing world. Scholte defines 
globalization as "processes whereby many social relations became relatively detached from 
territorial geography, so that human lives are increasingly played out in the world as a single 
place". 47 It is this trend of deterritorialization which distinguishes globalization from 
previous forms of internationalization. It is closely connected to the modernization thesis 
suggesting that radical social change due to the spread of capitalism and technology will 
result in a new type of society. These processes impact in all areas of society including 
economic, political and cultural. The exclusive authority of the nation state has been severely 
challenged by the global economy and the widespread availability of communication and 
information technology. Non-state actors are able to take part in areas previously reserved 
for the state including not only healthcare but also high politics such as war and peace. 
Furthermore, the abundance of transnational organizations is claimed to restrict the 
independence of the nation state. The globalization process appears to have heightened and 
highlighted the inequality gap both within countries and between different areas of the world. 
In the developing world, the pursuit of market capitalism often destroys local economies and 
illustrates the inability of governments to pursue policies that aid their citizens. There is also 
widespread concern that globalization is really just another form of Western imperialism and 
poses a severe threat to indigenous identities and cultures. The hostility towards some of the 
ills associated with globalization - both material e. g. unemployment, wage cuts and cultural 
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e. g. influx of Western products and lifestyle - means that the periphery in this globalised 
world tries to respond to these challenges by turning to institutions which are seen as the 
opposite to the dangerous Western influence and instead represent their indigenous culture. 
Frequently, religious movements undertake this role. 
Globalization has had a major impact on the ability of religious movements to play a more 
public role. It encourages multiple identities. This allows a member of a specific faith 
community to accentuate this identity while remaining loyal to the nation state. These links 
can strengthen weak states by connecting them to powerful networks. In other cases, 
religious movements will be regarded as a rival to the state. This can lead to open 
competition with the state or compel the government to use religious institutions to maintain 
legitimacy for their rule. The ability of religion to provide a collective identity as well as the 
universal appeal of many faiths, ensures that religious communities are one of the oldest 
transnational actors. Allegiance and activity is on a global scale rather than confined within 
specific territorial boundaries. Examples include the Vatican, Islamic organizations e. g. 
Islamic Conference, religious NGOs and different denominations of world faiths. 
Religious movements have also been key beneficiaries of some of the major tools of 
globalization - communications and information technology. It is this element of the 
globalization process which clearly distinguishes it from other historical eras. In the twenty- 
first century, developments in transport have made frequent travel possible for many while the 
information revolution has ensured that through television and the internet, events in one part 
of the world are viewed in "real-time" by citizens in another region while dispersed groups 
can keep instantly in touch by electronic mail and internet chat sites. People quickly become 
aware of the fate of their co-religionists around the world and call for a response from 
national and international actors. Discussing appeals from Muslims to aid their fellow 
believers in conflict zones such as Palestine, Bosnia and Chechnya, Piscatori asserts that we 
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have witnessed "the raising of the umma consciousnesSii. 48 Globalization has not only 
allowed religious groups to maintain a collective identity no matter where its adherents are 
located but in fact, often served to revitalise the entire community. Religious movements 
have adapted their methods to gain from such technology. For example, the Christian Right 
in the United States is renowned for its televangelism. Many Islamist movements use 
electronic communications to maintain contact with scattered followers. Even groups which 
advocate the return to a "Golden Age" tend to use modem resources such as the internet in 
their attempt to achieve this aim. In the developing world, religious movements have 
increasingly been seen to provide a voice for the marginalised - those in society who have not 
experienced the benefits that globalization was expected to bring. Thomas states that "It is 
argued that global resurgence of religion is more about increasing the political power of 
marginalised communities rather than bringing "religion" into Politi&9.49 
Another major impact of globalization on religion has been the growing awareness of the 
importance of culture. The process results in a move towards universalism yet also 
accentuates particularism. Robertson states that it is a two-fold process, the "interpenetration 
of the universalization of particularism and the particularization of universalism". 50 The 
belief that one global culture would emerge has so far proved to be utopian and instead, local 
cultures appear to have been reinvigorated. Religion is often a core element of a specific 
culture. In the developing world, it has frequently been used to illustrate an indigenous 
heritage to justify anti-colonial struggles for independence. Jurgensmeyer suggests that in 
Muslim countries, Islam is regarded as a "culturally liberating force" which contributed 
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greatly to successfully achieving independence. In general, the predominant reaction of 
religious movements to the challenges raised by the globalization process has been to act as 
the defender of the specific culture. 
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This is mainly due to the perception that indigenous cultures are under threat from a new 
Western onslaught - one which poses more long-term damage than the traditional methods of 
colonialism - invasion and occupation. Through television, tourism, films and music, the 
ability to maintain separate identities is greatly challenged. The growth in the international 
human rights discourse adds to the belief that the West is continually intervening in affairs of 
sovereign states in other regions. As the globalization process originated in the West, many 
non-western societies have felt unable to distinguish between modernization and 
Westernization and frequently view it as yet another aspect of imperialism. Disenchantment 
with the costs (especially cultural) of the material benefits of globalization has become a 
factor in the rejection of Westernization and the search for a more authentic culture. A 
concerted effort has been made to resist Western cultural hegemony. Religion can emphasise 
a collective identity by dividing society into insiders and outsiders. Another argument 
frequently used is that the so-called moral decay of the West has been prevented elsewhere 
due to fidelity to religious values. In some cases, this has been ascribed to the superiority of 
the other religion by its followers e. g. Muslims commenting on the role of Islam. Although 
contradictory to the above argument, cultural relativism has also been used by the ruling elite 
of particular cultures as part of their resistance to Western universalism. They highlight their 
different religious experiences to justify values which are different from those respected by 
the West e. g. a particular view of human rights. For example, some Muslim countries claim 
to derive their values from the sharia - Islamic law. Western values are perceived as rooted 
in its secular heritage and applicable only in that region. " There are certainly some 
weaknesses in this argument. Some leaders use these ideas to justify repression within their 
state while there is also debate regarding the origins of so-called religious traditions. In the 
Islamic case, many values held can be traced to the traditional heritage of each region rather 
than the actual tenets of the faith. However, it is certain that these claims are widely 
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respected in the specific regions. Religion has been able to reassert itself in the identity 
struggles which are being experienced in this era of globalisation. This has led commentators 
such as Kepel to claim that, perhaps contrary to what was initially expected, globalization has 
in fact stimulated the public role of religion and that what he terms the "revenge of God" can 
be viewed as a side effect of modernization. 53 However, others including Bruce regard this 
role as protector of a specific culture as a short-term phenomenon which will decline once the 
threat has either conquered or been defeated. 54 While this may indeed be the case, the 
struggle certainly appears likely to be ongoing in the near future. 
A key work regarding the relationship between religion and culture is Huntington's Clash of 
Civilizations. This influential thesis suggests that culture is the main distinction between 
societies in the post Cold War era. Thus, the power of nation states will increasingly be 
directed towards a wider culture i. e. they will act as "agents of Civilizations". 55 
Consequently, realignment in international alliances will occur to reflect these changes. 
Huntington divides the world into civilizations including Western, Islam, Confucian and 
Orthodox. While some of his categories have been criticised, the above mentioned do appear 
to give credence to this theory. What is certain is that the specific religious heritage in these 
regions can be seen to have influenced society and politics. Consequently, this will 
frequently result in confrontational relations, particularly as co-operation within civilizations 
increases. Huntington suggests that this will include "civilizational rallying" when members 
of one civilization aid their coreligionists who reside within another civilizational group. An 
example is the aid given by some Muslim states and organisations to their coreligionists 
engaged in conflicts against non-Muslims such as in Palestine, Lebanon, Bosnia, Chechnya 
and Kashmir. 56 According to this approach, religion will maintain its traditional ties to a 
particular culture, and in the case of the non-Western civilizations, can take a leading role in 
the struggle to assert an authentic culture separate from the West. 
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Huntington's approach tends to see each civilization as homogenous with conflict occurring 
in torn states which are split between different civilizations. For example, he describes the 
civil war in Lebanon as a fault line war where the participants belonged to different 
civilizations - the West and Islam. 
57 However, Christianity in the Middle East does not 
naturally fall into one civilization. Catholic and Protestant rites tend to identify with the 
West, while others, particularly the Oriental and Orthodox churches could be viewed as part 
of the Orthodox civilization. It is also unclear whether the Eastern Churches find outside 
support helpful. The Eastern Churches are not necessarily Western oriented and like their 
Muslim neighbours, are keen to keep an authentic cultural identity separate from the West. 58 
It can be argued that on matters of culture, some Eastern Christians actually identify with the 
Islamic civilization as they share the same historical experiences. 
59 Thus, it is possible that 
their religious identity as Christians can co-exist with their cultural attachments to the Arab 
world, rather than requiring outside aid from co-religionists from a different culture. In the 
past, Western powers have intervened supposedly on behalf of Christian communities in the 
region. This would appear to be representative of Huntington's "civilizational rallying" but 
now is more likely to occur amongst diaspora communities rather than states. 
Clearly, religious identity has maintained its importance in the Middle East, regardless of 
the specific affiliation. In Egypt, loyalty to the Coptic Orthodox Church while not 
necessarily being incompatible with loyalty to the state can be seen as at the expense of the 
state which is generally perceived as failing the needs of the community. Likewise, Maronite 
alienation from the ruling elite (both Muslim and Christian) has also allowed the Maronite 
Church to challenge the authority of the state. Although both denominations are closely 
connected to a specific country, they can now be termed transnational due to the dispersal of 
followers to all areas of the globe. As will be explored in Chapter Six, diaspora groups make 
use of modem communications to highlight their cause. The use of recent technological 
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advances has allowed these communities to retain ties with the home church. Both churches 
have concentrated efforts on electronic resources. Each patriarchate has its own website 
providing the latest information on the activities of the hierarchy. Churches and 
organisations both at home and abroad are encouraged to develop websites. It is also 
recognised that using such technology helps to maintain interest amongst the youth. 
An increase in the public role of religion in the Middle East would seem a plausible 
response to both the socioeconomic and cultural impact of globalization. This is likely to 
affect Christians as well as Muslims. Religious institutions can provide a sense of identity 
and belonging. Transnational belonging also becomes important as communities seek to 
acquire stronger friends to help safeguard their existence. This could either be individual 
states such as the United States or diaspora groups. In some cases, this apparent 
identification with the West could lead to friction with both the ruling authorities and society. 
Using the above approach, it would be expected that the backlash to the globalization process 
would allow the church to lead the response of the community as it is thefocalpoint of 
communal identity. The tools ofthe communications revolution would also serve to revitalise 
the church, allowing the patriarch to retain control ofthe entire community regardless of 
geographical location. Accordingly, the identification ofthe church with the indigenous 
culture of the community would enable thepatriarch to sustain a durable temporal dimension 
to his position. 
Theory Four - The Rational Choice Thesis 
The final theory to be examined is the rational choice approach. This method assumes that 
people choose their religious affiliation in the same manner as other life choices. According 
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to Iannaccone, people "approach all actions in the same way, evaluating costs and benefits 
960 and acting so as to maximise their net benefits' . When making a decision concerning their 
involvement in a religious institution, an individual would take account of the "input" 
required, especially the amount of time and money needed to become an accepted member of 
the group. Participation is also affected by constraints. These could be the extent of 
sufficient financial resources or knowledge and intellectual understanding required to 
successfully integrate into the religious community. Finally, the individual would also 
consider the potential rewards available after joining the group. These incentives cover 
benefits in this life e. g. sense of belonging, spiritual comfort, fellowship and promises 
concerning the afterlife (which vary depending on the chosen religious institution) . 
61 This 
use of market language to describe the sacred has led to a fierce debate among sociologists. 
Proponents of using the rational choice approach to explain the behaviour of religious 
institutions, who include Stark, Bainbridge, Finke and Iannaccone, have declared that it is a 
serious challenger to a discredited secularization thesis. Their approach has attracted 
criticism from Bruce, Herbert, Norris and Inglehart amongst others who question both the 
methodology used and its credentials as a separate paradigm. Two key models can be 
identified from the literature concerning rational choice and religious vitality. 
The model proposed by Stark and Bainbridge assumes that individuals make a rational 
decision concerning their religious affiliation. However any decision will be perceived as a 
risk in the sense that one cannot guarantee the outcome. The motives for religious adherence 
are divided into two categories - distant rewards (i. e. in the afterlife) and compensators (i. e. 
present benefits - both supernatural and material). This approach highlights that religious 
affiliation is often at least partly motivated by material gains e. g. friendship, status, sense of 
belonging or social services. This also means that social sanctions will be influential in 
ensuring continued allegiance rather than depending solely on religious belief. For example, 
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leaving a religious institution will have a major impact on the life of a person whose social 
network is almost entirely related to this group. Similarly, in some communities, the loss of 
status associated with leaving could have an adverse effect on personal and business relations. 
Thus, these potential consequences are likely to be taken into consideration by an individual 
when deciding on their future involvement with a religious institution. 
This approach is criticised by scholars who object to explaining religious participation 
solely as a logical decision by an individual and thus ignoring the importance of religious 
beliefs. According to Bruce, its main presumption is that people "do not turn to 
9 62 transcendental concerns unless thwarted in their pursuit of material rewards' . 
He argues 
that many religious believers cite spiritual reasons for their involvement in religious 
institutions. Young also adds that non-rational experience is at the heart of all religion. 63 
This is illustrated through the use of symbolic rites and belief in the supernatural. The ability 
of individuals to freely choose their religion is also questioned. For many people, their 
religious affiliation is already identified at their birth and in many cultures, it is difficult to 
change this membership. 64 Decisions about religious choice are not made in a vacuum. 
Both personal beliefs and the cultural environment are likely to be influential. While 
material benefits may certainly help attract people to a specific religious group (and also serve 
to maintain their loyalty), spiritual reasons are still acknowledged as the main reason for 
religious participation by most individuals. 
Another feature of the rational choice approach is to examine religious vitality from the 
supply side rather than the normal demand led approach. It is proposed that contrary to the 
key proposition of the secularization thesis, modernization does not adversely affect religious 
institutions. Instead, demand for religion depends on market conditions. Continuing with 
market language, religious institutions are defined as firms. "Religious firms are social 
enterprises whose primary purpose is to create, maintain and supply religion to some set of 
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individuaIS". 65 In brief, the rational choice model suggests that the greater the choice of 
religious goods, the more competition will occur, resulting in the stimulation of the religious 
market. Thus, Iannaccone states that religious institutions must cater for the needs of the 
population or face declining numbers. "In competitive environments, religions have little 
choice but to abandon inefficient modes of production and unpopular products in favour of 
more attractive and profitable alternatives". 66 However, if one institution enjoys a monopoly 
through institutionalised relations with the state, this will lead to decreased adherence overall. 
The emergence of alternative groups will be hindered by the preference of the state towards 
one institution e. g. favourable legislation, financial aid. Yet, as the religious needs of people 
differ according to their individual preference, monopolies will find it difficult to fulfil all the 
requirements of all the population and consequently, suffer a decline in the number of 
adherents. Finke suggests that "because of the underlying differentiation of consumer 
preferences, religious competition and pluralism will thrive unless regulated by the state". 67 
In this way, rational choice theorists seek to explain the apparent difference in religiosity in 
the United States and Western Europe. They argue that Europe is not as "secularized" as 
statistics may suggest. Instead, the low level of mobilization is attributed to the prevalence of 
established churches. In contrast, the United States Constitution clearly separates church and 
state and has ensured that no denomination is given preference by the state . 
68 Thus, the 
rational choice approach provides an explanation for the decline of religious institutions that 
is not connected to the secularization thesis. It argues that a clear pattern emerges after a new 
church has been established. As this church continues to grow, it is confronted by a dilemma 
- either to maintain its strict beliefs that often dissuade others from joining or to 
accommodate some of the norms of society which risks alienating its core members. In most 
cases, a compromise solution is reached which provides space for a new conservative group to 
form. Thus, this approach argues that conservative religious institutions are likely to enjoy 
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religious vitality while liberal variations will decline in popularity. According to Collins, 
"Liberal religion is constantly dying, while conservative religion is being reborn". 69 
Several criticisms have been made of these assertions. Firstly, the suitability of the 
methodology used by rational choice theorists has been questioned as too limited. The 
majority of studies focus on specific communities in the United States and Europe and 
concentrate on the nineteenth and twentieth century. Thus, there is doubt as to how relevant 
these findings are to the wider debate on religious vitality. There is also concern that the 
evidence does not necessarily support some of the claims made by proponents of rational 
choice . 
70 Secondly, various studies have demonstrated that religious pluralism is not a 
significant factor in explaining religious participation. In his study of the Baltic states, Bruce 
illustrates that a combination of cultural pluralism and minimal state interference can lead to 
less not more interest in religion. 71 Researching European post-industrial countries with a 
Catholic heritage, Norris and Inglehart found that religious participation was higher in Italy 
and Ireland where the Catholic Church enjoys a monopoly compared to the more pluralist 
societies of the Netherlands and France - completely contrary to the predictions of the supply- 
demand approach. 72 Furthermore, history has shown that some religious institutions have 
survived, even thrived, during times of hardship and persecution e. g. the early Christian 
church. 73 Thus, the existence of a monopoly does not mean that other groups will not be 
successful in attracting members. Thirdly, competition is not always beneficial as it can 
result in inefficiency as institutions duplicate their services, leading to fewer adherents for 
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each group as supply outweighs demand . Finally, Bruce states that the ability of religious 
institutions to change their ideas and policies in order to retain competitiveness and attract 
members is also limited. "Religious organizations are hugely constrained by their own belief 
systems". 75 In conclusion, it is clear that one must not lose sight of the cultural and social 
context when exploring religious vitality. 
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The rational choice model offers new insight into motivations for religious adherence. 
However, the majority of the empirical evidence relates to Western Christian movements. 
The proponents of this approach are keen to stress that their findings may not apply in other 
environments. Certain aspects of the theory can be applied to Christianity in the Middle East. 
In terms of providing compensators, it is clear that most of the churches in the region fulfil 
this function. As will be explored, identity is often expressed by religious allegiance. In a 
difficult and frequently insecure environment, the church can act as a haven for the 
community. Within the properties of the institution -a church, monastery, shrine or social 
club - there is a feeling of belonging where all are equal. This is particularly true of St 
Mark's Coptic Orthodox Cathedral in Cairo, the seat of Pope Shenouda. Members of all 
generations frequently congregate in the patriarchate grounds to meet fellow Copts, attend 
services or just enjoy the atmosphere. To a lesser extent, the church property around 
Bkerke, the Maronite patriarchal see performs the same function. Spiritual rites not only 
serve to strengthen communal bonds but also assert a separate identity which cannot be shared 
by members of other groups. The numerous Coptic fasting days illustrate this increase in 
collective activities which exclude non-Copts. Both churches also provide practical aid. 
The Coptic Orthodox Bishopric of Public, Ecumenical and Social Services has an extensive 
range of programmes to help needy groups such as the poor or unemployed. Through the 
monastic orders, the Maronite Church has continued to provide education and health services 
as well as helping to rebuild properties in the post-war era. Consequently, while one cannot 
lose sight of the spiritual reasons for membership of the churches, in general, the church is 
expected to cater to all the needs of the community. This lack of separation between spiritual 
and material benefits means that one cannot exclude material gains as a contributory motive 
for the increased religious vitality experienced by both churches. 
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The cultural context is extremely important when examining Christianity in the Middle East 
from the supply-side. The ability of individuals to make a "rational choice" regarding their 
religious affiliation is clearly restricted. In this region, conversions from one faith to another 
are often viewed as proof of the superiority of that particular faith. Conversions from 
Christianity are made more painfiil due to the small numbers of Christians in comparison to 
the Muslim majority. In Egypt, unwillingness to accept that Copts may choose to convert, 
means that rumours abound that Coptic girls are kidnapped and forcibly converted when in 
fact many have chosen to do so when marrying a Muslim man. In Lebanon, it is generally 
believed that if one of the religious communities attempts to proselytise, this negatively 
affects harmonious relations between the confessions. While it is not prohibited to 
proselytize in either country, it is clearly not encouraged. Thus, there is huge pressure on 
both sides (Muslim and Christian) to remain in the faith community of birth. These cultural 
factors can be seen to account for religious vitality in this region rather than religious 
pluralism. Consequently, the choices available to individuals are restricted to denominations 
rather than faiths. 
Living in a predominantly Muslim region means that realistic competition is confined to the 
section of the population already identified as Christians. Within this limited "market", it can 
be noted that competition has resulted in increased vitality for many of the churches. This is 
particularly true of the Coptic Orthodox Church. Like many of the ancient Eastern churches, 
it has had to compete with Catholic and Protestant challengers. The clerical hierarchy tend to 
regard these competitors as surplus to requirements and serving only to divide the already 
fragile and disunited Christian community. Despite this hostility, the Catholic and Protestant 
missionary movements were able to attract followers from the existing churches, especially in 
the nineteenth century. This was partly due to the contrast in the style of worship including 
sermons and more participation by the laity which attracted the well-educated elite who often 
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regarded the clergy of the ancient church as backward and ignorant. 76 The non-religious 
services of the Catholic and Protestant churches also served as an attraction such as education, 
social services and contacts to the West. In response to this competition, the ancient 
churches initiated reforms. For example, the Coptic Revival led by Patriarch Kyrillos IV in 
the mid-nineteenth century, involved introducing sermons in Mass, opening new seminaries 
for priests and building new educational institutions. 77 In communion with Rome, the 
Maronite Church avoided Catholic competition. However, they were not immune from 
Protestant missionary work. In the educational field, this competition led to the founding of 
two influential institutions in the late nineteenth century - the Syrian Protestant College (now 
the American University in Beirut) in 1866 and the Jesuit University of St. Joseph in 1875. 
Hence, it would appear that both the Coptic Orthodox and the Maronite churches were able to 
act as a monopoly but were forced to implement reforms and undergo a period of 
revitalisation in order to compete with other Christian denominations. 
While both of the case study churches have remained dominant within the Christian 
community, it is evident that this position is no longer taken for granted as in the past. The 
respective hierarchies are keen to maximise the number of possible adherents. Awareness 
that the community expects that the church will play a leading role in all aspects of life - 
spiritual, material, cultural and temporal - means that the church as an institution has become 
more involved in the daily life of its followers. It also increases the opportunities for the 
religious leader to become the political spokesman for the community. 
The cultural environment also affects the church-state relationship. According to the 
supply-side approach, a religious institution that enjoys a monopoly is likely to have strong 
links with the state. The patriarchs of both churches are recognised as spiritual and 
communal leaders by their respective governments. However, they do not share the same 
faith as the majority of the population and have not exercised power in the same way as 
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occurred in medieval Europe. Therefore, the two churches have not been identified with the 
ruling authorities -a development that tends to have a detrimental effect on the popularity of 
a religious institution. 
Applying the rational choice approach, one could attribute the increased religiosity 
experienced in both the Coptic Orthodox and Maronite Churches to the realisation that the 
church is the institution most suited to fulfilling all the needs of the community. Not only 
can it provide spiritual guidance (separating it from any other communal institution), it also 
reinforces identity, provides a sense of belonging, offers social networks and has resources 
which can be accessed during times of difficulty. In the context of the Middle East where 
religion still has a dominant cultural role, any member of the community who does not 
participate fully in the activities offered by the church could find themselves alienated from 
the wider group. Potential social sanctions such as the loss of friends, family shame and 
restricted employment opportunities are likely to influence the extent of involvement in the 
church, thus maintaining religious vitality. Again, this vitality can then be transformed by 
the spiritual head into temporal authority. 
The rational choice model can also be applied at the institutional level to help explain the 
different strategies adopted by church leaders. Throughout the region, the aims tend to be 
shared by the different churches i. e. full equality, participation and security. However, the 
methods clearly differ. For example, the Maronite church has traditionally emphasised the 
political aspect of its ministry. Church leaders are likely to take into account the strengths of 
their community as well as the domestic and international environment before deciding on 
policies. The patriarch of a community found throughout the region and subject to different 
conditions in each country is likely to adopt a traditional passive approach, refraining from 
criticising authorities in order to minimise risk to the community. The leader of a cohesive 
group which is concentrated in a well-defined homeland and enjoys a strong sense of identity 
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is more likely to exercise his temporal authority. The domestic environment influences the 
extent of political participation by church leaders. When the ruling authorities are perceived 
as being indifferent to the problems facing the Christian communities, especially if this is 
accompanied by a significant upsurge in political Islam, a proactive approach is likely to be 
taken as was pursued by Pope Shenouda during the Sadat years. However, if Christians are 
treated in a similar manner to other citizens, the need for active political representation by the 
church is not as necessary e. g. in Syria and Jordan. The international environment is also 
likely to affect the response of the church to specific issues. As will be explored in Chapter 
Six, the activities of lobby groups formed by expatriate Copts and Maronites influence the 
situation at home. The attitude of other countries, especially the only superpower, the United 
States, may also count as a factor in deciding the political approach of the church. Again, it 
is important to note that any decision will be influenced and perhaps constrained by non- 
rational aspects. Firstly, due to the power given to the patriarch as the head of the church, the 
personality of the leader is extremely important. Secondly, the teachings and traditions of 
each church will also be a contributory factor. There are three propositions that can be drawn 
from the rational choice approach. 
Firstly, religious institutions offer rewards and compensators which in this context, could 
strengthen the identity and cohesiveness ofthe community. This could lead to their 
willingness to delegate political representation to the patriarch. 
Secondly, the existence ofa monopoly would suggest that the religious institution benefited 
from a privileged relation with the state. Mle it would be expected that this situation would 
lead to a decline in members, it would be counterbalanced by the potentialfor the patriarch 
to use this relationship to secure his position as civil head ofthe community. 
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Airdly, it would be expected that the attitudes of the ruling authorities and society influence 
the political strategy pursued by the religious leader, resulting in a more assertive approach 
when the community is perceived as endangered. 
Summarv Of Theories 
From this discussion, it is clear that throughout the world, contemporary religious 
institutions continue to possess the capacity to be politically active. Thus, the political role of 
patriarchs in the Middle East should not be regarded as an anomaly. All four theories suggest 
that the political role of the church is closely connected to its ability to provide its followers 
with a distinct identity, sense of belonging and security, social networks and welfare services. 
If the church can fulfil these functions, this would appear to translate into acceptance of a 
temporal dimension to the office of patriarch. This tendency to perceive religion as fulfilling 
other purposes rather than being concerned solely with the transcendental has led to criticism 
that political activities are undertaken at the expense of spiritual matters. However, the early 
church was concerned with all areas of life. Therefore, involvement in the political sphere 
can actually be seen as the return of authentic religion. 
This thesis proposes that the crisis of state approach which relates the political role of 
religion to heightened perceptions of vulnerability best explains the political role of Patriarchs 
Shenouda and Sfeir. However, the debate regarding the historical experience of Christian 
communities in the region is also important. As Christianity in the Middle East did not 
undergo the fundamental changes which affected the church in the West, it is more accurate to 
examine these churches in the context of the term coined by Gregory III, "the church of 
Islam". They have been greatly affected by this Islamic environment, allowing the church 
leaders to retain predominance over the community at the expense of the laity. It would 
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appear difficult to separate the political dimension as the patriarch is expected by many of his 
adherents to provide guidance for the community on all issues. Elements of the globalization 
process have also aided the ability of the patriarch to retain control over the entire community 
both home and abroad. The problems faced by the region since the end of colonialism have 
clearly accentuated the ability of the patriarch to be the legitimate representative of his people. 
Aside from the rational choice approach, the other theories acknowledge that the strength of 
political religion is derived at least partly from its prominent place in a specific culture. The 
fact that these Christians are an indigenous minority in a culture dominated by another 
religion, seems to accentuate the role of the church in the everyday life of many Christians in 
'the region. Yet it is clear that there cannot be a universal approach to the problems faced by 
Christians in the Middle East. Thus, it is hoped that the crisis of state approach will explain 
why these two particular patriarchs have exercised the historical temporal dimension of their 
office. 
Methodology and Plan of Study 
Various resources have been used to compile this examination of the political role of the 
patriarchs in the Coptic Orthodox and Maronite traditions. Published sources have provided 
useful backgound and historical guides to this topic. Internet resources have also been used 
to gather information, particularly on the churches and 6migr6 groups. Due to the subject 
matter, the study relies on newspaper articles to ensure up-to-date coverage of events. As a 
consequence of my field trips to Egypt and Lebanon, I gained insight into the specific 
situation of each community in the two countries. Information obtained from interviews has 
been used to illustrate the varied opinions on the political role of the patriarchs. Visits to 
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Christian institutions, churches and monasteries also aided my understanding of the research 
area. 
Key criteria have been identified in order to determine what type of political role a Christian 
religious leader is likely to have in this region and the impact this will have on the 
community, state and wider society. The independent variables are connected to the 
theoretical approaches described above. Concerning the level of secularization, a highly 
secularized society would be expected to provide few opportunities for a religious leader to 
exercise political authority over his community. In contrast, a society that has experienced 
limited secularization could offer a spiritual leader substantial opportunities to develop a 
political role. The extent of state crisis would also affect the activities of the patriarch, with a 
higher level leading to a more pronounced political role. In the same way, the civil authority 
of a religious leader is more likely to be exercised when the effects of the globalization 
process are more visible in a society. Finally, according to the rational choice approach, 
where a competitive religious market exists, religious institutions will enjoy vitality, aided by 
their ability to provide rewards and compensators to members. This would significantly 
influence the ability of the religious leader to represent the community on civil matters. 
These variables are also connected to the following intervening variables. 
1) Yhe tradition and authority invested in the patriarch ofa specific tradition 
When this is strong, it is more likely to lead to an active political role of the religious 
leader. 
2) Yhe identity of the community 
A high sense of identity and exclusive approach could help create an environment 
where the spiritual leader could exercise civil authority as the head of the community. 
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It would be expected that this would decrease if there was a low sense of identity and 
the community traditionally pursued an integrationist approach towards the majority 
group. 
3) The existence ofa distinct homelandfor the community 
The fulfilment of this criteria is likely to enhance a sense of belonging and 
reinforce the position of the spiritual head as the leader of the community. 
4) The willingness ofchurch leaders to utilise their own institutions to cater to the needs 
of their community 
When this willingness exists, religious institutions are more likely to find that in order 
to cater to these needs, they will need to become involved in political issues. 
5) The historical background andpresent political situation of the country ofresidence 
In a country where religion has traditionally played an important role in the 
development of the state and remained prominent in society, one would expect that it 
would be more acceptable to a community to be represented in civil matters by a 
religious leader. This would be less likely if the privatization of religion had been 
widely experienced and accepted. Similarly, if a community perceives that the 
political context in their homeland discourages their participation in national affairs 
and allows discrimination, this is likely to result in a communal response which could 
be led by the spiritual head of the community. However, if the group feels integrated 
into society, they are less likely to consider that leadership from the religious 
establishment is required. 
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6) The personality and views ofthe patriarch 
If the religious leader has a dynamic and charismatic personality, he is more likely to 
desire to be involved in communal affairs than one characterised as passive. His 
opinion on whether the patriarch should be proactive or passive concerning political 
issues will also influence his behaviour. His views on the political situation and aims 
of the community are important in determining the type of political role he will fulfil. 
7) 7he challenges to patriarchal authority 
If there are few rivals to communal leadership, the patriarch is more likely to exercise 
both spiritual and temporal authority. The existence of numerous alternative actors 
would be expected to hinder the ability of the patriarch to claim this position and thus 
lessen the extent of his political role. The policies adopted by the ruling authorities 
will also influence the political role of the religious leader. When the patriarch is 
given relative freedom to voice his opinion, this is likely to encourage a more 
proactive approach than one operating in an environment where this is restricted. 
Yet, conversely, these limitations would also prevent other communal rivals from 
mounting a challenge to the dominant position of the patriarch. 
8) Yhe existence and activities ofa diaspora 
If a community enjoys the support of a large and politically active diaspora, this could 
lead to a more political role for the patriarch either because the diaspora urge him to 
fulfil this task or more likely, in order to prevent other actors from claiming to be the 
legitimate representative of the community. 
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The second chapter on patriarchal authority addresses the position of the patriarch in the 
Eastern Christian tradition. Focus is given to the authority of the Coptic Orthodox and 
Maronite patriarchs before concluding with a brief historical overview of the temporal 
dimension of previous patriarchs. Chapter Three looks at the nationalist challenge to the 
political role of the patriarch in the twentieth century. The alternatives to civil representation 
by church leaders for Christians in the Middle East will be explored. The analysis will cover 
general trends in the region at this period, especially the failure of Arab nationalism and then 
apply these to specific events in the two countries. A brief outline will be given of 
contemporary concerns of the Christian communities in Egypt and Lebanon. 
The next part of the thesis examines the political role of the two present patriarchs. 
Chapter Four will provide a detailed account of the political role of Pope Shenouda III, the 
Coptic Orthodox Patriarch of Alexandria and All Africa. Firstly, key developments in church 
governance during his reign will be examined to illustrate that the patriarch has ensured his 
dominant role in the church and hence the community. Secondly, his political activities and 
consequent response of both the community and the state will be discussed. In Chapter Five, 
attention will be given to the political role of Patriarch Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir, Patriarch of 
Antioch and All the East of the Maronites. This chapter will concentrate on the measures 
engaged by Patriarch Sfeir in his effort to reclaim the temporal dimension inherent in the 
office of Maronite patriarch. The discussion will focus initially on the spiritual revival of the 
church and then turn to more overtly political action undertaken in the post-civil war era, 
noting the impact of these policies on the different Lebanese actors. Chapter Six will 
examine the implications of global expansion on the political role of the two patriarchs. The 
reaction of the churches to emigration and expatriate communities will be outlined. The 
opportunities and challenges presented by this growth outside of the Middle East will be 
examined, with reference to the development of a universal rather than particular identity and 
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the emergence of rivals to the role of the patriarch as the civil representative in the form of 
6migre groups. Finally, Chapter Seven will present the conclusion to this study. After 
summarising the key findings, these will be analysed in the context of the theoretical 
framework developed in Chapter One. 
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Chapter Two - Patriarchal Authority in the Coptic Orthodox and 
Maronite Traditions 
Introduction 
The explanations for the involvement of religion in politics detailed in the introductory 
chapter are based on the assumption that religious institutions can undertake the 
representation of the community by directing their substantial resources towards this aim. In 
the Eastern Christian tradition, the office of patriarch is a key resource. The patriarch is more 
than the head of the church. He is the father of the flock, symbol of the faith and figurehead 
of the community. In short, the patriarch can be perceived as the personification of the entire 
church. This thesis proposes that the status of this office endows the patriarch with 
substantial authority over the community which can be used to further the temporal dimension 
of the office. While this is true to a certain extent of all Eastern Christian traditions, 
patriarchal authority in the two churches used as case studies, can be regarded as amongst the 
most developed. The establishment of the patriarchal sees and the origins of the Coptic 
Orthodox and Maronite patriarchs will be examined. Their authority will be discussed, 
emphasising the power given to the patriarch through canon law and tradition. Constraints 
on this power will also be explored including electoral requirements, the role of the Holy 
Synod, laity and external actors. For the Coptic Orthodox, this refers to the Egyptian 
government while in the case of the Maronites, the Vatican plays a major role in tempering 
the power of the patriarch. By establishing the extent of authority ascribed to the patriarch, it 
will be demonstrated that the patriarch, if he so desires, has the resources to act as the civil as 
well as the spiritual representative of the community. 
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The historical experience of Christianity in the Middle East has also proved influential in 
maintaining patriarchal authority. In contrast to the situation in Europe, the Arab conquest in 
the seventh century deprived the Christian churches of direct political power through control 
of the state. Yet, Islamic rule ensured that the patriarchs retained aspects of their civil 
authority. As will be explored, subsequent regimes in the Muslim world allowed the heads of 
the different Christian churches to exercise temporal power over their community in return for 
acting as the liaison between the community and the ruling authorities. The consequent 
absence of the secularization process as occurred in the West has presented the current heads 
of churches in the Middle East with the opportunity to continue to enjoy civil authority in a 
manner rarely seen elsewhere by Christian religious leaders. It is clear that the political 
dimension of the patriarchal office has remained significant throughout the centuries and 
certainly should not be perceived as a recent development. This will be explored by a brief 
examination of the initial period after the Arab Conquest to the Ottoman era when this 
political role became institutionalised through the millet system. Finally, attention will be 
given to the political activities of previous patriarchs in the modem history of both the Coptic 
Orthodox and Maronite churches. This will illustrate that there is a strong precedent 
(particularly in the Maronite example) of political leadership by the patriarch and also offer 
the opportunity to highlight the personal influence of the two present leaders - Pope 
Shenouda and Patriarch Sfeir. 
The Origins of the Patriarch in the Coptic Orthodox and Maronite Traditions 
The term patriarch which is used to describe the head of many Eastern Christian churches 
originates from a combination of Latin and Greek -pater meaning father, patria meaning 
lineage, race, people, nation and lastly, archos meaning leader or chief. 
' Originally, it was 
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given to Christian dignitaries as an honorific title. With the spread of Christianity throughout 
2 the Roman Empire, it was necessary for the early church to "centralize at the regional level". 
Initially, the church was concentrated in urban areas and thus, the key sees closely resembled 
the regional centres of the empire. Once Christianity became the state religion, the title 
patriarch was solely applied to church hierarchs. 3 The early ecumenical councils recognised 
the title in regard to the metropolitans of the five major sees - Rome, Constantinople, 
Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem. These five sees were chosen because of a combination 
of apostolic origins and political factors. Rome satisfied the criteria for both categories as the 
final see of St. Peter, the place of the martyrdom of St. Peter and St Paul as well as the capital 
of the Roman Empire. 4 Although Constantinople had little direct link to the apostles, its 
position as the new seat of the imperial government increased its prestige and at the Council 
5 
of Constantinople in 381, it was confirmed as second only to the see of Rome. Alexandria 
was associated with the martyrdom of St. Mark and developed as an intellectual and 
theological centre including the Didascalia - the Cathetical School. 
6 The growth of the 
Christian faith was regarded as spreading from Antioch - an early centre of evangelisation, 
following on from the work of the apostles. 7 The fifth see Jerusalem was actually the least 
important to the early church and was not designated a patriarchal see until the Council of 
Chalcedon in 45 1.8 
According to Corbon, the patriarch was the church equivalent ofpatrick (governor) and 
exercised temporal power in the territory under his jurisdiction. 9 The patriarchs had direct 
responsibility for doctrine and discipline of the other bishops in their region. Due to the 
growth of the church, it became necessary to hold councils where all bishops could meet 
together. The first council was held at Nicea in 325 and allowed the bishops to debate 
theological issues including the Arian controversy. It also confirmed the rights of the 
recognised patriarchal sees at that time -Rome, Alexandria and Antioch. 
10 Inthefourth 
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century, the church leaders still deemed it vital that the church pursued a common theological 
doctrine. Although the beginnings of national identities within specific regions were 
acknowledged e. g. Armenia, Persia and Egypt; it was still expected that the decisions of 
bishops in one region would affect the universal church. For example, the Egyptian 
Patriarchs of Alexandria played key roles in international church affairs, particularly 
concerning doctrinal issues. " Egyptian and Syriac monasticism also had a direct impact on 
the wider church through the writings of the desert fathers. Furthermore, there was rivalry 
between the patriarchs as each one wished to preside over the leading see. 
The unity of the early church was shattered by doctrinal controversies in the fifth century. 
As this discussion is confined to the formation of the Coptic Orthodox and Maronite 
churches, it will focus primarily on the Councils at Ephesus and Chalcedon. ln431, under 
the direction of Cyril, the Patriarch of Alexandria, the Council of Ephesus condemned the 
christological stance of Nestorius, the patriarch of Constantinople and engineered his 
deposition. Nestorius was identified with teaching that objected to Mary being called 
theotokos - the bearer of God - as he argued that she was the mother of Jesus but not the 
mother of God. 12 This complex christological dispute was renewed under Patriarch 
Dioscorus who controlled the second Council of Ephesus in 449 - the so-called Robber 
Council - and deposed the patriarchs of Antioch and Constantinople. However, the power of 
the Egyptian church was challenged two years later when these rulings were repudiated at the 
451 Council of Chalcedon. The Council defined that Christ possessed two natures, divine 
and human, which were joined in one person. 13 However, many theologians in Egypt, Syria 
and Armenia regarded this as too similar to the ideas of Nestorius which had been rejected at 
the previous council. Instead, they agreed with the definition given by Cyril, Patriarch of 
Alexandria, "single nature of the Word of God made flesh". 14 Hence, the church in Egypt 
adheres to the teachings of the first three ecumenical councils only. 
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There is an ongoing debate concerning the theological claims of the non-Chalcedonian 
churches. They still tend to be labelled Monophysite churches. Yet, some scholars 
including Pacini and Roberson argue that these churches rejected any definition that 
highlighted the two natures of Christ. Not only did they resist the dominant Chalcedon view, 
they consequently also rejected the classic Monophysite position offered by Eutyches of 
Constantinople who declared that the human nature of Christ was absorbed by his divinity. 15 
With the signing of common Christological declarations between these churches and both the 
Catholic and Orthodox churches in the late twentieth century, it has become widely accepted 
that these divisions can be attributed to power struggles in the early church rather than serious 
theological differences. 16 
While differences over doctrine were at the forefront of the schism, non-theological factors 
were also relevant. In the fourth century, the Emperor had shown interest in the ecumenical 
councils and legislated in religious affairs, thus adding a political dimension to the dispute. 
Rivalry between Alexandria and Constantinople can be regarded in the context of regional 
resentment of central authority. It is no coincidence that the three churches that were formed 
along national lines due to their rejection of Chalcedon, were situated in the periphery. This 
alienation was accentuated due to financial strains such as heavy taxation levied on the 
regions. According to Maila, the theological disputes were in fact a "thin veil for cultural 
clashes". 17 
The church in Egypt remained loyal to the Patriarch of Alexandria who was deposed at 
Chalcedon. Wessels states that this act was regarded as a national humiliation, particularly as 
Egyptian theologians had enjoyed a leading role in the universal church., 8 Thechurch 
refused to recognise any patriarch imposed on them from Constantinople, to the extent that 
one replacement was lynched by an angry crowd. 19 These events also illustrated the divide 
between the Hellenized elite who mainly resided in Alexandria and the rural majority who 
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used the Coptic language. The term Copt comes from the Greek for Egypt - aigyptos. 20 In 
this sense, the Coptic Orthodox Church can be regarded as the Egyptian national church. It is 
clear that a sense of national identity already existed. This was heightened by the 
appointment of a Chalcedonian Patriarch who was regarded as a foreigner. Given both civil 
and religious power, Cyrus attempted to quell the rebellion through force ranging from 
imprisoning and killing non-Chalcedonian believers, attacking monasteries and even 
murdering the brother of the Patriarch . 
21 However, this violence appeared to have the 
opposite impact on Egyptian Christians. Even by this early stage, the Egyptian church had 
witnessed substantial persecution. 22 For example, many thousands were killed from 303AD 
under the orders of Emperor Diocletian. According to Meinardus, "National feeling in Egypt 
was so intensely opposed to the Chalcedonense, which had become the Imperial Creed, that 
shortly before the Arab Conquest in the VIIth century the Melkite or Chalcedonian Patriarch 
of Alexandria had but 200,000 Greeks and officials for his adherents, whereas as many as six 
million Egyptians acknowledged the non-Chalcedonian faith. 9,23 The Arab conquest 
signalled the end of Byzantine persecution and the beginning of a new era. 
The Council of Chalcedon had a major impact on the universal church. The pattern of the 
duplication of patriarchs emerged. The pro-Chalcedon church continued to appoint 
patriarchs to other sees even although some had few followers such as in Alexandria. This 
need for a patriarch was the fundamental factor for the founding of the Maronite church. The 
term Maronite is derived from a fourth century hermit Maron whose ascetic life attracted 
disciples who founded a monastery in his memory - Beit Maroon. 
24 Although there is 
controversy regarding the doctrinal beliefs of these monks after the Council of Chalcedon in 
45 1, the Maronite Church firmly states that they adhered to the Chalcedonian Christological 
definition of one person in two natures. 25 As this doctrine was rejected by many in Syria and 
Egypt, the monks of Beit Maroon were subject to persecution including the massacre of 350 
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monks in 517 by followers of Patriarch Severus of Antioch. 26 Church historians claim that 
because the last Orthodox Patriarch in Antioch died in 609 and due to the Arab conquest, later 
patriarchs resided in Constantinople, the Maronite community was in gave need of a leader. 
The vacant see was filled in the late seventh century. 27 in this way, the Maronite monastic 
community evolved into a "church" with its own hierarchy and ecclesiastical autonomy. 28 
Given the title of Maronite Patriarch of Antioch and All The East, the first patriarch John 
Maron is regarded as the founder of the Maronite Church. Having lost Byzantine protection 
either due to electing their patriarch without the consent of the emperor, or as some historians 
claim, due to their following of the compromise Monothelitist doctrine, John Maron was 
credited with winning a decisive battle against the Byzantine army. 29 Continual conflict 
resulted in waves of emigration to the safety of Mount Lebanon. The attachment to this area 
as a territorial and historic homeland is a strong component of Maronite identity. While 
Mount Lebanon has long been regarded as a refuge for various persecuted minorities e. g. 
Druze, Shiites, Maronites particularly emphasised the mountain as their haven from the 
oppressive Islamic rule experienced by non-Muslims elsewhere in the Islamic world. Here, 
the Maronites developed their own ecclesiastical and community identity, resembling what 
Salibi terms shab (people) wherein the patriarch was seen as the tribal chief rather than just 
the head of the church . 
30 The arrival of the Crusaders in the late eleventh century halted the 
isolation of the community and allowed links with the Catholic Church to be re-established. 
In 1215, Patriarch Jeremias al-Aanshitti was the first Maronite Patriarch to visit Rome, 
attending the Council of Lateran IV and relations were reaffirmed in 1439.3 
1A gradual 
"Latinization" policy was encouraged with the founding of the Maronite College in Rome in 
15 84 and culminated in the 173 6 Synod of Mount Lebanon which undertook vast 
restructuring of the Maronite Church in accordance with Roman practices from the 1562 
Council of Trent. 32 
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Patriarchal Authorijy and Constraints 
The extent of patriarchal authority in each rite is derived from a combination of canon law 
and tradition. In the Coptic Orthodox Church, the Bishop of Alexandria is recognised as the 
patriarch and head of the church. This authority is derived from the scriptures, teachings of 
the church fathers and canon law. The apostolic origins of the church ensure that the writings 
of the early theologians, such as those in the Didascalia are followed regarding disciplinary, 
spiritual and moral matters. 33 The canons assert the importance of the leadership of the 
church and thus, great attention is given to the criteria that must be satisfied to become 
patriarch. The candidate must be celibate and while lay representatives have been patriarchs 
in the past, normally a monk would be chosen. Bebawi states that the "Coptic Church, the 
mother of monasticism, sees in the monk the ideal Christian: and it is the ideal Christian who 
should be chosen to be bishop". 34 The church canons clearly reject the idea of a bishop 
becoming patriarch. A bishop is appointed for life and is expected to devote the rest of his 
ministry to his diocese. By becoming patriarch, he would be regarded as having been 
consecrated twice. A useful allegory is to compare the elevation of a bishop to the patriarchy 
to "a man marrying a girl then leaving her to marry her mother". 35 Yet in several instances, a 
bishop has been elected as patriarch. Three of the five patriarchs of the twentieth century 
were diocesan bishops. In fact, the troubles of the church during their reign were interpreted 
by some Copts as punishment for breaking the canons. 36 The position of general bishop (i. e. 
without a diocese) established by Pope Kyrillos VI has intensified this debate as the present 
patriarch was previously General Bishop for Education yet as a layman, was instrumental in 
condemning the Holy Synod when bishops were elected as the head of the church. 37 
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Although the election rite has varied in the past, the present system, which was agreed in 
1957, aims to ensure that the elected candidate will enjoy the support of the community. The 
Electoral Committee consisting of the Synod and lay representatives choose three candidates 
from a wider list who are then drawn by altar lot. A fourth name is added, "Jesus Christ the 
38 Good Shepherd" to prove to the faithful that the candidate has been divinely approved. 
Once elected, the Coptic Orthodox Patriarch enjoys supreme authority over the community. 
While certainly not regarded as infallible, Wakin suggests that the patriarch can be classified 
as the Pope for Egyptian Christians. 39 A vacancy arises only with the death of a patriarch: 
he caimot be removed from office. As there is no higher figure, patriarchal authority extends 
wherever adherents reside. This contrasts with the situation of the Eastern Catholic 
Patriarchs whose power is restricted to inside patriarchal territory. According to canon law, 
apart from consecrating bishops, the patriarch performs the same functions as his fellow 
bishops. The Holy Synod is the highest ecclesiastical body in the church and is responsible 
for all church affairs. In theory, the patriarch governs the church in conjunction with the 
Synod but due to the position attributed to the patriarch (who presides over its meetings), it 
cannot be described as an independent force such as the synods of the Eastern Catholic 
Churches. The patriarch can be regarded as the personification of the church and the 
community. 
Turning to the Maronite rite, the role of the patriarch in the Eastern Catholic Churches is 
defined in the 1990 Codex Canonum Ecclesiaruni Orientalium (CCEO), the codification of 
canon law for these churches. Continuing the work instigated by the Vatican II Council, this 
code aims to reverse the Latinization process and emphasise their Eastern heritage. In this 
context, the importance of the patriarch to the church has been stressed. Canon 55 states, 
"According to the most ancient traditions of the Church, already recognized by the first 
ecumenical councils, the patriarchal institution has existed in the church : for this reason a 
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special honour is to be accorded to the patriarchs of the Eastern Churches, each of whom 
presides over his patriarchal church as father and head". 40 Chiramel suggests that this canon 
law (which is derived from previous ecumenical councils) has allowed the Eastern churches to 
regain the autonomy from Rome that was enjoyed by the early patriarchs. 41 Thus, the 
Maronite church is recognised as sui iuris -a community grouped under a hierarchy who has 
the right of self-determination. 42 While the pope is the supreme head of the universal church, 
the patriarchal churches have the right to govern themselves and promulgate laws within the 
patriarchal territory. The patriarch enjoys executive and administrative powers, such as 
issuing decrees and encyclical letters, ordaining bishops within the territorial boundaries and 
presiding over the Synod. He is also the highest juridical authority for the community 
concerning personal statute laws. 43 Although bishops must resign aged seventy-five, this is 
not applicable to patriarchs, hence illustrating the importance of the position. Faris states that 
"The patriarch neither functions in his church as a little pope, nor is he merely a first among 
equals in the Synod of Bishops". 44 The CCEO clearly emphasises the predominant position 
of the patriarch as the head of the church. According to Marini, "He represents in his person 
the entire Maronite Church, and he is the principal representative and spokesman for the 
Maronite Church and for all Maronites everywhere". 45 
The patriarchal authority addressed by the CCEO is reinforced by the historical leadership 
role played by the patriarch since its conception in the seventh century. As has been seen, the 
Maronites can be identified as a tribal group with their religious head simultaneously 
occupying a civil position. Labaki asserts, "The Patriarch was the leader of the Maronite 
nation, which from the beginning always rallied round him". 46 Furthermore, Beggiani states 
that, "The identity of the Maronite Church is inseparable from the role of the Patriarch" and 
furthermore, "the patriarch is the embodiment of Maronitc history and Maronite identity". 47 
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Consequently, the patriarch enjoys authority over the community which is extremely difficult 
for other leaders (religious or civil) to challenge. 
While both denominations acknowledge the patriarch at the head of a hierarchical structure, 
this does not necessarily lead to blind acceptance of his decisions. Several constraints have 
been placed on the patriarch. In the Coptic Orthodox Church, the authoritarian almost 
monarchical structure is surprisingly coupled with a strong populist tradition. Hasan states 
that "from time immemorial, it has seen, despite its authoritarian hierarchic structure, an 
inordinate amount of lay involvement in church affairs". 48 To a certain extent, the patriarch 
has to take into consideration the opinions of the community, especially regarding the 
placement of bishops to dioceses. This was institutionalised in the late nineteenth century 
with the establishment of the al-majlis al-milli (community council) which was instigated by 
the laity elite who wished to gain control of the financial and administrative affairs of the 
church. However, Pope Kyrillos V saw these reformers as a challenge to his authority over 
the church and the community. As Meinardus suggests, "patriarchs always looked at the 
majlis al-milli as an organization which restricted their authorities". 
49 Under republican 
governments since 1952, the activities of the council have been weakened in favour of the 
patriarch. Representatives are included in the electoral committee but members voted on to 
the council rarely differ with the church hierarchy, especially the patriarch. 
50 Therefore, 
while laity participation remains an important tradition in the Coptic Orthodox Church, such 
activities cannot be described as effective constraints on patriarchal authority. 
Occasionally, the Egyptian government has also limited the extent of patriarchal power. In 
general, this has occurred at the invitation of the church. For example, in 1954 when 
members of a radical group Umma al-Qibtiya (The Coptic Nation) kidnapped Patriarch Yusab 
II in an attempt to forcibly depose him due to the rampant corruption under his reign, the 
51 
government secured the return of the patriarch. Aware of the discontent among the Coptic 
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community, the authorities accepted the request of the Holy Synod and the majlis to relieve 
him of his powers. Pennington states that "The formula is significant in that it legitimized 
government intervention in patriarchal appointments, albeit with the support of the 
community at large". 52 Another illustration was the government postponement of patriarchal 
elections after the death of Yusab II. Internal disagreement between the Synod who wanted 
another bishop as patriarch and the reformers who wished to return to the tradition of 
choosing a monk, meant that a decision could not be reached. 53 The government became 
involved in the process of electing a new patriarch by appointing a patriarchal representative 
to promulgate electoral laws. In most instances, once the patriarch is elected, the authorities 
have little involvement in church affairs. However, the patriarch must obtain recognition 
from the president and in extreme circumstances, this can be revoked as will be explored later 
regarding Pope Shenouda in 1981. 
Similarly, there are several constraints on the Maronite patriarch. Unlike the Oriental 
Orthodox churches where the patriarch is recognised as the head of the church, final authority 
in Eastern Catholic churches lies with the Pope - the supreme head of the universal church. 
This means that the Vatican is involved in all aspects of church affairs. The Pope must be 
informed of a vacant see and patriarchal elections. The Pope also has the final decision 
regarding the candidate in the sense that to gain legitimacy, the patriarch must receive 
ecclesiastical communion from the Pope. 54 Although the canon law states that the patriarch 
is elected solely by the Holy Synod, the Vatican also enjoys influence. While the patriarch in 
conjunction with the Holy Synod, has autonomy in passing laws and electing bishops, this 
(excluding liturgical laws) applies only within the patriarchal territory. In common with 
most Eastern Christian churches, a substantial proportion of adherents to the Maronite church 
no longer reside in the region defined as the patriarchal territory i. e. Middle East. During the 
process of codification of the CCEO, this issue raised fierce debate. The final decision 
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retained the historic principle of territory, thus restricting patriarchal power. Pastoral care of 
Maronites in the diaspora is provided by the Congregation for the Eastern Churches, part of 
the Roman Curia. The pope appoints bishops in eparchies outside of the patriarchal territory 
although there is some contribution by the Maronite Synod who present a list of three 
candidates. 55 The patriarch is recognised by the community as the head of their church but 
the bishop is under the direct authority of the Vatican through the Congregation for the 
Eastern Churches. While there has been an increase in co-ordination between the two, this 
issue negatively affects the ability of the patriarch to claim to represent the entire Maronite 
community when in reality, this is proven only within patriarchal territory. 
Another constraint on patriarchal authority is the role of the Holy Synod. The CCEO has 
also recognised the Eastern tradition of Synodal governance and ensured that the patriarch and 
the synod are interdependent. The patriarch has the executive role as he convokes and 
presides over the Synod while the Synod enjoys legislative and judicial power. 56 The Synod 
also performs an important function in conducting the elections of patriarchs and bishops. 
Regarding the vacant patriarchal see, the Synod members enjoy the exclusive right to elect the 
new patriarch. 57 Since the twentieth century, the laity have no longer exercised their 
traditional involvement in the electoral process. However, laity participation in church 
affairs is provided through the patriarchal assembly, a consultative group which includes two 
lay representatives from each eparchy amongst the predominant clerical group. This body 
cannot set the agenda but it does at least ensure that the laity can have some influence on 
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specific matters discussed. While institutionalised laity participation may be minimal, the 
church hierarchy does take popular opinion among the Maronite community into 
consideration. In conclusion, it is clear that both patriarchs enjoy substantial authority over 
their community. As this is derived from canon law, the patriarch enjoys legitimacy to an 
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extent which cannot be replicated by other leaders. Using this as a foundation, the head of 
the church has the resources to provide both spiritual and civil leadership to the community. 
The Historical Experiences of the Churches in the Middle East 
Since the beginning of the institution of the patriarch, a political dimension has been 
involved. In contrast to the process experienced by the church in Europe, Christianity in the 
Middle East was only associated with state power for a short period. Yet, the temporal role 
of the patriarch was ironically reinforced through centuries of Islamic rule as the patriarch 
was identified as the civil leader of their community. The Arab conquest heralded a new 
political system in the Middle East - one based on Islam. Although the Muslim rulers 
initially favoured the Christian communities who had been persecuted by the Byzantine 
authorities, the fact that the majority of the population of the new empire were non-Muslim 
meant that a standard approach to non-believers had to be devised. Islam divided the world 
into dar al-Islam (house of Islam) and dar al-harb (house of war). The existence of non- 
Muslims within dar al-Islam resulted in the need to find a compromise solution. Due to their 
possession of a written revelation from God, both Christians and Jews were termed ahl al- 
kitab (People of the Book). 59 As members of this group, Christians were given three choices 
- to convert, submit to Islamic political rule through the paying of tributes or to fight against 
MUSliMS. 60 The idea of a covenant with non-Muslims was pioneered by Muhammad at 
Medina with a Jewish tribe in 623 and at Najran with a friendly Christian community in 
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. 
61 These treaties guaranteed freedom of person, property and religion in exchange for the 
payment of thefizya (poll tax). Thus, Christians became known as dhimmi - coverianted 
people. 62 
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The different Christian communities were treated as groups who were defined by religion. 
According to Masters, these groups can be called taifa (collective group). Once established, 
a taifa had a set of rules regarding membership and leadership and could ask Islamic rulers to 
mediate in internal disputes. 63 As the head of this community, the patriarch was held 
responsible for the conduct of the whole group. In general, the patriarch continued to enjoy 
authority over the internal affairs of the community on condition that taxes were paid and that 
there was no interference in Islam - the state religion. 
64 In order to collect taxes, the 
patriarchs were given positions in the administrative system and allocated "civil coercive 
authority" to attain this. 65 Although the following statement by Atiya concerns the Assyrian 
Church of the East, it can be applied to other heads of churches. "The patriarchs were 
beginning to look like civil servants as much as ecclesiastical dignitaries". 66 Several 
patriarchs were sent as envoys on behalf of Islamic rulers. In the ninth century, Coptic 
Orthodox Patriarch Joseph was sent to mediate between the Christian king of Nubia and the 
Muslim rulers of Egypt while Patriarch Siyus became the emissary of the Caliph to the 
Byzantine Empire in 1280.67 In exchange for religious freedom in Lebanon, Maronite 
patriarchs used their connections with the Vatican and European Catholic countries to aid the 
Druze emirs of Lebanon. Patriarch Yuhanna Makhluf was an adviser to Emir Fakhr al-Din II 
and instrumental in securing trading relations and an alliance against the Ottomans, between 
the emir and the Grand Duke of Tuscany. 68 
However, relations were not always cordial. In the medieval era, Coptic Orthodox 
patriarchs were often imprisoned by caliphs for ransom money because of the initial wealth of 
the church. 69 Similarly, in times of crisis, the Maronite patriarch became a target for the 
Islamic authorities. For example, Patriarch Daniel was killed in 1282 after resisting the 
Marnluks while in 1367, Patriarch Jibrail was burned at the stake . 
70 In fact, Labaki asserts 
that the capture of the Patriarch was more prized by enemies than the capture of a town. 71 
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Under this system, there was little challenge to the temporal authority of the patriarch. Not 
only was the patriarch recognised by the Islamic authorities as the head of the community but 
also, there were few opportimities for Christians to attain the status required to rival this 
recognised civil representative. Non-Muslims were prohibited from political and military 
occupations. Their influence was confined to public administration and medicine. Bosworth 
concludes that although Christians were tolerated for their skills, they were still clearly 
identified as second class subjects. 72 Hence, the ability to acquire a power base independent 
from the patriarch was severely limited. 
Non-Muslims were given autonomy within the Islamic empire after the Arab Conquest but 
it was not until the Ottoman Empire was established in the mid-fifteenth century, that this 
system became institutionalised through the millet system. According to Pacini, "The 
religious authorities of each millet acted both as representatives of the members of their millet 
and as intermediaries between the latter and central power in administrative matters". 73 
Aware that a substantial proportion of the population of the Ottoman Empire was Christian 
due to the fall of the Byzantine Empire in 1453, the Ottoman Caliph Mehmet II was keen to 
integrate the Christian groups into the administrative system of the empire. Identifying the 
Pope as the enemy of the empire, the caliph was favourable towards the Orthodox church. 74 
In 1454, the Greek Orthodox millet was established, theoretically uniting all Eastern 
Christians under one religious authority. The Greek Orthodox Patriarch in Constantinople 
was responsible for all religious, civil, legal, educational and financial affairs in the Christian 
millet . 
75 Consequently, the clergy enjoyed a privileged status within the millet. This was 
aided by their economic power over church property. Therefore, Betts suggests that the 
76 Orthodox Patriarch assumed the role of a Christian caliph . 
It is clear that the Greek Orthodox Patriarch benefited hugely from this official recognition. 
However, other heads of churches were also able to secure their position as the civil heads of 
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their communities. The religious heads (excluding the Maronite patriarch who relied on 
French protection) were given a berat - legal recognition of their position. 
77 This served to 
reinforce the legitimacy of their authority. Due to their historical identity as a national 
church, the Armenians were granted their separate millet in 1461 and were able to run their 
internal affairs outside of Orthodox control. 78 Yet the geographical distance from 
Constantinople to Egypt, Syria and Lebanon, allowed the Coptic Orthodox, Syrian Orthodox 
and the Maronite patriarchs to continue to exercise de facto control of their community with 
little external interference from the Greek Orthodox. 
In the Egyptian case, the development of an indigenous millet system illustrates the close 
connection between the Coptic Orthodox community and the Egyptian nation state. 
Although nominally part of the Ottoman Empire, due to geographical location, the rulers of 
Egypt tended to enjoy autonomous power to a certain extent that allowed the notion of a 
distinct Egyptian identity to remain. 79 Consequently, it was natural that the figures of the 
Sultan and the Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople would be replaced by the 
Egyptian ruler and the Coptic Orthodox Patriarch - the leader of the vast majority of 
Christians in Egypt. In contrast to the formal establishment of other millet e. g. those formed 
in the nineteenth century to accommodate the Eastern Catholic branches of the ancient 
churches, there is no precise date of the recognition of the Coptic Orthodox as a separate 
millet. Instead, it appears to have evolved in conjunction with developments in the formation 
of the Egyptian state to become the present millet system that is in operation in contemporary 
Egypt. 
In contrast, the Maronites did not live under strict millet conditions. This is mainly due to 
their isolation in their remote homeland of Mount Lebanon. Similar to Egypt, Mount 
Lebanon was officially part of the vast Ottoman Empire. Yet, Ottoman authority rarely 
penetrated deeply into this area, partly due to its remoteness and partly due to its tradition of 
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providing a safe haven for different minority groups e. g. Maronites and Druze. Thus, 
individual rulers remained relatively independent and in some cases, were favourable to the 
Maronite community. 80 The patriarch did liase between the ruler and the community but 
without the sense of inferiority that was inherent in the millet system .81 Thus, Labaki states 
that in Mount Lebanon, "They had the constitutional elements of a nation with its necessary 
organization under the leadership of the church headed by the Maronitc Patriarch. They were 
even ruled by their own civil laws". 82 As will be seen, this situation has changed as a 
consequence of the Lebanese Civil War and has evolved into what Rowe terms a "neomillet 
system", resembling the situation of other Christian communities in the region. 83 In 
conclusion, it can be seen that centuries of Islamic rule maintained and perhaps enhanced the 
civil authority of the Christian religious leaders in this region. This claim is reinforced by 
examining the political activities of previous patriarchs in both case studies. 
In the modem era, the temporal authority of the Coptic Orthodox patriarch was still 
conditioned by relations with the individual ruler. The reign of Patriarch Peter VII (1809- 
1852) coincided with that of Muhammad Ali. Due to his refusal to accept offers of 
protection from the Russian Emperor, Mohammed Ali rewarded him by easing restrictions on 
Christians. The short patriarchy of Kyrillos IV (1854-1861) was more controversial. 
Known as the "father of Coptic reform", Kyrillos IV enacted various reforms in the fields of 
education (both clerical and secular), administrative, church building and the purchase of a 
printing press. 84 While these had a major impact on the internal affairs of the church and can 
be regarded partly as a reaction to increased Catholic and Protestant missionary activities, the 
Patriarch was also active in more political issues. Kyrillos IV was instrumental in restoring 
the exemption that Christians traditionally enjoyed from conscription to the armed services. 
This had been changed as part of the reforms implemented by Mohammed Ali to provide 
equality for all Egyptians regardless of their religion. The patriarch also tried to increase the 
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foreign relations of the Coptic Orthodox Church. Although he mediated on behalf of the 
Khedive, his relations with the Russian Orthodox Church prompted rumours on his death that 
he was poisoned on the orders of the Khedive who was suspicious of these contacts and 
regarded him as a competitor for national leadership. 85 
In contrast, Kyrillos V (1875-1927) enjoyed a long patriarchy that coincided with upheaval 
in Egyptian political life, in particular the British occupation in 1882. Much of his patriarchy 
was preoccupied with the continuous struggle against laity attempts to gain control over 
church affairs. Kyrillos V used Russian diplomats to publicise these problems and 
consequently was exiled by the Khedive for six months. This event illustrated the symbolic 
importance of the Coptic Orthodox Patriarch as an Egyptian as opposed to solely a Christian 
religious leader. His return from exile was interpreted as a victory against the British 
occupation forces and he was welcomed by Muslim and Christian crowds. 86 The patriarch 
was also sympathetic to the nationalist movement, supporting the rebellion led by Ahmed 
Orabi in 1882.87 Furthermore during the 1919 Revolution, the patriarch played an important 
role in preventing the British authorities from dividing the opposition. When a Copt was 
offered the post of Prime Minister, the patriarch strongly advised the candidate to refuse. 
Hence, the patriarchy of Kyrillos V is a helpful illustration of the tendency of Coptic 
Orthodox Patriarchs to pursue policies that emphasise their loyalty to the Egyptian nation. 
The era of Patriarch Kyrillos VI marked the beginnings of the internal revival of the Coptic 
Orthodox Church. Through his cautious dealings with the Free Officers government, the 
patriarch was able to use this understanding to the advantage of the church especially the 
hierarchy. The Nasser government abolished the Majlis Milli in 1962, thus bringing an end 
to the internal friction which had plagued the church since its creation in favour of the 
patriarch . 
88 Kyrillos VI also secured presidential permission to build an agreed number of 
churches each year and the authorisation of a new patriarchal cathedral in Cairo-89 In 
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exchange for these measures, the patriarch aimed to promote loyalty to the government, 
conforming to the traditional millet model of community relations. Thus, the church issued 
declarations and held Islamic-Christian meetings during crucial times in national policy such 
as the 1956 Suez War and the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict. 90 Statements following the 
direction of government policy were also given including the condemnation of colonialism, 
the Vietnam War and calling for the liberation of Palestine as a duty for all Arabs. 91 
Kyrillos VI benefited from the personal intervention of Nasser over the Deir al-Sultan issue. 
This holy site located on the roof of the Armenian Church of St. Helena in Jerusalem has been 
at the centre of a dispute over rightful ownership between the Coptic Orthodox Church and 
the Ethiopian Church since the nineteenth century. It became an Egyptian national issue 
when Nasser supported the Coptic claims and used diplomatic pressure to ensure that the 
Jordanian authorities reinstated the rights of the Coptic church to this site. 92 Since this area 
came under Israeli control in 1967, the Ethiopians, with the support of the Israeli authorities 
have held the keys for the property. Consequently, the general anti-Israeli stance held by the 
church leadership can also be attributed to this ongoing dispute. According to Pennington, 
Patriarch Kyrillos VI mostly avoided participation in national issues, "otherwise than 
allowing his name to be used when the government needed formal support from religious 
leaders". 93 This favourable policy towards the government can be regarded as an effort to 
ensure state non-intervention in church affairs. 
Due to the relative autonomy of Mount Lebanon under Islamic rule, the Maronite 
patriarchate has always had a political dimension as the leader of the community. This was 
challenged by the Maronite lay elite who attained authority through the feudal system. 94 By 
the fifteenth century, the patriarch was no longer the sole tribal chief However, class 
conflict between the feudal lords and peasants allowed the patriarchate to reclaim temporal 
authority by the mid-nineteenth century. Led by Patriarch Boulus Masaad (1854-1890), the 
72 
first of a new generation of patriarchs from peasant backgrounds, the church leadership 
secretly supported peasant revolts against the feudal regime. According to Abraham, this 
" 95 action meant that he was "cheered as the patriarch of equality, freedom and justice . 
However, the patriarch was also wary of the popularity of the leaders of the revolt, especially 
Yusuf Karam whom he regarded as a rival for Maronite political leadership. The church 
leadership pursued a path of mediation between the two groups, in order to illustrate that 
Maronite political unity - vital for the survival of the community - could only be achieved 
through the patriarchate. 96 The defeat of the charismatic Karam who was persuaded by the 
patriarch to accept exile in order to ensure peace in Mount Lebanon, eliminated a major 
competitor to the temporal authority of the patriarch. This was enhanced by the simultaneous 
decline of the Maronite feudal aristocrats. Patriarch Masaad was also involved in the 
tensions leading to the 1860 massacres. He encouraged the Maronite peasants in the South to 
imitate their co-religionists in the north and rise against the feudal lords. However, as the 
notables in this region were predominantly Druze, this action were interpreted as an attempt 
by the patriarch to assert his authority throughout the whole area and consequently, was a 
factor in the ensuing conflict. The new political order of the mutasarrijiya, guaranteed by 
foreign powers, allowed Patriarch Masaad and his successors to consolidate temporal power. 97 
The patriarchy of Elias Hoyek (1899-193 1) illustrates the political dimension of the office. 
During the wartime Ottoman occupation, the patriarch became a target of the rulers who were 
determined to restore their authority over the region. Although finally forced in 1916 to 
accept thefirman - legal recognition of the community from the Sultan which had been 
avoided by previous Maronite patriarchs - Patriarch Hoyek resisted continual efforts by the 
government to exile him. 98 Having safely safeguarded his community from this challenge, 
the patriarch attended the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference as the head of the Lebanese 
delegation. His impassioned pleas for an independent Lebanon as opposed to incorporation 
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into Syria were instrumental in securing the establishment of Greater Lebanon under French 
protection. Patriarch Hoyek is considered a founding father of the modem state of Lebanon. 
His status was illustrated at the ceremony which proclaimed Greater Lebanon when the 
patriarch was second only to the High Commissioner in protocol. 99 Even with the 
establishment of the office of president, power remained with the High Commissioner and 
thus, the patriarch enjoyed pre-eminence as the political representative of the Maronites. 
While the patriarchs tended to be firm supporters of France, this affection did not prevent 
them speaking out when Lebanese interests were not served. Patriarch Hoyek deplored the 
anticlerical attitude of High Commissioner General Sarrail. His successor Patriarch Antoine 
Arida also criticised French policy. A main concern was the tobacco monopoly which was 
seen as promoting French economic interests at the expense of the Lebanese people. ' 00 The 
patriarch also urged the return of constitutional government and the drafting of a new 
constitution to allow the Lebanese to progress towards full sovereignty. 101 Thedesireofthe 
patriarchate for complete independence resulted in an unlikely alliance with Syrian nationalist 
leaders. Speeches by the Patriarch calling for each community to receive its rights in an 
independent Lebanon were instrumental in persuading Muslim leaders to accept Lebanon as a 
separate entity from Syria. This resulted in the patriarch becoming the focal point of 
opposition to French policies. Once independence was achieved, the church leadership 
returned to its traditional loyalty to France which was still perceived as being the main 
guarantor of the active Christian political presence in Lebanon. 
The National Pact which allocated executive powers to the president - who was Maronite - 
reintroduced the rivalry between the patriarchate and civil leaders. According to Moosa, "this 
is not to say that the National Pact destroyed the status of the patriarch as the spokesman of 
his own people; it rendered it secondary to that of the president in civil matters". 102 Under 
Patriarch Boulos Meouchi (1955-1975), the Maronite Church continued to voice its opinion 
74 
on all aspects of life. In particular, Meouchi played a major role in the 1958 crisis over both 
the pro-Western foreign policies of President Chamoun and the attempts of the president to 
gain a second unconstitutional term of office. 103 By opposing Chamoun, Patriarch Meouchi 
demonstrated his awareness of the tense regional environment which was dominated by 
Nasser's Arab nationalism and ensured that the conflict did not divide along sectarian lines. 
During a 1956 visit to Basta, a poor Muslim suburb of Beirut, the patriarch reiterated that 
Lebanon was for its entire people and placards welcomed the "patriarch of Lebanon". 104 
Qubain states that while Meouchi was still a fierce protector of Lebanese independence, he 
was aware that cordial ties with neighbouring Arab states were vital, "now that the days of 
French protection were over". 105 According to Frankel, it appeared to some worried 
Maronites that their Patriarch was the "leader of the predominantly Muslim opposition". 106 
The Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) witnessed the collapse of patriarchal temporal 
authority. Unlike his predecessors, Patriarch Antonios Khreish (1975-1986) attempted to 
stay out of politics, stating "In the past the Maronites were alone and the Patriarch was 
everything. When we gained our republic, the function and role of the Patriarch changed ... 
I 
am the Head of a Church not of a community". 107 Similarly, he explained that "We in the 
Patriarchal Seat (Bkerke) have no deterrent military force. We only have moral power which 
we have engaged in the service of Lebanon". 108 As the state had disintegrated, many 
Maronites still looked to their church to provide leadership, especially in times of crisis. Few 
Maronites agreed with the assertion of the patriarch that he had only moral and not temporal 
authority. Consequently, power within the church shifted from the patriarchate to the 
Maronite monk orders. Monks such as Sharbel Kassis and Abbot Boulos Naaman were key 
contributors to Christian "ethnic" nationalist ideology that stressed the Islamic threat to 
Maronite identity. 109 Thus, the reign of Patriarch Khreish was a sharp contrast to the political 
roles undertaken by his predecessors. 
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From this discussion, it can be seen that on the whole, the Coptic Orthodox Patriarch has 
been regarded by the different authorities in Egypt since the Arab Conquest to the present 
day, as the religious and civil head of the community. The ability of the patriarch to defend 
his community has mostly depended on his relations with the ruler. In general, successive 
patriarchs have aimed to co-operate with the Muslim rulers in order to secure the survival and 
presence of the church. While the patriarchs have never been in a position to enjoy temporal 
authority in Egypt -a predominantly Muslim country, the status attached to the position has 
ensured that for the Coptic community, the patriarch can lay claim to both spiritual and 
political leadership. In contrast, Maronite patriarchs have always enjoyed more overt 
elements of temporal authority. This is much more pronounced than other heads of Christian 
churches in the Middle East due to the unique historical circumstances of the Maronite 
community in Mount Lebanon. However, it is also true that secular leaders have always 
provided a challenge to this role. When these forces are divided or contained as occurred 
from the era of Patriarch Masaad, the patriarch remains the only figure who can unite the 
community. In contrast, if the community perceives that their needs can be better provided 
by secular leaders, then the patriarch resembles more of a symbolic figurehead than an active 
political leader. 
SUMMAI: y 
This chapter has illustrated how influential the position of patriarch is to the two case studies 
- the Coptic Orthodox and the Maronite churches. The authority invested in the office 
confers legitimacy on the patriarch to an extent that is difficult for any other communal actor 
to attain. %ile there are some constraints, these do not detract from communal acceptance 
of the patriarch as the head of the community. Equally important, the historical process 
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experienced by these communities has actually served to accentuate the temporal dimension 
of the patriarch. Throughout the centuries, both Coptic Orthodox and Maronite patriarchs 
have claimed to act as the civil head of their community. Under Islamic rule, they were 
excluded from wider access to state power but remained the recognised head of the 
community. Consequently, the absence of the effects of the secularization process as 
experienced in Europe, has had a major impact on the political role of the patriarchs. 
The analysis of previous incumbents demonstrates that Coptic Orthodox patriarchs tend to 
refrain from intervening in national affairs, other than to support policies proposed by the 
ruling regime. However, in exchange for this co-operation, they expect to enjoy autonomy 
over communal affairs, be consulted by the state on matters affecting Copts and be given 
official recognition of their status as the main spokesman for the community. In contrast, the 
different experience of the Maronites who enjoyed de facto autonomy in Mount Lebanon 
allowed Maronite patriarchs to build on their recognised leadership position and act as a 
spokesman for all Lebanese regardless of religious affiliation. While not exercising formal 
political authority, successive patriarchs have been able to use the moral power of their 
position to publicise their views on national affairs and exert the ruling elite to act according 
to these interests. The Maronite case can be regarded as a more overt example of the 
temporal authority of a patriarch. However, this role is also undertaken by the Coptic 
Orthodox Patriarch. Several patriarchs have taken advantage of the undisputed jurisdiction 
over the spiritual affairs of the community to exercise authority over the Copts in civil matters 
as well. This chapter has demonstrated that a political dimension to the patriarchal office has 
long been recognised by both the communities and rulers. Thus, the discussion on the 
political role of Patriarchs Shenouda and Sfeir must acknowledge this context and 
demonstrate the ways in which they have continued and at certain times, transformed this 
tradition. 
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ChaDter Three - The Twentieth Century Nationalist Alternative 
to Political Representation by Religious Leaders 
Introduction 
The previous chapter has illustrated that since the birth of Christianity, the patriarchal 
churches in the Middle East have enjoyed significant temporal authority. Although 
individuals were able to attain key positions in the administrative system of the various 
Islamic empires, responsibility for the political representation of Christians was conceded to 
the church hierarchy. However, this exclusive role has been challenged by other members of 
the community. The key priority was to discover a strategy where they could be fully 
involved in society as equals with their Muslim compatriots, thus not needing to resort to 
religious protection. From the late nineteenth century to mid-twentieth century, nationalism 
was perceived as the best approach. For the purposes of this study, a distinction can be made 
between Arab nationalism (acknowledging the existence of an Arab nation), Egyptian 
nationalism (restricted to Egyptian national identity) and Lebanese nationalism (more overtly 
Christian with less focus on Arabism). 
Christians throughout the Ottoman Empire were able to take advantage of the opportunities 
offered by the tanzimat reform process. The tanzimat introduced the notion of citizenship 
regardless of religious adherence and opened up possibilities for Christians to escape their 
historical dhimmi status. This led to their active participation in the development of the 
nationalist currents that became popular in the region from the early twentieth century 
onwards. However in the independence era, the shortcomings of nationalist ideologies were 
exposed. In short, regimes failed to permanently transcend religious identities and unite all 
citizens as equals under the banner of nationalism. Lacking legitimacy partly due to the 
82 
failure to deliver socioeconomic improvements, political participation, Arab unity and 
military victories, the appeal of nationalism began to wane throughout the region. Since the 
1970s, political Islam has gown to become the main political alternative to the existing 
regimes. As yet, an Islamic system has not been widely implemented in the region. 
However, if its proponents were to achieve power at a future date, this could hinder the ability 
of Christians to gain full equality and rights. In an environment where Islamists are regarded 
as the main opposition to the existing regimes, the perception of vulnerability among 
Christians is likely to increase, leading to a renewed emphasis on religious identity and 
affiliation. 
Although relevant regional trends will be discussed, this chapter will focus primarily on 
developments in Egypt and Lebanon and their effect on the Coptic Orthodox and Maronites 
respectively. This provides an interesting comparison. Although Egypt possesses a distinct 
identity and heritage, it has long been regarded as one of the leading powers in the region and 
became a key proponent of pan-Arabism. In contrast, Lebanon offers a unique example 
where the dominant nationalism supported by the Maronite community differed significantly 
from the mainstream ideological current. The two countries are also characterised by 
opposing development strategies - authoritarian statist in Egypt and laissez-faire in Lebanon. 
An overview of the contemporary political concerns of the Christians in the two countries 
(Egypt and Lebanon) highlights their unease at the present situation. Therefore, any political 
leader of the community will be measured and judged by their response to these issues. 
The Emergence of Nationalism in the Middle East and Christian Involvement 
The reforms undertaken by the Ottoman authorities in the nineteenth century had an 
important impact on the Christian communities in the region. The modernization measures 
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championed by Muhammad Ali, known as the founder of modem Egypt who ruled the 
country from 1801-1851, proved to be the catalyst for this process. Underhisregime, 
qualified Christians were allowed to achieve high positions in government. Betts argues that 
"During his long administration, Copts rose to positions of great authority both privately and 
within the government and in a relatively short period came to form the backbone of the 
Egyptian civil service". ' This openness encouraged many Christians to emigrate to Egypt, 
resulting in a variety of Christian communities flourishing in Cairo. 2 Western influence on 
the Ottoman Empire also hastened reforms. By the eighteenth century, the European powers 
had proclaimed that safeguarding the Christians of the Ottoman Empire was a primary foreign 
policy concern. However, this interest in Eastern Christians can be seen merely as an 
extension of the great power rivalries during this era. In the nineteenth century, the growth of 
British and French demands that full equality be granted to Christians can partly be attributed 
to their desire to ensure that Russia had no excuse to militarily intervene on behalf of 
Orthodox Christians. 3 Ottoman officials were also in favour of reform as not only were they 
wary of European intentions, they also believed that if the empire was to survive, it would 
need to adopt the Western model of a nation state with strong institutions and an army. 4 
Consequently, the Sultan instigated the tanzimat (reform) process. 
The Gulhane decrees proclaimed by Sultan Abdulmekid in 1839 were the first changes to 
the political system. These tried to introduce the concept of Ottomanism where all were 
5 
equal subjects regardless of religion or language. All individuals were made directly 
responsible for paying tax and military service. Thus, one of the major historical 
6 distinguishing features - thefizya (poll tax) - was abolished . While Christians tended to 
support these reforms, they were rarely implemented at the local level. The next stage was 
the Hatti Humayun decrees in 1856. These proclaimed that as all subjects were equal, 
Christians were now citizens of the empire. Discrimination on the basis of religion would no 
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longer be tolerated, Christians would be eligible for military service and legal discrimination 
would be abolished. 7 These proclamations can be regarded as revolutionary. For the first 
time, an Islamic state had tried to abolish the ideas inherited from the Covenant of Umar, 
proposing instead that all citizens were equal. These measures received a hostile reaction 
from many Muslims. While economic issues had been an underlying cause of tension in the 
past, this had usually been tempered by awareness of their dhimmi status. Courbage explains 
the difference that the tanzimat brought. "When political equality was suddenly proclaimed, 
economic inequality became a provocation, and jealousy was no longer balanced by 
,8 compassion'. Some Muslims opposed the reform process because it was seen as breaking 
the fundamental values of the Islamic state as the inequality between believers and non- 
believers preached in the Quran was no longer practised. Consequently, there were several 
incidents of sectarian violence, particularly in the geographical region of Syria. One notable 
example was in Mount Lebanon where communal violence between Maronites and Druze 
erupted in 1860. In only four weeks, 12,000 Maronites were killed, over 3000 died of 
starvation and disease, 10,000 were made refugees and many churches and Christian villages 
were burnt. 9 This conflict spilled over into Damascus where the placement of a large bell on 
a church apparently acted as the catalyst for the Muslim population to set fire to the Christian 
Quarter. 10 Yet in spite of this violence, the tanzimat radically altered the position and status 
of Christians in the empire and provided a strong foundation for their subsequent efforts under 
the nationalist movements to participate in political affairs. 
Christians enjoyed a pioneering role in the literary revival (the nahda) which occurred in 
Greater Syria from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. The modernist literary trend 
identified the existence of an Arab nation based on a shared language, culture and history. " 
The Christian scholar Butrus al-Bustani argued that both Muslims and Christians could 
identify with the common land, language and cultural heritage. Based on this premise, the 
85 
Arab nation al-umma al-'Arabiyya automatically included Christians. 12 In order to achieve 
this, he stressed that religious tolerance was vital and religion must be separated from 
politics. 13 Christian scholars played a leading role in this nahda. According to Salibi, "The 
men of the Arab renaissance were Christians whose Christianity did not deter them from 
loving the heritage of their predominantly Muslim society, and worked tirelessly to revive 
it2q. 14 They established literary societies to discuss these ideas and journals to communicate 
their concepts of Arabism to the wider public. 15 Participants in these societies were 
predominantly Christian and although some Muslims joined at a later date, they tended to be 
members of the elite rather than ordinary citizens. According to Tibi, the nahda remained a 
literary movement as the environment was not conducive to a more overt political approach . 
16 
However, the Christian scholars in the vanguard of the movement played a crucial role in 
introducing the notion of an Arab nation with a heritage separate from that of the Ottoman 
Empire. Yet, Khalidi states that their concept of Arabism had little immediate impact on the 
Muslim majority. 17 Instead, their influence was confined to accentuating the importance of 
education and mass communication. 
The ideas raised in the nahda were adapted towards the political realities of the late 
nineteenth century. Under the despotic rule of Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid 1, the Ottoman Empire 
continued its decline in direct contrast to increasing Western influence in the region. 
Throughout the empire, Westernised military officers formed secret societies which aimed to 
halt this process and restore its former power. In the Arab provinces, this loss of confidence 
in the Ottoman authorities led to increased support for the deccntralisation of the region, 
partly in order to prevent further Western penetration. 18 The notion of a distinct Arab 
identity became a usefiil tool in providing justification for the above demands. Thetension 
between the Arab provinces and the central government increased with the 1908 Young Turks 
revolution. The Turkification process pursued by the officers which included the use of the 
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Turkish language in administration, courts and schools throughout the empire, alienated most 
Arabs, significantly including a substantial amount of Muslims. ' 9 Oncemore, 
decentralisation. became a key demand. Arab nationalism was seen as a viable alternative to 
the ruling Turkish nationalism which appeared to exclude other identities. Salibi argues that 
it was Turkification rather than the merits of Arab nationalism alone, which resulted in 
Muslim acceptance of its role. 20 These activities culminated in the first Arab Congress held 
in Paris in 1913 which was attended by both Christians and Muslims. Its resolutions 
included the recognition of the Arab people, proportional representation in the central 
administration, decentralisation for the Arab provinces and recognition of Arabic as an 
official language. However, the participants still stressed their loyalty to the Ottoman 
Empire. 21 
The outbreak of World War One had a major impact on the movement. The arrest and 
execution of leading activists during 1915-1916 by the government proved the catalyst for the 
1916 Arab Revolt. 22 Guaranteed an Arab Kingdom by the British, Sharif Husain of Mecca 
led an uprising against the Ottomans. This was the first united action taken by the Arab 
nationalists and turned their cause into a populist movement. However, the long sought after 
Arab state failed to materialise due to the division of the Ottoman Empire into mandates by 
the European powers. Defeat for Turkey meant that Ottomanism was no longer a viable 
option. Consequently, the majority of Arabs came to support the Arab movement - even 
those who had been loyal to the empire until its demise. 23 The founding doctrine of the 
movement remained constant - due to a shared land, language, history and culture, Arabs 
were a nation and thus should be politically represented through their own state. According 
to Tibi, disillusionment at the colonial regimes resulted in the loss of liberal elements of the 
movement. "It developed into an apologetic, reactionary, populist and frequently aggressive 
ideology". 24 Nuseibeh states that Arab nationalism was mostly based on negatives - defined 
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by what it opposed rather than what it stood for. 25 Hence, it became anti-imperialist. 
Concentrating on achieving an Arab state was at the cost of excluding discussion concerning 
the type of state desired. This meant that differences existed over what type of nationalism to 
pursue - pan-Arabism or loyalty to the new individual states, thus severely damaging the 
chances of attaining the Arab nation state envisaged by the nahda scholars. 
Christian support during the different phases of Arab nationalism outlined above remained 
constant. However since World War One, their role as instigators of the nahda was 
superseded by Muslim political activists. 26 Once Muslims became convinced of the merits of 
Arab nationalism, Christians returned to their traditional place as a minority with only a few 
individuals taking leading positions. Consequently, Phares states that while it may have been 
formulated by Christians, the movement was largely made up of Muslims. 27 This is 
particularly crucial regarding the often ambiguous relationship between Arab nationalism and 
Islam. For Muslims, Islam was at the heart of Arab identity due to its impact on the history 
of the region and the significance of Arabic being the language of the Qur'an. It was not 
until Islam was given a more prominent role that Arab nationalism became a populist 
ideology. 28 Christians had to accept the special place of Islam in the Arab nation. Salibi 
states that they acknowledged the historical role of Muhammad as the leader who united the 
Arab nation and bequeathed the Islamic civilisation. 29 Yet this clearly differs from the 
original concept of the Arab nation which promoted ethnicity over religion. Christians were 
still eager to support the Arab nationalist movement as they were aware that an Arab nation 
state offered the best opportunity to have an equal role in society and that any alternatives 
were likely to reintroduce the dhimmi concept. In Syria, the geographical heart of the 
movement, several Christian figures were influential in developing aspects of Arab nationalist 
ideology and applying it to practical politics e. g. Michel Aflaq, a key ideologue of the Ba! th 
party and Antun Sa'ada who founded the Syrian Nationalist Socialist Party in the 1930s. 30 
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Consequently, although Islam was a major component in Arab nationalism, the belief that a 
common language and culture also contributed to Arab identity, meant that this nationalist 
movement provided the first opportunity for Eastern Christians to participate on equal terms 
with Muslims concerning their political future. 
The EgvDtian Context 
In Egypt, Christians were active participants in the early nationalist movement. As 
illustrated earlier, the Coptic Orthodox community recognises itself and is accepted as an 
indigenous group to Egypt. In fact, since the late nineteenth century, it became common for 
Copts to describe themselves as the true Egyptians, descended from their ancient Pharaonic 
ancestors. However in reality both communities can take equal pride in this heritage as most 
Egyptian Muslims can trace their origins to Copts who converted to Islam. 31 Yet, relations 
between the Christian and Muslim communities were tense at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, partly as a consequence of the British occupation since 1882. Some Copts had 
apparently hoped that they would be favoured with govemment positions by their 
coreligionists, which was met with resentment by some Egyptian Muslims. 32 Ties were 
severely strained when Prime Minister Boutros Ghali -a Copt - was assassinated in 19 10 by a 
Muslim nationalist. Many Copts believed that he had been killed primarily because he was 
Christian. 33 Consequently, a Coptic Congress organised by influential Coptic figures was 
held in Assiut in 1910 and published a list of demands - better representation, the end ofjob 
discrimination and unequal education, and Sunday as a weekly holiday for Christians. 34 
However in response, Muslims held their own Congress at Heliopolis in 1911, rejecting the 
Assiut demands as a Coptic conspiracy and declaring Islam the official religion of the state. 35 
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Yet this tense period was followed by a time of unprecedented co-operation between 
Egyptian Christians and Muslims. Under the leadership of Saad Zaghlul, Egyptians - both 
Muslim and Christian - were united in opposing the British occupation. As head of the 
Wafd, Zaghlul was keen to stress Egyptian national unity. While his inclusion of Copts in 
the initial delegation may have been primarily a token gesture, it quickly became genuine due 
to their skills, particularly in legal matters, speech making and foreign languages. 36 The 
Coptic members of the Wafd also proved to be amongst the most loyal. For example, 
Makrarn Ebeid and Sinut Hanna were imprisoned and exiled by the British authorities, thus 
ensuring that they were supported by all Egyptians. These Coptic notables clearly believed 
that stressing their credentials as nationalists was the best way to ensure an equal future in 
Egypt. While this may have been a political tactic, they were also genuinely dedicated to 
achieving Egyptian independence. A 1923 speech by Makram Ebeid stated that "all 
Egyptians, Copts and Muslims are brothers, because their mother is Egypt and their father is 
ZaghloUl". 37 According to Hasan, they "rightly calculated that in the long term it was more 
important for them to gain Muslim tolerance by proving their loyalty to the national cause 
than to count on the remote and not always effective alien Christian support". 38 Furthermore, 
communal co-operation was not confined solely to the elite. Valognes writes that the 1919 
Revolution is renowned for its symbols of national unity which were able to mask the 
previous religious antagonisms. 39 For example, the WafJ emblem was an interlocked cross 
within a crescent. Similarly, Father Sergios, a Coptic priest, led a demonstration to al-Azhar 
mosque in protest at the exile of Zaghlul and became the first Christian to preach at this 
famous Sunni institution . 
40 Copts denounced any attempt by the British to use religion to 
divide the movement such as the appointment of a Coptic Prime Minister in 1919. 
Consequently, Carter states that 'The Coptic reward for providing both leaders and 
followers to the movement was substantive incorporation into the post-independence political 
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system". 41 The first Wafd cabinet included two Coptic ministers - Murqus Hanna and Wasif 
42 Ghali 
. The popular support for the Wafd also meant that Coptic candidates were able to 
win in predominantly Muslim districts e. g. Makram. Ebeid in the Cairo area of Sayyida 
43 Zaynab 
. In general, Christian representation was significant whenever the Wafd were 
victorious. For example, 16 were elected in 1924 and 1926, which then rose to 20 in 1936.44 
Furthermore, the Wafdist Copts were eager to be seen as Egyptians rather than being 
identified by their religion. When devising the 1923 Constitution, few objected to Islarn 
being described as the state religion because other articles declared equality for all. 45 They 
also rejected to being classified a minority group. Instead, they argued that the only 
difference was religion. Egyptian Copts and Muslims shared the same language, ethnicity, 
culture and traditions. Consequently, most Egyptians accepted that Copts were only a 
minority in a strictly numerical sense. The majority of Coptic activists in the Wafd were 
strongly against including legislation to protect minorities, especially through the use of 
reserved seats. They argued that this was an attempt by Britain to remain involved in 
Egyptian internal affairs and would result in a permanent divide on religious lines. Instead, 
they were confident that Copts would be able to enjoy full participation as Egyptian citizens. 
The fact that Coptic candidates actually won more seats in 1924 than would have been 
possible under a proportional representation system was seen as proof of their success in 
achieving equality in Egyptian society. 46 
However, the high expectations raised by the Wafd were not fulfilled. The party was 
drastically weakened after the death of Zaghlul which led to a succession CriSiS. 47 makram 
Ebeid's decision to form a splinter party al-Kutla also intensified internal disunity. 48 
Although this era is regarded as the Golden Age of communal relations, simultaneously, the 
underlying Islamic current in Egyptian politics became prominent once more with the 
founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928. Wafd commitment to Coptic equality declined 
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and in order to gain votes, the party allied with the Muslim Brotherhood in 1950 with only 
seven Coptic candidates enjoying success. 49 Consequently, the Coptic community believed 
that their best opportunity to attain equality and participation in the Egyptian state had passed 
by without achieving adequate results. Nisan concludes that "Tbe struggle for an egalitarian 
pluralistic polity had been a Wafd ideal but not an Egyptian reality" . 
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The Lebanese Context 
In contrast to Christian support for Arab nationalism in Greater Syria, the Maronites in 
Lebanon developed their own form of nationalism. Amongst some Maronite circles, a strong 
attachment was formed to the idea of a separate nation with Mount Lebanon as the historical 
homeland. In order to justify these claims, intellectuals stressed the separate ethnic identity 
of the Maronites. One influential approach which began in the late nineteenth century was to 
link the Maronites of modem Lebanon with the Phoenicians - the ancient Lebanese traders, in 
order to illustrate that their origins were not found in Arab or Islamic civilization. Both 
functioned as a trading and intellectual centre for the region and cover the same geographical 
area e. g. Tyre, Sidon and Byblos. The Phoenician movement was primarily an intellectual 
one led by figures such as Charles Corm, Michel Chiha (Chaldean Christian) and Said Aql 
who founded Phoenician clubs and journals. 51 This heritage was used to justify Lebanese 
Christian demands for a separate political state. Salibi criticises this approach arguing that 
there are no direct factual links between the Phoenicians and modem Lebanese, and even if 
these did exist, it would not exclusively apply to the Maronites but instead affect all 
Lebanese. 52 Another rejection of Arabization was the claim that the Maronites are 
descendants of the Mardaites, a tribal group used by the Byzantine rulers to resist the Arab 
conquest. 53 
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These ideas were influential in the development of a separate Christian (predominantly 
Maronite) nationalism. The establishment of an independent Lebanese state was regarded by 
some as a means to secure legal recognition of the Maronite homeland. However, there were 
divisions over the function of a Lebanese state. On the one hand, figures such as Emile Edde, 
believed that the primary role of Lebanon was to be a refuge for Christians in the Middle East. 
He suggested that an independent state be based on the boundaries of Mount Lebanon to 
ensure a significant Christian population majority. 54 On the other hand, there was more 
support for "Greater Lebanon". Although accepting Christianity as a major factor in the 
identity of Lebanon, supporters of this option regarded the country as a national homeland for 
all its citizens. Support for the larger option was also motivated by the need to ensure that it 
would be economically viable. 
The Maronite desire for a homeland coincided with French interests in the Middle East. 
Hence, the French mandate was announced in 1919 and established Greater Lebanon. Areas 
with a significant Muslim population such as Tyre, Saida and the Beqaa Valley were annexed 
55 into the new state. Consequently, the 1932 census illustrated the slight majority enjoyed by 
Christians. Out of a total of 793,426 citizens, 28.7% were Maronite, 9.7% Greek Orthodox, 
5.9% Greek Catholic with a total of Christian citizens of 51.3%. Sunnis were 22.4%, Shiites 
19.6% and Druze 6.7% with a total of 48.8%. 56 Although the Maronites dominated the 
mandate state, hostility from many Muslims who had been forcibly incorporated into what 
was perceived as a Maronite Christian state, meant that they were almost solely dependent on 
French authorities to ensure the survival of their state. The Maronite community was still 
split between two trends. The National Bloc led by Emile Edde regarded Lebanon primarily 
as a homeland for Middle East Christians and supported a special relationship with France. 
In contrast, the Constitutional Bloc led by Bishara al-Khuri advocated full collaboration with 
other communities in order to attain independence which was regarded as necessary to pursue 
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their common political and economic interests. 57 With increased Sunni political participation 
since the establishment of constitutional government in 1926, the second option gained 
ground. In the immediate period of independence, it was hoped that Lebanese nationalism 
could expand to incorporate members of all the confessions rather than be restricted solely to 
one group - the Maronites. Yet it was clear even at this stage, that there was a crucial dispute 
regarding the identity of Lebanon. Was it to be a country where members of different 
confessions could coexist or would it be, in essence, a Maronite state? 
The Shortcomings of Nationalism as a Strategy for Christians in the 
Independence Era 
One of the key aims of the nationalist movements - independence - was attained as a 
consequence of World War Two. In return for support against the Axis powers, Britain and 
France promised immediate independence once hostilities ended. Owen states that although 
Arab governments were not really ready for independence, the colonial powers fulfilled their 
promises. 58 However, the granting of independence did not achieve the Arab nationalist 
dream of a pan-Arab state. Instead, the creation of new "artificial" states ensured that this 
ambition remained unfulfilled as the populations gradually transferred their loyalty to the 
individual Arab countries. The newly independent governments were immediately faced 
with challenges associated with developing states. For example, population figures increased 
at a higher rate than economic growth leading to unemployment, poverty and struggling 
welfare systems. Post-colonial governments developed into authoritarian, often military 
regimes that tended to have a charismatic leader and developed a one party monopoly. A 
series of military coups occurTed: the overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy by the Egyptian 
Free Officers in 1952, military rule in Syria since 1949 culminating in the seizure of power by 
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the Ba'thist party in 1963 and the 1958 Revolution in Iraq against Hashemite rule which also 
led to Ba'th rule in 1968.59 
Arab nationalist rhetoric was used as a legitimising tool in order to gain support from the 
people. The idea of a united Arab state was still proclaimed by the new leaders. The 
populist pan-Arabism favoured by the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser was attractive to 
many. Similarly, the Ba'thists clearly stated that loyalty to Arab unity - al-qawmiyYat al- 
arabiyya should be prioritised over patriotism to a specific state - wataniyya. 60 However, the 
Arab nationalist regimes were unable to make a significant material impact, leading to a 
situation which can be described as a crisis of state. Continual population growth and 
urbanisation resulted in huge unemployment and housing shortages. 61 The widening gap 
between the wealthy few and the impoverished masses became more apparent. Corruption 
among the ruling elite was rife, illuminating economic incompetence. Arab nationalism was 
now identified with socialist principles but was unable to solve the political, economic and 
social problems affecting the region. The failure to attain socioeconomic gains never mind 
the lofty goal of Arab unity led to the erosion of legitimacy for the Arab nationalist 
governments. Instead, regimes became single party states with little political participation. 
Political power in the military states was concentrated in the position of president and 
supported by the judiciary, military, police and intelligence services. 62 The loss of populist 
suPPort was a factor in the increased use of repression as the main means of retaining power. 
Arab nationalism was also adversely affected by the rivalry between different movements 
eager to take the lead role in the region. This was particularly true of Egypt and Syria - the 
two main state instigators of Arab nationalism. Although the majority of Arabs continued to 
see themselves as "one cohesive cultural entity", in practice, attachment was given to the 
individual states. 63 This was illustrated in 1958 with the creation of the United Arab 
Republic (UAR) -a union between Egypt and Syria. The disagreements between the two 
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parties over Egyptian domination were a major cause of its dissolution in 1961. Thissplit 
highlighted that Arab nationalism had splintered into different ideologies that were closely 
connected to a specific state. It also confirmed that identification with the so-called artificial 
nation states had been achieved to a certain extent. By this stage, pan-Arab nationalism 
could no longer be considered a practical political policy for the region but was instead 
reduced to solely rhetorical claims. 
A further blow to the Arab nationalist vision was the failure of the Arab states to defeat 
Israel after its creation in 1948. While concern had grown regarding Jewish immigration to 
Palestine in the early twentieth century, it was not until the actual establishment of a Jewish 
state that the fate of the Palestinians became a rallying point for Arabs. As the majority of 
the regimes which fought Israel were dominated by the armed forces, the lack of military 
success undermined their credibility. The final catalyst of the waning power of Arab 
nationalism was the humiliating Arab defeat in the Six Day War in 1967. Not only did the 
Israeli army rout Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian forces but their success also allowed them to 
expand their territory to include the holy city of Jerusalem. 64 This illustrated that the Arab 
leaders pursued policies perceived to be in the interests of the individual state rather than 
those of the entire Arab nation including the Palestinians. Furthermore, it was also an 
irrevocable blow to the once dominant Arab nationalist movement and cruelly highlighted 
that this long proclaimed myth had been shattered. Kramer notes that in the end, Arab 
nationalism "produced very little liberty, equality or even revenge". 65 The ideological 
movement which had been championed as an indigenous solution to multiple challenges 
proved unable to rise to the complex situation and instead, led to a crisis of state environment. 
In contrast to the earlier phases of the Arab nationalist movement, few Christians were 
actively involved in the military regimes, primarily due to the absence of high ranking 
Christian military officers. 66 Yet as the founding constitutions still stressed the equality of 
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citizens regardless of religion or ethnicity, many ordinary Christians were initially favourable 
towards the nationalist revolutions in the hope that they would provide the framework for 
equal participation in Arab society. However, the versions of Arab nationalism followed by 
the independent states proved remote from Christian aspirations. The authoritarian nature of 
the nationalist regimes did not provide the liberty and equality sought by Christians. Some 
regimes attempted to highlight the Islamic heritage of Arab nationalism in order to deflect 
criticism concerning the political and economic performance of the government. Although 
the majority of the Arab nationalist states could still be described as "secular" during this 
period, it can be argued that the constitutional guarantee of full equality regardless of religious 
affiliation was not fully implemented. As the case study of Egypt will demonstrate, 
Christians became disillusioned with the path taken by the ruling Arab nationalist regimes. 
By discarding dhimmi status, the founding laws and constitutions of the Arab nationalist 
regimes did offer Christians some protection from the Islamic system of managing other faith 
communities which they had lived under from the days of the Arab conquest. However, in 
practice, these regimes failed to fulfil the perhaps lofty ambitions that Christians had come to 
associate with Arab nationalism. 
The Egyptian Context 
During this phase of the Arab nationalist ideology, developments in Egypt mirrored those 
described above. The 1952 Free Officers Revolution abolished the monarchy and ascribed 
political power to the military. Within a short period, this was concentrated in the position of 
president, supported by the military, police and intelligence services. 67 Yet due to his 
charisma, Nasser did enjoy initial populist support for Pan-Arabism, especially after his 
perceived success in challenging Britain, France and Israel over the Suez Canal in 1956. 
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This proved short-lived as Nasser the champion of pan-Arabism could not deliver the 
socioeconomic benefits desired by the Egyptian population, failed to achieve victory in the 
Arab-Israeli wars and apart from the temporary union with Syria, achieved little concrete 
success in furthering moves towards Arab unity. 
The formation of the military regime also had a significant impact on the Christian 
community in Egypt. Although officially proclaimed a secular ideology, the links between 
Pan-Arabism and Islam were extremely strong in contrast to the situation at the turn of the 
century. Following the precedent set during the Wafd era, freedom of religion was 
constitutionally guaranteed but Islam as the religion of the vast majority of Egyptians was 
acknowledged as the state religion. The lack of Coptic figures in the upper ranks of the 
military excluded close involvement in the new regime. A by-product of several policies 
followed by the government was the decline of influence of the Coptic elite. Their status in 
the community was adversely affected by the abolition of the al-majUs al-milli (community 
. 
68 -ma -milli had long been a source of council) As described in Chapter Two, the al jlis al 
conflict between the church and the elite and was the main body used by the elite to exert 
their influence over both the church hierarchy and the community. Nasser was keen to 
disband any independent organisation that could have the capacity to become the focus of 
opposition to the regime. In 1955, a presidential decree dismantled the separate religious 
courts (a residue of the millet system) and unified the personal status laws. As the council 
presided over these courts, its influence diminished. The Coptic elite was dealt a fatal blow 
with the resolution of the waqf (land which provided income for the church) problem. As 
part of its nationalization policy, the regime had confiscated church land over two hundred 
feddans. Not only did this deprive the church of important revenues, it also further curtailed 
the authority of the elite by threatening its involvement in the financial affairs of the 
community. 69 In 1960, Nasser agreed to allow the patriarch to take control of the remaining 
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waqf land. The Coptic Orthodox Waqf organization was created and its members were 
chosen exclusively by the patriarch. The decline of the elite hindered their ability to fulfil 
their traditional role as liaison between the church and state. Thus, this constant source of 
communal tension was eventually resolved in favour of church dominance over the 
community. 
The political influence of the Coptic elite also diminished at the national level. The 
traditional method of political participation for the Coptic elite halted when the new regime 
banned all political parties. 70 Land reform and the nationalization of companies had a severe 
impact on the Christian elite who tended to invest in land and business, partly due to their 
economic success but also as a means to ensure protection and power. 71 While certainly not 
directed solely against Christians, this loss of power and prestige meant that a significant 
number of the Christian elite, particularly the younger generation, began to emigrate from the 
1960s onwards. 72 However, Nasser did ensure that Coptic representation was maintained in 
parliament and the Cabinet by appointing additional members to supplement the Coptic 
presence. The president also continued the tradition of including two Copts in the Cabinet. 
According to Nisan, "Nasser traditionally appointed one or two Coptic ministers to the 
cabinet, a political crumb with no concomitant poweeg. 73 The main impact of the 1952 
Revolution on Christians was to deprive the traditional elite of their prestige and power and 
allow only a token political participation. 
The Lebanese Context 
Lebanese nationalism underwent a different series of events from those in Egypt and several 
other Arab states. Lebanon avoided military regimes and compared to neighbouring 
countries, enjoyed relative freedom. This can be traced back to the unique situation of the 
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historic role of Lebanon as a refuge for various communities. In order to attain 
independence, two of the main groups - the Maronites and the Sunnis - negotiated to find an 
arrangement that would satisfy both sides. The result was the 1943 National Pact (al-Mithaq 
al-Watani). Initially an oral pledge between Bishara al-Khuri and Riyad al-Solh, the 
National Pact becarrie institutionalised as an unwritten constitution. 74 The main political 
offices were assigned to the six major sects. Each community was represented in the political 
system according to its proportion of the population registered in the 1932 census. 
Parliamentary representation was fixed at a ratio of 6: 5 in favour of the Christian 
communities. The National Pact defined Lebanon as Balad Yhu Wajh Arabi (country with an 
Arab face) 
. 
75 Thus, the Maronites accepted that Lebanon was situated in the Arab world and 
renounced Western protection, while Muslims recognised Lebanon as a separate sovereign 
state and abandoned the idea of a Greater Syria. Khazen describes this compromise as 
"Lebanonizing Muslims and Arabizing Christians". 76 
The National Pact reflected the interests of the elite who chose political pragmatism in order 
to attain independence. Success depended on the ability of the elite to form a grand coalition 
and exercise a mutual veto. 77 Whenever this was endangered, the cohesiveness of the state 
was at risk. The ambiguity inherent in the National Pact meant that it was also open to 
different and often contrasting communal interpretations. As it enshrined confessionalism, it 
also acted as an obstacle to attaining a Lebanese identity that could override these 
attachments. Furthermore, this power sharing agreement rested on the distribution of power 
according to the 1932 census. Yet, there were no provisions to amend the political system to 
reflect future demographic changes. By confirming confessionalism, the National Pact may 
have enabled the political elite to attain independence but simultaneously, it constrained their 
ability to develop a nation consisting of Lebanese and resulted instead in a Lebanon made up 
of different confessional communities. This failure to develop a true Lebanese nationalist 
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movement acceptable to all groups increased the likelihood that national unity would 
disintegrate whenever challenged. 
A major test was experienced with the 1958 crisis. The pro-Western foreign policy of 
President Chamoun culminating in acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine was perceived as 
deviating from the provisions of the National Pact which stressed the need for strict neutrality. 
Under Chainoun, Lebanon was the only Arab country not to sever diplomatic ties with France 
over the 1956 Suez invasion. While the personal rivalry between Chamoun and the Egyptian 
President was a factor, this incident also illustrated the different views of the confessional 
communities in Lebanon towards regional developments. Lebanese Muslims, like their 
coreligionists throughout the Arab world, were drawn to Nasser's pan-Arabism. However, 
some of the Maronite elite viewed this doctrine as a challenge to Lebanese independence. 
Contrary to the National Pact, they turned to the West for protection. 78 In this context, the 
attempt by Chamoun to amend the constitution in order to extend his presidential mandate 
proved inflammatory. This move also alienated several influential Maronite actors as well as 
members of the Muslim communities and prevented the unrest denigrating into confessional 
conflict. Two to four thousand people were victims of a civil war that also had a significant 
impact on the econoMy. 79 The elite were able to halt the violence by choosing the next 
president, General Fu'ad Shihab, the army commander who had refused Chamoun's orders to 
crush the uprising. On this occasion, Lebanese identity survived the challenge but it 
illustrated that national unity was extremely fragile. 
Similar to other countries in the region, post-colonial Lebanon also satisfied the crisis of 
state criteria. The laissez-faire economic policies followed by successive governments, with 
the exception of the Shihab years, contributed to substantial wealth inequality. Uneven 
development resulted in Greater Beirut and parts of Mount Lebanon prospering, while the 
North, South and Beqaa with significant Muslim populations, were mostly ignored by the 
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authorities. Corruption among the elite was also rife, leading ordinary Lebanese to believe 
that communal leaders were only interested in maintaining their privileged position. The 
Lebanese political system was one based on clientelism. The zuama (the traditional term 
given to communal leaders) relied on political patronage to safeguard their position and status 
in the community. Members of the traditional zuama families from each community became 
parliamentary deputies. As the main aim was to protect the interests of their own community 
in order to secure re-election, the granting of favours tended to be conducted on a 
confessional basiS. 80 Primordial ties of kinship and local community ensured that 
confessionalism remained entrenched in Lebanese politics and hindered the development of a 
genuine party system. 
Adding to these socioeconomic challenges, Lebanon also suffered serious security threats. 
The geographic location of the country in one of the most turbulent regions of the world 
ensured that Lebanon was always vulnerable to outside pressure. Having barely survived the 
Arab nationalist challenge in 1958, the Palestinian presence in Lebanon from the late 1960s 
presented a grave obstacle to the cohesion of the Lebanese state. Negotiations to regulate 
Palestinian armed raids on Israel that were launched from Lebanon led to the 1969 Cairo 
Agreement. This recognised Lebanese sovereignty but gave Palestinian organisations the 
right to be armed within the refugee camps. In reality, the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization was given extra-territorial rights, creating what Nisan terms "Fatahland". 81 The 
1970 Jordanian crackdown against Palestinian militants left Lebanon as the only remaining 
base. The Lebanese government was unable to replicate the actions of their neighbour as the 
Palestinian issue proved extremely divisive. According to Picard, the success of the National 
Pact depended on an "utopian plan" to maintain neutrality in regional affairs. 82 Instead, "The 
Palestinian powder keg, skilfully confined to Lebanese territory by neighbouring regimes 
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determined to maintain order in their own lands, added fire and blood to a Lebanese society 
already inflamed by its domestic divisions". 83 
From independence until the outbreak of civil war in 1975, the Lebanese strand of 
nationalism barely survived the numerous challenges detailed above. It persevered primarily 
because the Christians, especially the Maronites were able to dominate the new state with 
support from the Sunni elite. In this way, it was a successful strategy for Christians to 
maintain their privileges and political participation. However, the failure to develop a 
nationalist ideology that included all communities from all social classes - not just the elite - 
meant that this could only be a short-term policy. Communal ties continued to be prioritised 
over national identity. The Palestinian issue proved to be one challenge too many. 
Traditional Maronite fears concerning their future in a Muslim dominated region, became 
prominent once more. A lingering doubt remained that given the opportunity, Lebanese 
Muslims would seek to introduce dhimmi status for Christians in Lebanon. 84 This perception 
that Muslims had divided loyalties over their country and their faith, meant that any calls for 
reform or support for the Palestinians were rejected as a ploy to deprive Christians of their 
political power. Amongst Maronites, Lebanese nationalism became equated with support of 
Christian rights in the country. According to Haddad, "Lebanonism emphasises 
individualism and self-sufficiency, rejection of Islam and the Arab world, identification with 
the West and some Western values and insistence on the survival of Lebanon as a Christian 
, 85 and democratic heartland in the Middle East'. The mythologies mentioned earlier e. g. 
Phoenicianism. and the romantic attachment to the land, were used to justify this stance. The 
somewhat half-hearted attempt since independence to reach out to all Lebanese as citizens of 
one state and members of one nation categorically failed with the outbreak of a long and 
tragic civil war in 1975. 
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The Challenges to Nationalism since the 1970s and the impact on Christians 
In the contemporary Arab world, political Islam can now be regarded as the main populist 
ideology. Politically active Islamist groups are not new to the region. However, the 1967 
war proved to be the catalyst which illustrated the demise of Arab nationalism and focused 
attention on other movements aiming to fill the political vacuum. To explain the Arab defeat, 
Islamists suggested that it was a punishment from God because of Muslim deviation from 
Islamic values. 86 Thus, it was necessary to Islamize society as a prerequisite before victory 
could be achieved. The ambiguous relationship between Arab nationalism and Islam allowed 
the ruling regimes to capitalise on this return to religion and use Islam as a legitimising tool to 
fill this ideological vacuum. In contrast to 1967, the Arab war against Israel in 1973 was 
fought under the banner of Islam. For example, it was named the Ramadan War, the 
Egyptian attack was given the code name Badr, a significant battle won by the Prophet and 
the battle cry Allahu Akhbar (God is Most Great). 87 The initial Egyptian attack burst through 
the Israeli defence, destroying the myth of an invincible Israel. The Israelis regained the 
initiative and the war was halted when a ceasefire was imposed on 22 nd October with strong 
backing from the superpowers. However, this war was viewed in the Arab world as a moral 
victory and a religious success. Simultaneously, the balance of power within the region 
shifted to the oil rich conservative Gulf States, especially after the oil embargo. Furthermore, 
the 1979 Iranian Revolution highlighted the increasing power of political Islam. The Pahlavi 
regime, associated with the West, was replaced by an Islamic state led by clerics proving that 
the impossible was possible. Therefore, the failure of Arab nationalism allowed Muslims to 
rediscover an alternative - Islam. 
The key objective of political Islam is to establish an Islamic state as only then can Muslim 
society be deemed truly Islamic. Islamist theorists assert that Islam is more than nih1ah 
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(religion) but instead, din wa dawlah (way of life). 88 Mawlana Ala Mawdudi, an influential 
twentieth century Islamist, preached that Islam was a self-sufficient ideology which covered 
all aspects of life. As sovereignty comes from God alone, the separation of state and religion 
is deemed impossible. An Islamic system was championed as the only means to provide a 
favourable environment for Muslims. The problems faced by Muslims in the twentieth 
century were blamed on the failure of the umma to be faithful to the teachings of Islam. 
Muslim power and status would only be regained by returning to the correct path - sirat al- 
mustaqim. 89 The implementation of sharia law is regarded as vital by Islamists as it is a fully 
comprehensive code of conduct regarding all aspects of life and the only meaningful law for 
Muslims. Esposito describes it as "a set of divinely revealed general principles, directives, 
and values". 90 Consequently, these objectives of political Islamists raises questions regarding 
the status of non-Muslims in an Islamic state. 
The ambivalence inherent in the Quran regarding this subject is replicated in the framework 
offered by Islamists. In general, cordial relations are advocated between Muslims and 
Christians. Islamists tend to promote the history of Muslim tolerance towards other religious 
communities, especially in contrast to the Western experience of Jewish persecution. 91 There 
is also common agreement that Muslims can respect the rights of others without giving 
credence to their beliefs. Shad should only be waged against those who actively oppose 
Muslims. Yet, the ambivalence of the Quran regarding Christians means that more radical 
theorists such as Sayyid Qutb argue that Christians cannot be shown friendship as this would 
amount to recognising another religion. 92 Islamists acknowledge that an Islamic state 
discriminates between believers and non-believers as preached in the Quran. Citizenship is 
based on membership of a religion. Outlining his vision of the Islamic state, Mawdudi 
envisaged two types of citizenship - one for Muslims who took responsibility for the state and 
the other for non-Muslims who agreed to be loyal to the state. 93 Islamist activists tend to 
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refer to Christians as muwatin meaning compatriot rather than as citizen. 94 Kramer states that 
the main purpose of the Islamic state is to pursue the interests of the umma through the sharia. 
The refusal of non-bclicvers to observe all aspects of Islamic laws, means that they cannot be 
95 involved with decision-making and implementing policies. The main limit on Christians in 
a modem Islamic state is political. In general, they are only able to hold non-sensitive posts, 
i. e. reverting back to their historical prominence in administration. Ayatollah Muhammad 
Husayn Fadlallah, a prominent Shiite spiritual leader in Lebanon admits that Christians could 
not have high office in an Islamic state but solely because no state allows people who do not 
adhere to the key tenets of the ruling system to have leading positions. 96 
While the inequality inherent in the Islamic system is highlighted when examining political 
participation, this also affects religious freedom. The political nature of Islam means that the 
religious sphere is not confined solely to matters of worship but also concerns relations 
between the different communities. In general, the ahl al-kitab are expected to consider 
Muslim feelings and respect Islam. Limitations include not selling forbidden items such as 
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alcohol or pork, showing religious symbols in public or speaking negatively of Islam. Yet, 
these restrictions are not reciprocated by Muslims because Islam is regarded as the superior 
religion. This can be seen as an interpretation of the historical covenants which allowed non- 
Muslims religious autonomy on the condition that they did not abuse these privileges. A 
98 
similar modemised version of thefizya would also be expected. It is clear that Islamists do 
not envisage a situation where Christians would enjoy equal participation in all aspects of 
society, including religion and politics. Christian communities in an Islamic state would 
appear to revert back to dhimmi status, with all the historical inequality and challenges that 
the term implies. At present, the existing regimes have defined Islamist movements as the 
main threat to their rule and accordingly have adopted repressive measures towards them. It 
is also unknown whether political Islam would deliver its promises once in power or prove to 
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be a disappointment just like Arab nationalism. However, perceptions of vulnerability 
among Christians in the Middle East have increased in recognition of the populist support for 
these ideas. 99 
The Egyptian Context 
An examination of Egypt illuminates the influence of political Islam and the impact this has 
had on the Christian population. Historically Egypt has been at the forefront of any emerging 
trends in the Arab world. It is no surprise that the Muslim Brotherhood - the prototype for 
Islamist movements - was founded in Egypt by an Egyptian schoolteacher Hassan al-Banna 
in 1928. The movement became the target of successive governments, resulting in mass 
imprisonment and the execution of leaders including the influential theorist Sayyid Qutb. 
For example, over 1000 Islamist activists were arrested in 1954, followed by over 27,000 in 
1965 as part of a wider crackdown on opposition to the regime. ' 00 However, once Anwar 
Sadat became president, the Muslim Brotherhood was effectively given a new lease of life. 
Facing opposition from left-wing movements, he turned to Islamists to counter this threat. 
Sadat released Islamist prisoners and tolerated their social work and presence in universities. 
He also tried to gain their support by amending the constitution to ascribe a greater role to the 
sharia in Egyptian law. 101 On a personal level, he adopted Islamic rhetoric in his speeches, 
and called himself "The Believer Presidenf '. 102 However, the use of Islamist movements to 
balance political power had its own consequences. All these groups denounced the 1977 
peace negotiations with Israel. There was also an increase in militancy as some Islamists 
advocated the use of violence against the regime. 
A significant consequence of this Islamization process was the increase in incidents against 
Christians. It must be noted that Sadat was not specifically anti-Christian. In fact, some 
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measures benefited them. The infitah - open door economic policy - allowed Christians to 
participate once more in private business. 103 However, his policies did aid the Islamic revival 
which occurred at this time. Groups such as al-Shadjustified attacks by arguing that 
believers had the right to impose their will on others by force. 104 In 1972, a church in al- 
Khanka was attacked and ensuing protests by the Coptic community resulted in riots which 
left numerous Christian homes and shops destroyed. 105 There were various incidents in 
Upper Egypt when priests were attacked and churches burnt. In 1981, fourteen people were 
killed and over one hundred wounded in riots in Zawya al-Hamra, a poor suburb of Cairo. 106 
During these events, there was a general feeling amongst the Coptic community that the 
authorities were not protecting Christians, instead trying to appease the Islamist movements. 
By 1981, the president authorised a crackdown on all opposition members leading to over 
1500 arrests including many Islamists. 107 However, these actions were not enough to prevent 
the assassination of Sadat on 6 th October 1981 by Islamist militants. 108 
The Mubarak government targeted Islamic militants associated with the killing of Sadat but 
during the 1980s and 1990s, violence continued against Copts, primarily in Upper Egypt and 
areas of Cairo. Accusations of Christian provocations were used to justify attacks on 
churches, jewellery shops and assaults on individuals. 109 In 1992, an assault on Christians 
working in the fields around Mansinat Nassir resulted in the deaths of thirteen Christians and 
two Muslims who attempted to aid them. ' 10 Two monks and three lay Copts were shot 
outside the Deir al-Muharraq monastery in 1994 and nine Copts were killed during an attack 
on a church in Abu Qurqas, a village in Upper Egypt in 1997.111 These examples illustrate 
the dangers facing the Coptic community at this time. Yet, Mubarak concentrated on 
denying the Islamist opposition any further chances to overthrow the state. Methods to 
accomplish this included strict emergency laws and military courts that gave harsh sentences 
with no appeal! 12 The government also sought to gain control of mainstream Islam by 
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nationalising mosques and making licenses mandatory for preachers. 113 It was not until the 
mid 1990s that the government tackled the militants largely responsible for attacks on the 
Copts in Upper Egypt. This was primarily due to a change of tactics by the militants who 
began to target the security services and tourists in order to inflict maximum damage on the 
state. The economic consequences alienated public support for these movements, especially 
after the 1997 Luxor massacre when 58 tourists and 4 Egyptians were killed. ' 14 Government 
action including mass arrests and violent confrontation, mostly succeeded in crushing these 
groups and consequently, militant attacks on Copts decreased massively. 
Under the Mubarak presidency, the Muslim Brotherhood has opted for political 
participation and is committed to a non-violent approach. Due to the prohibition of parties 
based on religious lines, the movement has entered electoral alliances with other parties. 
This allowed it to become the largest opposition group with nineteen seats in 2000 (although 
running as independents due to the restrictions on their participation placed by the 
government). ' 15 This success was continued in the 2005 elections when Islamist candidates 
dramatically increased their parliamentary representation to around ninety seats with almost 
40% of votes cast. 116 These achievements have been attained despite being banned and 
suffering frequent government harassment. Electoral laws have been changed to hinder small 
parties. For example, in 1987, a complex proportional representation system was introduced 
which required parties to poll over an 8% threshold in order to be represented in 
parliament. ' 17 Muslim Brotherhood participation in civil society through professional 
associations has also been targeted. In 1995 the judiciary was given powers to intervene to 
prevent Muslim Brotherhood members standing as candidates and in 1996, the lawyers and 
engineers syndicates were taken over by the state and closed down-' 
18 Even their success in 
de facto political participation is tempered by the strength of the ruling party. In the same 
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2000 elections mentioned above, the NDP not only polled 353 seats but also 35 independent 
candidates joined the governing party. 119 
In this period, the Muslim Brotherhood has tried to stress that it is committed to full rights 
for all Egyptians regardless of religion. 120 For example, Coptic candidates have been 
selected as electoral candidates. Yet there is still wariness among Copts (and many Muslims) 
as to how genuine these proposals are and how they would be guaranteed in practice. The 
Muslim Brotherhood has also continued its social work including clinics, schools and charity 
services, often in contrast to the failure of the state to provide these services. Furthermore, as 
these services are usually channelled through the mosque, the organization has been able to 
make the mosque the centre of the community. 12 1 Hence, through its visible presence, the 
Muslim Brotherhood illustrates the strength of political Islam in Egyptian society. 
However, the Islamic revival in Egypt as in other countries has not been exclusive to 
Islamist movements. The government has also sought to promote mainstream Islam as a 
counter to the Islamist current. State finance has increased to institutions such as al Azhar 
and the Higher Council for Islamic Affairs. A growing Islamization of Egyptian society is 
evident today. Regarding the impact of Islamist activists on popular culture, Gerges declares 
that "they lost the war but won the debate". 122 A major illustration of this Islamic cultural 
revival is its increasing visibility. In contrast to the 1960s, the wearing of the veil has 
become the norm for Muslim women, and men often grow beards as a sign of their beliefs. 
Islamic symbols and religious "noise" such as the recital of the Quran, are frequent in shops 
and offices. 123 Mosque attendance has increased, and government offices and news bulletins 
halt for the call to prayer. 124 Religious programmes are frequent on radio and television and 
bestselling books tend to be tafsirs (commentaries of the Quran). It is clear that Islam in 
Egypt in the late twentieth century enjoyed a cultural revival that has once more put it at the 
centre of society. No matter how hard the government and others may try to contain it to the 
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cultural sphere only, Islam will continue to have an impact on the Egyptian political system. 
These developments have increased Christian vulnerability as they become increasingly 
aware of the more fervent religious environment. 
The Lebanese Context 
The failure to establish an inclusive Lebanese nationalism was vividly illustrated during the 
civil war (1975-1990). This conflict not only proved that confessional identity remained the 
primary tie in Lebanese society but also intensified the divide between confessions. Power 
shifted to the various militias (mostly organised on confessional lines) which were employed 
by communal leaders to expel members of other groups from their territory leading to de facto 
cantonization. 125 Atrocities were committed by all sides and renewed mutual suspicions. 
One notorious act was the revenge killings after the assassination of the President-Elect 
Bashir Gemayel, committed by the Maronite Kataib militia in September 1982 in the Sabra 
and Shatilla refugee camps. The number of victims (mainly women and children) is disputed 
and ranges from 700-800 according to the Israeli Kahan Committee while other sources raise 
this figure to 1500-2000.126 In general, the Maronite community felt particularly vulnerable 
during the civil war period. A significant proportion of the estimated 25% Lebanese affected 
by forced displacement were Christian. 127 For example, the 1983 Mountain War resulted in 
the expulsion of Christians from the Chouf, with over 1400 Christians killed., 28 Lebanese 
from all confessions chose to emigrate during the war years. However, roughly 75% of those 
emigrating in 1975 were Christian and six years later, the figure was 68%., 
29 
Many Maronites believed that they were fighting to ensure the survival of a Lebanese state 
which would allow them to fully participate in national affairs. To secure this, some 
Christian nationalists advocated the creation of an overt Christian state or a fcderal system 
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where Maronites would enjoy political autonomy in their own area. Support from certain 
Maronite circles for an alliance with Israel, particularly during the Israeli occupation of 
Lebanon, did little to enhance relations with other communities. 130 The radicalization of 
some Lebanese Muslim groups also raised concerns for Maronites. Iranian influence was 
instrumental in the founding of the Shiite movement Hizb'allah which in its charter, discloses 
its eventual aim of establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon. For the moment, Hizb'allah has 
decided to participate in the confessional political system. While political Islam may not 
present the same threat to Christians in Lebanon as it does in other parts of the Arab world 
due to the size of the community and the presence of other confessional groups, it still adds to 
Christian perceptions of vulnerability. 
As a consequence of the 1989 Taif Accord, hostilities finally ceased several months later. 
In one sense, the Lebanese nation was made whole again but ironically, considering the 
struggle for independence, under Syrian tutelage. The Lebanese nationalist current which 
had recognised that its Christian past was an active contributor to national identity was no 
longer predominant. Maronites were concerned that in post-war Lebanon, their interests 
would not be adequately represented through the national framework alone. Although the 
Taif Accord continued to grant the presidency to the Maronites, the powers of the next two 
offices - Prime Minister (Sunni) and Speaker of Parliament (Shiite) were increased with all 
three enjoying the right of veto. ' 31 Continuing the tradition of strong communal leadership, 
leaders from each confession gained official positions in the Taif system and theoretically 
represented the interests of their group. However, by the end of the war, the Maronite 
leadership was weak and divided. 
Like most groups, internal factionalism led to periodic intracommunal conflict. A 
damaging schism occurred in 1989. Under General Michel Aoun, the army had been revived 
as a state institution and attempted to establish law and order within the Christian enclave. 
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As caretaker Prime Minister, Aoun launched a War of Liberation in March 1989 against the 
Syrian presence in Lebanon which had been legitimised by the Taif Accord. Sporadic 
clashes between the Aoun army faction and the Maronite militias who feared the loss of 
power, culminated in a failed attempt by Samir Geagea, the head of the Lebanese Forces, to 
oust Aoun. A new round of fighting occurred, what Phares terms the "first Lebanese 
ChriStianCiVilWae'. 132 In the battle for supremacy between Aoun and Geagea, one 
thousand people were killed, three thousand wounded and the Christian enclave was divided 
into two sections. 133 A significant proportion of the Maronite masses remained loyal to 
Aoun's attempts to defend Lebanese sovereignty. However, an attack on the presidential 
palace and Aoun territory by Lebanese and Syrian forces ended this last resistance in October 
1990. Consequently, by the end of the civil war, it was clear to all that the Maronites had 
relinquished two criteria central to Maronite policies since the mandate era. Only on paper 
did Maronite supremacy and Lebanese independence still exist. 
The Contemporary Concems of the Coptic Orthodox and Maronite 
Communities 
This chapter has argued that religious identity in the two case studies has proved too strong 
to allow nationalist strategies to satisfy all parties. The Egyptian version of nationalism did 
attempt to incorporate Christians in to the nation state as equal citizens with their Muslim 
compatriots. However, it can be argued that it did not deliver its promises of equality and 
citizenship to the extent expected by Egyptian Christians. In contrast, Lebanese nationalism 
was too closely linked to Christian interests to attract widespread Muslim support and instead, 
identity remained primarily at the confessional level. Although different development 
strategies were employed, both the statist and laissez-faire approaches have failed to deliver 
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successful economic growth, leading to a further obstacle to widespread support for 
nationalist ideologies. The failure to attain full participation and enjoy widespread 
socioeconomic benefits has led to disillusionment among Middle East Christians. As a 
consequence of the increased public role of Islam in the region, Christian perceptions of 
vulnerability have also grown. Thus, any political leader will be judged by their success in 
articulating and responding to the political concerns expressed by the communities. 
Christian Concems in Egypt 
In Egypt, a key Christian demand is adequate Coptic representation in the political system. 
According to Murqus, under the nationalist regime, Copts retained their social citizenship but 
lost their political citizenship. 134 The President usually appoints around five or six Coptic 
parliament deputies and one or two Cabinet ministers. These figures tend to come from the 
traditional notable families e. g. Makram Ebeid, Boutros Ghali, Wassif and Abdelnour. 135 
These representatives appointed by the government are frequently dismissed by ordinary 
members of the community as belonging to an elite that has no interest in the ordinary 
people. 136 Often they are accused of being Christians by name only and their participation is 
viewed purely as symbolic. Few Coptic candidates are elected to Parliament or even selected 
for party lists, mainly due to the perception that they are unlikely to win votes in a 
predominant Muslim society. Most also feel that Christians will not be appointed to top 
positions solely due to their religion. Ordinary Copts tend to dismiss the nomination of 
Coptic candidates by the NDP or opposition parties as merely decorative and not an indication 
of genuine support amongst the Egyptian political elite for Coptic participation. 137 As the 
1977 Political Parties Law prohibits parties formed on religious, class or regional lines, there 
has never been a solely Coptic political party. 138 There is a general consensus among the 
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community that while a Coptic party could be successful at raising issues that are mostly 
ignored by mainstream parties, this would be at the cost of inviting hostility upon the 
community. 
Like many Egyptians, Copts can also be accused of apathy towards politics, especially at 
election time. For example, voter turnout for the 2005 parliamentary elections was a pitiful 
20%. 139 This tendency amongst Copts has been criticised by Coptic intellectuals who urge 
the community to solve their problems by becoming proactive in political affairs instead of 
continuing the widespread withdrawal that has become common. After the 2005 elections, 
Dr. Nabil Luqa Babawi dismissed the existing political approach of the community as merely 
comprising of "weeping and wailing" and suggested that it was not surprising that the 
community was politically marginalised. 140 However, many Copts (and indeed Egyptians) 
would respond to this accusation that as elections in Egypt make little difference to the figures 
or policies of the government, there is little incentive to participate. Copts would also cite the 
above arguments concerning the difficulties experienced by Coptic candidates as further 
reasons which dissuade involvement in the political system. 
However, there has been some recognition of the problem regarding Coptic political 
participation. In the run-up to the 2000 elections, many influential figures stressed the need 
to entice Copts to participate in the political life of their country. 141 Consequently, 75 Coptic 
candidates stood for election, mostly businessmen running as independents. The WafJ party 
nominated 12, the banned Labour Party (Islamists) 9, Tagammu. 4 and the NDP 3.1 42 Forthe 
first time since 1952,3 Copts were elected, Youssef Boutros Ghali (NDP), Ramy Lakah an 
independent who resigned due to holding dual citizenship, and Wafd candidate Mounir Fakhri 
Abdel Nour. 143 On the whole, the election was conducted with minimal sectarian language. 
While the 2000 elections represented an important breakthrough, it is unclear if these efforts 
will become permanent. For example, only one Coptic candidate was successful in 2005 - 
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the Minister of Finance Youssef Boutros Ghali. Thus, it can still be argued that many parties 
and voters perceive a Coptic candidate as an electoral disadvantage and unlikely to succeed. 
Furthermore, the strength of the Muslim Brotherhood in these elections also served to raise 
fears in the Coptic community. 
The perception of discrimination is a longstanding Coptic view. Equality is enshrined in 
the constitution but some members of the community believe that this is not fully 
implemented. While discriminatory measures are not widespread, many Copts perceive that 
they do not enjoy equality regarding employment and opportunities. Until January 2006, 
there were no Coptic regional governors and few are found in high-ranking positions in the 
military and security services. 144 However, the list of new appointments for the twenty-six 
govemates included a Coptic military officer Lt. Gen. MaJdi Ayoun Iskandar, formerly an 
assistant to the Minister of Interior who was made the governor of Qana. 145 Prior to his 
appointment, Fouad Aziz Ghali, a decorated war hero from the 1973 war, was the last Copt to 
hold the office of governor (Southern Sinai 1980-1983). Clearly, there are opportunities for 
Coptic figures to be successful in this field. Furthermore, as a consequence of the size of the 
Coptic community, it would be expected that they would be a smaller proportion in such 
statistics. The perception among Copts of discrimination in certain areas also means that few 
enter these career areas e. g. police or security services, thus decreasing the already minimal 
pool of candidates to choose from. Instead, educated Copts tend to either work in the 
business sector (where they can be extremely successful) or else concentrate on specific 
professions including legal affairs, journalism and especially medicine. This has led to the 
possibility that Copts may be over-representcd in these areas. Consequently, one argument 
suggests that this compensates for the difficulties experienced in reaching high office in the 
political and military fields. 146 This is reminiscent of the historical status of non-Muslims as 
116 
dhimmi under the millet system where economic prosperity was possible but political power 
and authority over the Islamic armies was generally exclusive to Muslims. 
There are two main examples of discrimination given by Copts. The first concerns 
religious freedom. Copts are free to practice their own religion but this does not extend to 
proselytism. Due to mass social pressure against converting to Christianity, few Muslims 
convert and those who do, often emigrate to the West, contributing little to the indigenous 
community. 147 In contrast, the process for conversion to Islam is substantially easier e. g. new 
ID cards are issued quickly. However, procedures are still implemented including the 
requirement that the individual must meet with a priest before the official conversion takes 
place. It is estimated that 10-15,000 Egyptian Christians convert to Islam each year often due 
to economic and social reasons. Rumours regarding the kidnapping of Coptic girls and their 
subsequent forced conversion do arise. However, little evidence has been provided to back 
these claims, which frequently concern young women who wish to marry Muslim men. Yet 
several times, most notably over the Wafaa Constantine affair in December 2004 (the wife of 
a Coptic priest purportedly converted but was then returned to the church hierarchy by the 
authorities), the Coptic community has demonstrated for the return of Coptic women who 
they believe were forcibly converted. 
The second example is the legislation concerning building places of worship. While there 
are few restrictions on building mosques, under the Haymouni Decree, a government license 
is needed to build a church. The 1934 Ministry of Interior regulations also set out further 
conditions. These include the site being over 100 metres away from the nearest mosque, the 
religious composition of the community and the proximity of other churches. 148 Until 
recently, presidential permission was needed for repairs, no matter how minor. Another 
complaint was the lack of permits available. Between 1981-1990, only 10 permits for new 
Coptic Orthodox churches and 26 for repairs were granted. 149 Due to population growth and 
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urban migration, existing churches were often overcrowded and unauthorised buildings used 
for services. As will be explored shortly, this regularly led to communal clashes. ' 50 The 
time taken to receive any response to an application - often over ten years - while mosques 
were constantly built, frequently near proposed sites for new churches, also served to illustrate 
this inequality. 
In response to strong criticism of this situation, a 1999 presidential decree made repairs of 
all places of worship subject to the 1976 Civil Construction Code, putting churches in the 
same category as mosques for the first time. 151 Permission for new churches needs 
presidential approval but there has been a sharp increase in the amount of permits approved 
e. g. 23 in 2001 and 9 in 2002. However, problems still exist. On average, applications take 
over four years to be approved and there are some cases where decisions have been 
continually postponed. The Ministry of Interior is usually slow at submitting applications to 
the President and even once granted, local authorities and the security services often block 
construction. 152 In some instances, Christian communities build without a permit or try to 
convert Christian-owned property in to a church building. Even although they know that this 
is likely to escalate the situation and potentially lead to violence with their Muslim 
neighbours, they persevere in the hope that if the work can be completed, they will get de 
facto recognition as the government will want to avoid being accused of closing down 
churches. 153 These problems have been acknowledged in a presidential decree proclaimed in 
December 2005 which transferred authorization for the construction of churches from the 
presidential level to that of regional governors and stipulated that decisions must be 
publicised and justified within one month of submission of an application. 
154 As yet, it is 
unknown if this will prove to be the major breakthrough in church building legislation or only 
lead to more disillusionment among the Coptic community. Government officials have also 
begun to participate in consecration services in order to highlight that Christians are legally 
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entitled to have their own place of worship. ' 55 Yet it is clear that in Egypt, a public place of 
worship appears to take on a "sacred" quality which in the case of churches, can cause tension 
between the communities. Individuals (on both sides) can still create obstacles regarding 
building and repairing churches. 
Another area of Coptic concern is security. While the threat from militant groups has 
mostly been eliminated, sporadic clashes still occur. Assaults on Christians and attacks on 
churches frequently appear to be triggered by Muslim anger at Christian attempts to build or 
expand churches. In particular, unrest has been caused by Christians trying to use other 
buildings e. g. houses, libraries and offices of Coptic social organizations as unofficial 
churches (illegal under Egyptian legislation). 156 Incidents can also escalate in Upper Egypt 
due to the tradition of blood vengeance against perpetuators of any violence. 157 One 
prominent clash centred on the village of al-Kush in Upper Egypt which has a Christian 
majority. A dispute between a Christian shopkeeper and Muslim customer in January 2000 
escalated into a confrontation that left twenty Christians and one Muslim dead, over forty 
injured and Christian homes and shops attacked. 158 Relations between the two communities 
had been tense since an incident in 1998 when two Christians were murdered and allegations 
of police brutality against Coptic villagers were publicised in the international media. 159 
When clashes erupted in the same village in 2000, the local authority response was deemed 
inadequate, failing to prevent the killings that occurred over a three-day period and spread to a 
neighbouring village. Instead, the government reacted after the event, funnelling substantial 
funds into the village, which while aiming to avoid future problems, can actually be seen as 
rewarding such actions. 160 
Therefore, it is often claimed that the government does not provide enough protection and 
fails to bring the perpetuators to justice. The al-Kush incident illustrates this pattern. A 
common Coptic complaint is that the government treats the victim and the aggressor in the 
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same manner, not recognising the clear differences between the two. Firstly, substantial 
numbers on both sides were arrested in order to avoid being seen as supporting one 
community. 161 Secondly, the initial trial of 58 Muslims and 38 Christians acquitted 92 out of 
the 96 defendants. 162 A retrial was immediately ordered by the government, yet again, only 
three were convicted - one for killing the sole Muslim and the other two for the destruction of 
property. 163 This failure to prosecute the perpetrators is viewed by some Copts such as 
Youssef Sidhom, editor of the Christian owned newspaper Watani, as proving that Christian 
blood is worth little and that the only justice Copts will obtain will be from God. ' 64 In 
general, some of the initial unrest associated with confessional violence may have been 
caused by the actions of a few Christians. However, most incidents follow the same pattern 
of escalation which without intervention from the authorities leads to attacks on unspecified 
Christians and their property and minimal damage to Muslim interests. Consequently, 
security fears remain a high priority for many Copts, especially those residing in Upper Egypt 
and rural areas. 
Finally, economic concerns also feature highly. An ongoing economic crisis has led to a 
rise in inflation and decline in real wages, bome mostly by the middle class. 165 The country 
has a large public debt and budget deficit at around 6.5% GDP. 166 The Economist estimates 
unemployment at around 20%. 167 Mass rural to urban migration has resulted in a significant 
expansion of the major cities especially Cairo. This has led to overcrowding, housing 
shortages, a breakdown in welfare services and accentuated the inequality of wealth 
distribution. Egypt is also experiencing mass population growth, overburdening the already 
stretched resources of the state. While these difficulties are experienced by all Egyptians, the 
added perception of discrimination acts as a further incentive for Coptic emigration, 
especially to the West. The Coptic community has traditionally stressed the importance of 
education. It is common for middle class couples to work long hours and abstain from 
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luxuries in order to educate their families to the highest possible standard. Thus, relative to 
the size of the community, Copts are generally highly educated. A significant proportion of 
this younger generation seek work abroad where they believe they will be able to attain high 
positions reflecting their abilities in contrast to their experiences in Egypt. Combined with 
the lack of political representation, discrimination and security issues, these factors all serve 
to enforce feelings of vulnerability among the Coptic community in Egypt who find 
themselves living in a crisis of state environment. 
Christian Concems in Lebanon 
In Lebanon, similar concerns are shared by the Maronite community. One key grievance is 
the lack of representation in the political system. After the civil war, many Maronites felt 
that they had lost power in a country they perceive that was created as their homeland. 
Although the President remains a Maronite, his powers have been reduced. The two post war 
presidents have been regarded by most of the community as lightweights indebted to Syria for 
their positions. It was not until the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri in 
February 2005 and the Syrian withdrawal that the leaders who are perceived as genuinely 
representing the "Maronite street" - Michel Aoun and Samir Geagea were able to return to 
Lebanese politics (from exile and prison respectively). 
Examples giving by Maronites of discrimination tend to concentrate on political issues. As 
in the pre-war era, seats in parliament are divided amongst the different confessions according 
to the quotas established in the Taif Accord. 168 However, candidates can gain votes from 
Lebanese of all confessions. According to el Khazen, "the decisive factor in influencing the 
outcome of elections is the size of the electoral district, that is, the number of Christian and 
Muslim voters in each constituency". 169 During the years of Syrian influence, electoral laws 
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minimised the impact of voters from certain sects in specific constituencies. In general, 
regions with a Muslim majority were made into large electoral districts (between 19 and 28 
seats) while those with a Christian majority were adapted into small districts (between 3 and 8 
seats). 170 
Under the 1992 law, votes for each candidate were counted at the level of the large 
constituency (muhafaza) but unlike previous elections, the candidates competed to represent a 
smaller unit (qada). As el-Khazen demonstrates, this meant that a candidate could be elected 
to represent a specific area without polling the majority of votes in that constituency. By way 
of illustration, a Maronite candidate, Manuel Younes, received 5271 votes compared to 927 
votes polled by his opponent Charles Ayoub in the count in the qada of Batroun. Yet 
Younes only won by 232 votes after the votes from the rest of the muhafaza had been 
included. Ayoub received 98% of his votes from electors in other constituencies within the 
muhafaza. 171 Due to these conditions, candidates who represented a different confession 
from that of the majority of voters in the large electoral district relied heavily on the support 
of those from different confessions. For example, candidates for the five Christian seats in 
the South were dependent on Muslim votes as only around 20% of the electorate were 
Christian. In Jbeil, Christian voters decisively influenced the election of the one Shiite 
candidate as there were 51,944 Christian voters compared to 11,835 Muslim voters. 172 
Although this system distorted representation at the qada level for several confessional 
groups, the Christian communities were affected to a greater degree as nine Christian deputies 
were de facto elected by Muslim voters while three Muslim deputies were dependent on 
Christian votes. 173 This occurred to the extent that the Greek Orthodox vote did not 
decisively influence the outcome of the fourteen deputies elected to represent them. 174 
Consequently, several of the Christian candidates elected were not considered as populist 
representatives by their communities. Furthermore, in previous elections, the 
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multiconfessional constituencies had served to dilute the chances of candidates considered 
representative of extremist views in their particular confession. This helped to minimise the 
likelihood of confessional unrest. Under the new law, this safeguard no longer existed 
because voters from another group were unable to have any effective influence on the 
outcome of several seats. As demonstrated above, in this regard, the division of the electoral 
district favoured Muslim communities. For example, Hizb'allah candidates were successful 
in securing the two Shiite seats in Mount Lebanon (traditionally seen as a Maronite 
stronghold). 175 This can be ascribed to a combination of the electoral law and the consequent 
Christian boycott. 
Christian participation was greatly affected by both the absence of strong leadership to build 
cross-community alliances and the electoral boycott started by opposition parties in 1992. 
This was due to the refusal of the authorities to postpone elections until Syrian redeployment 
took place as stated in the Taif Accord. 176 In 1992, only 5% of eligible Christians 
participated, with one seat in Mount Lebanon won with 41 votes out of 60,000 registered 
voters. 177 35% of the successful Christian candidates were elected by Muslim voters but as a 
consequence of the electoral law, Christian voters had little influence on the election of 
Muslim candidates. 178 Corruption was also widespread in electoral campaigns, especially in 
the first two elections held under Syrian tutelage. In the 1996 elections, these patterns 
continued. Furthermore, electoral districts were shaped to serve the interests of key figures in 
the political establishment. For example, South Lebanon was categorised as one district to 
aid the Speaker Nabih Berri. However, in Mount Lebanon, the region was split into six small 
electoral districts in order to secure success for the Druze leader Walid Jumblatt. 179 Although 
these measures were intended to prevent any electoral gains for government opponents, the 
fact that many of the key opposition figures were Christian, meant that Christians perceived 
that the electoral laws were used to discriminate against them. 
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There was deep discontent among Maronite circles when this electoral law was retained for 
the 2005 parliamentary elections held after the Syrian withdrawal. The Maronite community 
continued to be plagued by internal disunity. Some joined the new anti-Syrian opposition led 
by Saad al-Hariri and supported by Walid Jumblatt e. g. Qornet Shehwan members Nassib 
Lahoud, Nayla Mouawad and Gabriel Murr. However, Aoun remained aloof from these 
actors and allied with Christian figures who had been prominent in the former regime. His 
bloc was successful in winning 21 seats in the Mount Lebanon constituency. In the 
immediate aftermath of the momentous events which occurred in Lebanon during 2005, there 
appeared to be few changes to the feelings of political alienation previously expressed by the 
Maronite masses. President Lahoud who is generally considered as a pro-Syrian appointment 
especially after the extension of his mandate in September 2004, withstood initial calls for his 
resignation and remained in the office which is perceived as the highest position of authority 
available to Maronites. 
Security issues are also a Maronite priority in the post-civil war era. This focused on 
Syrian influence in Lebanon in the post-civil war era. The Taif Accord legitimised the 
presence of the Syrian army but did state that the Syrians should redeploy to the Beqaa valley 
within two years. ' 80 This aspect was not implemented and instead, Syrian policy was 
perceived by some as resulting in the de facto annexation of Lebanon. Several pacts were 
signed, including the May 1991 Treaty of Brotherhood, Co-operation and Co-ordination, the 
September 1991 Pact on Defence and Security and bilateral agreements on specific policy 
areas. 18 1A Maronite critic illustrates their understanding of Syrian-Lebanese relations. "All 
major decisions are to be arrived at "jointly" between the two unequal partners, which of 
course translates into the stronger (Syria) dictating to the weaker (Lebanon) on every 
level". 182 There was also grave concern that the Lebanese system was becoming 
"Syrianized". 1 83 Both the judiciary and security forces were used to crackdown on 
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government opponents. Opposition demonstrations were rarely granted official permission 
in contrast to frequent legal (and often armed) marches by Hizb'allah. 
The issue of Hizb'allah causes concern as unlike other militias, Hizb'allah was not disarmed 
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and instead was promoted by the authorities as the official resistance against Israel . Not 
only do some Lebanese regard this as double standards but they also fear the consequences of 
such activity on the future stability of the country. The army was regularly used to disperse 
opposition demonstrations, resulting in injuries and the detention of the predominantly student 
protestors. Members of the two main opposition groups - the Free Patriotic Movement led 
by Aoun and the Lebanese Forces loyal to the imprisoned Geagea - were targeted by the 
regime. In August 2001, over 150 were questioned and over 75 received a prison 
sentences. 185 While conditions have eased since the withdrawal of the Syrian army, new 
security concerns have arisen. Since the assassination of al-Hariri, there has been a series of 
bombing incidents in the Greater Beirut region. Several of these exploded in predominantly 
Christian areas and influential Christian figures have been targeted. 186 Naturally, this is 
likely to have an adverse effect on the Maronite community and dampen initial enthusiasm for 
this new era in Lebanese history. 
Finally, the grave economic situation is a major concern for all Lebanese, not just 
Christians. Socioeconomic inequality, which favoured the Maronites, was recognised as a 
contributing factor to the civil war. In the preamble to the Constitution, the architects of the 
Taif Accord states that, "The even development among regions on the educational, social, and 
economic levels shall be a basic pillar of the unity of the state and the stability of the 
systern' '. 1 87 Although economic growth was initially fuelled by the post-war reconstruction 
boom, this faltered by the mid 1990s due to overspending, the failure to collect taxes or clamp 
down on corruption and lack of investment due to regional instability. Consequently, the 
post-war economic situation has become characterised by a vast national debt of around $32 
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billion and rising, high unemployment - with youth unemployment estimated at 34%, 
minimal economic growth, high cost of living, inadequate welfare services and frequent 
strikes protesting against these conditions. ' 88 Government policy has appeared inept at 
dealing with this ongoing crisis. Instead, economic inequality has increased and corruption 
remains rampant. Many Lebanese believe that the power struggle between Lahoud and al- 
Hariri contributed to the economic crisis as it paralysed government institutions. These 
factors have provided incentives for many Lebanese, including Christians, to continue to 
emigrate. It is estimated that around half of those who left during the war years were 
Christian. Furthermore, few Christians have returned since peace occurred and the still 
steady flow of emigrants affects the already smaller community. As a consequence, it is 
widely accepted that the Shiites are the largest community - estimated at around 30%, with 
the Sunnis around 27% and the Maronites at 22%. 189 If current trends continue, there are 
fears that the Christian population, currently not more than 30% of the population, could 
decline to 15% within ten years. In general, these factors have led to the reawakening of the 
historic Maronite fear of losing their ability to fully participate in the Lebanese state. There 
are concerns amongst Maronites that their unique position is endangered and that Lebanese 
Christians will soon experience the dhimmi status common to other Christian communities in 
the region. Consequently, these traditional anxieties reinforce the perception of vulnerability 
held by many in the Maronite community. 
Summajy 
This chapter has examined the main political strategy pursued by Christians in the Middle 
East from the late nineteenth century onwards. While the details may have differed 
depending on the variation of nationalism followed (Arab, Egyptian or Lebanese), the aims 
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remained steadfast. The tremendous changes which occurred in the region - the collapse of 
the empire, the presence of colonial rulers and independence - offered Christians a multitude 
of opportunities. Nationalism represented a natural development from the situation attained 
by the ground-breaking tanzimat reforms which introduced the notion of citizenship 
regardless of religious allegiance. Its emphasis on ethnicity rather than Islam as the 
fundamental determining identity of the nation allowed Christians to discard their dhimmi 
status. It also provided the framework to participate in society as individual citizens rather 
than depending on communal representation. The hope, time and energy invested in these 
movements by Christians illustrates the belief that this approach was the only way to secure 
recognition and participation. Yet by the latter twentieth century, it was apparent that not 
only had all three variations failed to cure the problems facing the region or state respectively, 
but also the quest for full participation and equality remained unfulfilled. 
Various factors were responsible for the demise of nationalism as a populist indigenous 
ideology. Firstly, actors proved unable to transform the rhetoric into comprehensive policies. 
Regardless of the development strategy followed, both countries failed to experience 
widespread economic growth and fulfil the material needs of the entire population. 
Secondly, complex identity issues remained unresolved. In the case of Arab and Egyptian 
nationalism, there was never a clear distinction between nationalism and Islam. Hence, there 
was a clear correlation between the increased prominence of Islam at the heart of these 
movements and its popularity among the masses. In Lebanon, the variation of nationalism 
followed by the Christian population (particularly the Maronites) failed to develop into an 
ideology which surpassed communal identity and could be accepted by all citizens of the 
Lebanese state. When confronted with severe political, socioeconomic and security 
challenges, nationalism appeared to have no answer in either of the states. 
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According to the criteria established in the earlier chapter, the two countries studied in this 
thesis can be describing as exhibiting conditions associated with a crisis of state environment. 
Both states have struggled to provide physical and material security for all their citizens. 
With the failure of the post-independence nationalist movements, a pattern has emerged 
among the Muslim population. There has been a general revival of political Islam, witnessed 
particularly in Egypt and amongst the Shiite community in Lebanon. The Christian 
communities are concerned at this potential return to dhimmi status and the inequality 
conveyed by this term. The failings of the nationalist movements are simultaneously the 
failings of Middle East Christians to find a system that allows them to participate in political 
life as equal citizens. For Christians, this leaves unanswered the traditional questions 
concerning their role in society. This perception of vulnerability is apparent when examining 
contemporary concerns of the Christian communities. The Coptic community is still 
struggling against its traditional position of dhimmi, failed to attain full equality with Egyptian 
Muslims and frequently made the scapegoat when tensions erupt either between the 
communities or between the authorities and Islamic militants. Recovering from the traumas 
of the civil war, the Maronites came to the unhappy realization that their secular leadership 
had collapsed and their pre-war political dominance was no longer assured. Instead, they 
now have to wrestle with the same issues facing other Christian communities in the Middle 
East, in particular political participation, equality and security. In this context, it is 
unsurprising that both communities have turned to the one communal institution which is 
perceived as serving their interests - the church. Just as has occurred with the revival of 
political Islam among the Muslim population, this is not a new radical approach but is instead 
an updated version of a traditional and historic aspect of Christianity in the Middle East - 
political representation through the church hierarchy. 
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Chapter Four - The Political Role of Patriarch Shenouda 111, 
Coptic Orthodox Patriarch of Alexandria and All Africa 
Introduction 
The previous chapters have attempted to substantiate the claim that throughout the 
centuries, especially with the implementation of the millet system, the Coptic Orthodox 
Patriarch has acted as the representative of the community to the Egyptian authorities. In the 
contemporary era, the Coptic community has witnessed the decline of its secular elite who 
were influential in the early twentieth century nationalist movement. The rise of political 
Islam in Egypt, particularly under the presidency of Sadat, heightened perceptions of 
vulnerability amongst the Coptic community. Sporadic outbursts of communal violence add 
to the general problems facing Egypt - demands for political participation, economic benefits 
and security. It is under these conditions that Patriarch Shenouda has led the Coptic 
Orthodox Church since his election in 1971. This study proposes that the patriarch has used 
the ample resources of the church to consolidate his position as the head of the community 
and has filled the leadership vacuum which existed as a consequence of the decline of the 
secular elite. 
This chapter will explore the methods used by the patriarch to reinforce the political 
authority of the Coptic Orthodox Patriarchate. Firstly, a short biography will be given of 
Patriarch Shenouda. The discussion will then examine his assertive style of rule between 
1971-1981 which ended with his banishment to a desert monastery. The main focus of this 
thesis is centred on the activities of the patriarch since his release in 1985 and will provide an 
opportunity to contrast the different methods he pursued, with the aim of explaining the 
motivation for the change of approach. The Coptic Renewal has had a significant impact on 
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patriarchal authority. As this revival commenced in the 1940s, its effects had obviously 
already been witnessed in the church by the time Patriarch Shenouda became the head of the 
church. However, it is crucial that it is examined here as it is a vital element of the authority 
enjoyed today by the patriarch. As a member, monk and bishop of the Coptic Orthodox 
Church, the future Patriarch Shenouda was active at every level of the renewal movement. 
Furthermore as patriarch, he has presided over a vibrant Coptic Orthodox Church and enjoyed 
the fruits of the renewal process. The discussion will then look at the ways in which 
Patriarch Shenouda has used the themes of this renewal as tools to enhance the authority of 
the patriarch over the community. This study claims that after his return from the desert in 
1985, the patriarch initially concentrated on consolidating power within the church and 
community. This will be analysed in relation to the hierarchy, laity and ecumenical 
organisations, illustrating that this has mostly been successful. Once this had been achieved, 
the patriarch was able to address other issues in his role as Coptic civil representative. 
The political views voiced by Patriarch Shenouda will be examined, suggesting that 
although these relate to the Coptic grievances detailed earlier, they must be viewed in the 
context of the millet partnership. The discussion will look at the response to this political 
role amongst the Coptic community (both clergy and laity), Islamic religious representatives 
and the government to determine whether the involvement of a religious leader in political 
issues has an adverse effect on communal relations. Lastly, the success of these endcavours 
by the patriarch will be critically assessed and possible scenarios for the continued role of the 
patriarch as the civil representative of the Coptic community will be explored. This will 
stress the importance of the individual characteristics of a patriarch in influencing the 
response to any political role. Hence, this chapter will provide a discussion on the political 
dimension of the Coptic Orthodox Patriarch under Patriarch Shenouda with reference to the 
extent that the leader of a religious institution can exercise temporal authority in a crisis of 
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state enviromnent in a country where relations between different groups are characterised, by a 
system which cedes authority to the head of the church. 
A Brief Biography of Patriarch Shenouda 
The development of the Coptic Orthodox Church in the late twentieth century has been 
greatly influenced by its patriarch elected to office in 1971 - Pope Shenouda. Born Nazir 
Gayed in 1923 to a middle class family in Assiut (Upper Egypt), he graduated in History from 
Cairo University and was an army officer in the 1948 war against Israel. ' Thefuture 
Shenouda became known as a theologian, journalist, orator and poet. Hewasactively 
involved in the Sunday School movement, editor of the Sunday School magazine and in 1953, 
was the chair of theology in the seminary at Helwan. 2 Aged thirty-one, he entered monastic 
life, joining Deir al-Surian in 1954 where he spent sometime as a hermit. Aftereightyears 
in the monastery, he became one of the first to take the new position created by Patriarch 
Kyrillos VI - general bishop. In 1962, he was consecrated Bishop of Higher Theological 
Studies and was able to continue his interest in the Sunday School movement. As bishop, 
Shenouda was extremely popular particularly with the Coptic youth. His charisma and 
energy contrasted with the traditional clergy. Heikal states that "Shenouda was the 
outstanding representative of the new generation of militant monks, determined to change the 
Church from an isolated and backward institution into something more in tune with the 
contemporary world .3 One 
important activity was his weekly meetings - dars a1jumaa 
(lesson on Friday). His willingness to answer questions from ordinary members of the 
community often with humorous remarks not only illustrated these differences but also helped 
to ensure that he became well-known within the community. Shenouda was known to be 
outspoken regarding Coptic rights. 4 
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After the death of Patriarch Kyrillos VI in 197 1, Shenouda was elected by altar lot having 
5 come second behind Bishop Samuel in the first stage of the elections. Aged forty-seven 
when he became patriarch, Shenouda has been able to make an impression on the church in all 
areas - spiritual, social and political. As will be seen, the Coptic Renewal movement 
certainly cannot be solely associated with Shenouda. However, he has played an 
instrumental role in ensuring its continuation. According to O'Mahony, "It was to Shenouda, 
the product and personification of the Church's renewal, that the task fell of inscribing the 
new leadership vocation of the patriarchate of Alexandria in history". 6 
The Early Years as Patriarch (1971-198 1) 
As has been seen, under the millet system, the patriarch as the religious representative of the 
Coptic community, also enjoyed a de facto political role. Several factors combined to ensure 
that Patriarch Shenouda utilised this position in a more assertive manner than his predecessor. 
In fact, Sedra states that his election to the patriarchate ended the traditional millet 
relationship between the state and the church. 7 Representing the new generation of church 
reformers, Patriarch Shenouda was eager to fill the leadership vacuum left by the decline of 
the secular Coptic elite. Farah states that "The new church modernists saw themselves as 
both the religious and political spokesmen for the Copts". 8 Patriarch Shcnouda was known 
for his charismatic personality, strong political views and authoritarian Icadership. 9 As 
Bishop with responsibility for education, he held weekly meetings which had taken a political 
tone to the extent that Nasser pressurised Pope Kyrillos to control his outspoken clcric. 10 
According to Ansari, he represented the movement within the church hierarchy that was no 
longer willing to seek recourse through the traditional method of private representation of 
Coptic concerns to state officials. " Instead, he saw it as his duty to adopt an assertive role to 
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stand up for the collective rights of the community. Van Nispen states that "the patriarch 
himself, Pope Shenouda, a very strong personality and one of the symbols of the Coptic 
renaissance, came increasingly to play a political role and to be seen not only as the 
representative, but as the real political leader of the Christians". 12 
This new confrontational approach was apparent between 1971 and 1981. Thefirstmajor 
tension centred on a traditional Coptic grievance regarding restrictions on church buildings. 
Due to the difficulties encountered in gaining the required building permits, churches were 
sometimes built unofficially or Coptic owned buildings were used for services. Tension had 
increased in Khanka, a town to the north of Cairo over Coptic attempts to transform the 
offices of a Christian society into a church. In November 1972, the premises were set on fire. 
However, the patriarch refused to opt for problem solving behind the scenes with government 
officials as had been the tradition under other patriarchs. Instead, one hundred priests and 
monks were sent to Khanka in protest at this incident and conducted prayers on the site. 
Consequently, the situation escalated when local Muslims attacked Christian property. 13 A 
parliamentary commission investigated this incident and recommended several measures 
14 including amending the laws pertaining to church building but these were not implemented. 
In 1977, tensions were raised again when the government attempted to introduce sharia law 
into the Egyptian legal system. The inclusion of the apostasy penalty was viewed by church 
leaders as affecting Christians because those who converted to Islam for convenience e. g. 
divorce or career ambitions, would be unable to return to Christianity. " Consequently, a 
Coptic Conference was held which addressed not only this specific issue but also other 
general concerns. The conference urged the government to reject the apostasy bill, annul the 
Ottoman law concerning the building of churches, ensure equal opportunities and take a 
robust approach to Islamic extremism. 16 Furthermore, Patriarch Shenouda called for a five 
day collective fast to highlight the problems facing the community. This public use of a 
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Coptic ritual illustrates the mood of the community at this time. O'Mahony suggests that 
these actions by the patriarch should be seen in the context of the community taking on the 
role of the monastery where all participate through collective action. 17 The government 
abandoned the bill but violence against the Copts increased as many Muslims resented what 
they perceived as unnecessary Coptic interference in a Muslim only issue. 18 
The third example of this assertive approach occurred in 1980 amidst increased sectarian 
violence and the amendment of the constitution to acknowledge sharia law as being the 
principal source of legislation. In an attempt to highlight government inaction regarding anti- 
Christian violence, the patriarch cancelled the 1980 Easter celebrations and retired with the 
church hierarchy to a desert monastery. ' 9 This measure was embarrassing for President Sadat 
as government representatives normally attended Easter celebrations to proclaim their good 
wishes to the Coptic community. Consequently, these examples illustrated a break from the 
traditional co-operative political role of the church. However, the majority of these responses 
can be related to legislative proposals or attacks against Coptic property. According to 
Ansari, "what aroused the hostility of the militant Copts and compelled them to adopt 
defensive measures was the rise of Islamic militancy" . 
20 
Ordinary Muslims were not the only people who opposed this new confrontational 
approach. Sadat saw the reaction of the Coptic Orthodox Church as a threat to his 
presidency. As a Muslim leader of an Islamic country, he believed that he was solely 
responsible for ensuring the protection of minorities under his care. 21 Tension was also 
raised due to the refusal of Patriarch Shenouda to lift the ban on Coptic pilgrimage to 
Jerusalem. Until the Six Day War in 1967, the Coptic Orthodox Church had encouraged 
22 
visits to the holy sites in East Jerusalem which was under Jordanian control. In particular, 
they organised annual pilgrimages at Easter. However, these had stopped once Israeli forces 
captured the entire city of Jerusalem. With the normalization of relations between Egypt and 
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Israel as a consequence of the Camp David Accords in 1978, Sadat was under pressure from 
the Israeli government to increase the number of Egyptian visitors to Israel. These were 
minimal in contrast to the many Israeli holidaymakers who came to Sinai. Acknowledging 
that his policy towards Israel was highly unpopular, Sadat accepted that few Egyptian 
Muslims were likely to be willing to visit Israel. However, he hoped that Copts could be 
encouraged to resume their pilgrimages to Jerusalem. In contrast, Patriarch Shenouda did not 
believe that the hostile political relations between Egypt and the rest of the Arab world would 
remain permanent. 23 Thus, it was crucial to ensure that the Coptic community avoided any 
possibility of being labelled traitors to the Arab cause. Patriarch Shenouda told Sadat that he 
would only go to Jerusalem if he was accompanied by the leader of the Palestinians, Yasser 
Arafat. 24 Although this reaction can be seen as indicative of the patriotism of the church 
leaders, it is also true that the decision was motivated by his desire to protect the community. 
The refusal of the patriarch to lift the official ban on the pilgrimage angered Sadat. This 
apparent disobedience heightened the personal rivalry between the two men. 
Furthermore, Sadat was humiliated during his 1980 trip to the United States when Coptic 
6migr6s launched newspaper campaigns and organised demonstrations protesting at the plight 
of Copts in Egypt. 25 On his return, he launched scathing public attacks on the church 
hierarchy, declaring that the patriarch was aiming to be a political as well as religious leader. 
He accused him of conspiring to establish a Coptic state in Upper Egypt, accepting CIA funds 
to achieve this, stirring up sectarian strife and aiding the Lebanese Maronite militias. 26 Sadat 
was able to use the clashes at Zawya al-Hamra, which was a rare case when Copts also used 
arms, to illustrate that the patriarch posed a threat to the integrity of the Egyptian state. 27 
Consequently, as part of the crackdown on all opposition, he used this opportunity to banish 
Patriarch Shenouda to a monastery in Wadi Natroun and thus, appeared to retain his authority 
as the political leader of all Egyptians, including the Copts. The assassination of Sadat ended 
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this particular personality clash. However, it did not lead to the instant release of the 
patriarch. It was not until Christmas 1985 that President Mubarak gave permission for his 
return. This was partly due to the easing of communal relations and also the realization that 
Patriarch Shenouda still maintained strong support from many Copts who rccognised him as 
the only legitimate leader of the Coptic Orthodox Church. Any attempt to depose the 
patriarch would encounter fierce resistance from the community. 
The Coptic Renewal Process and Church Govemance 
To understand the political role of the patriarch, it is vital to examine the extent of 
patriarchal authority in the church. Since his return from the desert, Patriarch Shenouda has 
clearly focused on consolidating his dual position as the head of the church and community. 
In his efforts to establish the church as the only institution regarded as truly representative of 
the community, he has been able to benefit from the Coptic renewal process that has 
revitalised the church since the 1940s. One consequence of the efforts of church reformers 
such as Shenouda has been the establishment of the church as the focal point of the 
community. This contrasts with the situation in the first half of the twentieth century when 
the church was perceived by its members as stagnant, corrupt and plagued with rivalries. 
Catholic and Protestant churches were gaining converts, partially due to the different style of 
worship but also due to their educational and social services. 28 In response, urbanised 
educated middle class youth began to work to revitalise the church. Hasan states that the 
church became the "main outlet for their reforming zeal and proceeded to use it as a safe 
haven, outside the reach of the Muslim state, from which to launch their project". 29 One of 
the major initiatives of this renewal was the Sunday School movement. The credit for the 
early Sunday Schools is given to Habib Girgis who was one of the first students on the newly 
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reopened theological seminary in 1893. Greatly concerned at the lack of religious education 
received by Coptic children in schools, he attempted to fill this vacuum by establishing 
Sunday Schools where they were taught about the bible, Coptic history, traditions and the 
saints . 
30 By 1918, an organisational structure was established under the General Committee 
for the Sunday Schools. Teaching methods used were similar to those employed by 
Protestant Sunday Schools which was ironic considering one of the reasons for the Sunday 
Schools was to protect Coptic Orthodox children from Western missionaries. 
Other Sunday Schools were started in Cairo in the 1930s and 1940s by university students 
who were similarly concerned at the lack of Christian religious education in schools. 31 These 
student - run schools developed their own specialised fields. For example, the St. Anthony's 
branch at Shoubra concentrated on the spiritual roots of the Coptic Orthodox faith in order to 
revitalise the church. 32 The future Pope Shenouda was a key figure in this school. In 
contrast, the Giza branch where the future Bishop Samuel worked, can be termed social 
activists who combined material assistance with biblical teaching. 33 Although there were 
other specializations, the approaches taken by the St. Anthony's and Giza branches have been 
extremely influential in the wider church, often leading to rivalry between the two groups. 
This growth in Sunday Schools meant that the student branches and those created by Girgis 
merged in the late 1940s. 
At this stage, the key instigators of the reform movement were young lay workers. One of 
their main demands was internal church reform. By the late 1940s, it became clear to this 
generation of reformers that the next steps could only be taken from within the church 
hierarchy. Hasan also argues that the lack of opportunities in secular politics for the Coptic 
university graduates accentuated the attraction of life in the church administration. 34 From 
this period, the key activists in the Sunday School movement entered the clerical ranks. For 
example, influential figures such as Saad Aziz, Nazir Gayed and Yusuf Iskander (the future 
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Father Matta al-Meskeen) entered the monasteries. Although many of the traditional clergy 
were hostile to the young reformers, the new patriarch Kyrillos VI who was elected in 1959, 
was sympathetic to their plight and nominated them to positions within the church hierarchy. 
Saad Aziz and Nazir Gayed became general bishops of Public, Ecumenical and Social 
Services and Church Education respectively, reflecting the specialisation of the Sunday 
School that each had been involved in. 35 The Sunday School generation had achieved their 
aim of gaining access to the church hierarchy. Now they were in a position to further 
influence the Coptic Revival. 
Another feature of the reform movement was the monastic revival. Monasticism has 
always been a key component of the Coptic Orthodox faith. However, this too had declined 
by the twentieth century. By 1956, ten Sunday School leaders had joined monastic life 
hoping to have a similar impact on monasticism. 36 Their aims were aided by Pope Kyrillos 
VI. Working for a spiritual revival of the entire church, the patriarch ordered all monks to 
return to their monasteries and was instrumental in reviving old monasteries and building new 
ones. According to Doom-Harder, one of his first acts as patriarch was to lay the cornerstone 
of the new monastery Deir Abu Mina. 37 The patriarch also appointed one of the influential 
new monks as Abbot of Deir Abu Maqar with instructions to rebuild the ruined monastery. 
Father Matta al-Meskeen (the former Yusuf Iskander) was keen to revive the notion of the 
hermit monk and lived as an ascetic for several years. However, he also founded a lay 
religious movement where young well-educated men pledged their life to the church. 38 He 
led his followers to the desert, initially to live a solitary life in the style of the Desert 
Fathers. 39 Once given the task of rebuilding the monastery, he oversaw its expansion and 
successful agricultural projects. Consequently, the monasteries became centres of activity, 
attracting more monks. 
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Once he became the head of the church, Patriarch Shcnouda continued the policies of his 
predecessor. Consequently, in the twenty-first century, the monasteries are a key part of the 
Coptic religious experience. They are easily accessible to the community. This leads 
O'Mahony to claim that the "desert has now been partially incorporated in the city". 40 The 
faithful can visit the monasteries regularly, participate in services and talk to the monks. The 
monasteries have also taken on extra functions such as holding retreats and conferences. 
Hence, they are now equipped with visitors centres. This modernisation has added to the 
duties of the monks. As well as the traditional tasks of scholarship and agricultural work, 
new ones include construction and computing. Partrick concludes that monasteries can no 
longer be categorised as museums. 41 
Under Patriarch Shenouda, there has been a significant expansion in monasteries. This 
increase has been accompanied by a steady growth in the number of monks. According to 
Watson, there were two hundred monks in 1950 which had risen to 2000 in 2000.42 Indeed, 
several monasteries are so full that they can no longer take on new novices. The monks are 
predominantly well-educated, often university graduates and aged between twenty-five and 
forty. 43 Gruber suggests that the willingness of these men to give up their careers and future 
prospects in the secular world can be viewed as the continuation of the monastic tradition of 
sacrifice. 44 Certainly it is clear that becoming a monk is now perceived as a "prized careee, 
among Copts, particularly the youth. 45 Other less spiritual motives can include the desire to 
escape economic or personal hardship and ambition to reach high positions within the church 
as candidates are chosen exclusively from the monasteries. Although the monastic revival 
has concentrated on male Copts, its wider effects have also led women to seek their place 
within the renewal movement. Thus, there has been an increase in the number of both 
contemplative nuns (the traditional pattern) and active nuns such as the Bariat Maryam who 
work in the community. 46 It is clear that the monastic revival experienced in the latter half of 
145 
the twentieth century has served to energise the wider church and acted as a focal point for the 
community. 
Elements of the renewal process have also been used to relate to contemporary problems. 
Hasan states that "Coptic religious memory is continuously being reconstructed to guide the 
faithful through treacherous paths and help them to cope with difficulties and take on new 
challenges". 47 The Coptic Orthodox Church is clearly linked with early martyrs. For 
example, it is inspired by St. Mark who according to tradition was martyred in Alexandria. 
The Coptic calendar commemorates the persecution suffered under the Emperor Diocletian. 
This concept of martyrdom is not confined to history. Recent violence against Copts has led 
to these victims also being proclaimed martyrs. Meinardus queries if distinctions are being 
made between those who are killed due to their religious identity e. g. those who died in the 
incidents at al-Zawya al-Hamra in 1981 and al-Kush in 2000 and those martyred due to their 
witness e. g. a priest murdered in Diwaina in 1988 and the nine Copts killed during a prayer 
meeting in 1997 in a church in Abu Qurqus. 48 Certainly it is clear that the notion of 
martyrdom is still a strong component of the Coptic Orthodox faith. Religious literature is 
overwhelmed by stories of the ancient saints and martyrs. Wakin argues that Coptic religious 
leaders have been able to use the idea of persecution as an asset . 
49 Indeed, many Copts stress 
that the church has a history of hardship and that this is not only part of life as a Coptic 
Christian but also strengthens the community and explains the vibrancy of the church. 'o The 
revival has also encouraged intellectual efforts to emphasise this identity. The study of the 
ancient Coptic language has been encouraged as a means to rediscover Coptic heritage. 
Wakin suggests that this fulfils an important psychological need as possessing a unique 
language reinforces the idea of a separate identity. 51 
One consequence of the Coptic Renewal is that the church is now central to the Coptic 
community. Church attendance has increased massively to the extent that churches are full 
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and extra services are held to accommodate the needs of the community. Many laity have 
been incorporated into the organisational structure through work as deacons and church 
servants. 52 The church has also concentrated greatly on the youth. Due to the Islamic 
environment that the Coptic Orthodox Church finds itself in, the children of Coptic couples 
are almost entirely the only new members, thus great emphasis is placed on ensuring their 
allegiance. It is no surprise that the Sunday School movement plays an important role in 
educating the children on their faith considering its influential figures now occupy top 
positions in the church hierarchy. Through the Bishopric of Youth, Patriarch Shenouda has 
attempted to further cater for their needs as young adults. As well as youth organizations, 
they are encouraged to become khuddam (church servers) which can be regarded as training 
for future positions in the church. 53 
Leisure time is dominated by the church. Activities include prayer groups, visits to 
monasteries and voluntary work restoring icons, churches and monasteries. The social 
service network is also important in drawing people to the church. The Bishopric of Public, 
Ecumenical and Social Services provides material assistance, educational classes, literacy 
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programme and job training schemes. Frequent home visits by the family priest reinforces 
the link between Copts and their church. The community is invited to share in some aspects 
of monasticism such as fasting and prayer, thus strengthening the bonds within the 
community. Recorded liturgies, sermons and chants as well as religious booklets are sold at 
shops at churches and monasteries. In these ways, the influence of the church extends much 
further than the weekly attendance of a service. Similar to the Islamic revival, this Coptic 
renewal is also visible. Christian homes and shops frequently have religious symbols e. g. 
pictures depicting scenes from the bible, and women often wearjewellery shaped in a cross. 
Furthermore, by stressing religious identity, the reform movement has been successful in 
alleviating the class struggles that plagued the church in the nineteenth century. In particular, 
147 
the middle classes have identified with these leaders who are seen as sharing the same 
background and thus, being attentive to their needs. 55 The Coptic Renewal has allowed the 
church to provide a space for Copts where they can fully participate. According to Hasan, 
"By giving all Copts a role to play from their early teens on, the church has provided them 
with a compensatory status system and a chance of upward mobility outside of civil 
society". 56 However, this appears to be at the cost of withdrawal from wider Egyptian 
society. Khawaga claims that the renewal has provided a sense of belonging to the extent 
that when a Copt enters the gates of the patriarchate, they feel that it is their home -a place 
where they are treated equally. This self-isolation can be seen as a response to exclusion from 
national life. The factors that have encouraged the ongoing Islamic revival (questionable 
legitimacy of the ruling elite, political exclusion and socioeconomic hardship) can also be 
seen as aiding the success of the Coptic renewal movement. It is also likely that the 
emphasis on religious identity in one community encourages a reaction from the other. 
It is clear that the ongoing Coptic revival has placed the Coptic Orthodox Church at the 
centre of the community. Although the process commenced long before the present patriarch 
became the head of the church, he has been able to capitalise on these substantial resources of 
the church in order to unite the community under him. Building on the fruits of the renewal 
process, Patriarch Shenouda has sought to shape the contemporary church according to his 
vision. Through several measures, he has striven to consolidate his authority in the 
governance of the church which consequently has presented him with the opportunity to stake 
his claim to the historic position as the civil representative of the Coptic community. This 
strategy can be seen as a reaction to his banishment to the desert in 1981. Onhisreturn, he 
was aware of the need to expand his power base within the community in order to prevent this 
event recurring. Although he had enjoyed the support of middle class and poor Copts, this 
had not extended to the elite or a significant amount of the church hierarchy. Many members 
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of the clergy had believed that Patriarch Shenouda had lost sight of his traditional role as 
spiritual leader and had concentrated too heavily on political matters. For example, Bishops 
Samuel, Gregorius, Johannis, Athanasius and Michael served on the papal committee 
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appointed by Sadat to run church affairs. Thus, the patriarch set out to ensure his authority 
over the entire church and hence, the community. 
Since this period, an ongoing process of centralization has occurred. There has been a 
move towards direct control of the monasteries. Their administration has been transferred to 
the patriarchate and the patriarch appoints the abbots of new monasteries. 58 As the church 
leadership is recruited from the monasteries, it is extremely significant that the patriarch has 
direct contact with many of the monasteries. Valognes suggests that some can be categorised 
as "Shenoudiarf 'monasteries whose members give personal allegiance to the patriarch . 
59 In 
recent years, many bishops have been chosen from Deir Anba Bishqi - the official residence 
of the patriarch . 
60 In contrast, monks from Deir Abu Maqar, which is led by Father Matta al- 
Meskeen, a prominent critic of the patriarch, have mostly been isolated from other 
monasteries and rarely promoted to the hierarchy. In order to have a successful church 
career, it can be concluded that joining a monastery that enjoys patriarchal support enhances 
these prospects. Thus, the independence of one of the main church institutions has been 
adversely affected. 
Another characteristic of his long reign is the appointment of the preferred candidates of the 
patriarch to key positions within the church hierarchy. For example, in the same year that he 
was elected patriarch, two colleagues from the St. Anthony's Sunday School were 
consecrated bishops - Johannis of el-Gharbia and Pachomius of al-Buheira. 
61 There has also 
been a sharp increase in the number of dioceses. There were twenty-eight dioceses when 
Shenouda was elected patriarch. By 1995, this had increased to cighty-three. As of June 
2004, Patriarch Shenouda had ordained 106 bishops. 62 This steady growth has been achieved 
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by reducing the territory of a large diocese and sub-dividing a diocese after the death of the 
incumbent bishop. Smaller dioceses allow the bishops to cultivate personal relationships 
with their congregations. Hence, the pastoral duties of the bishop have also greatly 
increased. They are expected to deal with the concerns of their community whether spiritual, 
economic, social or political. The type of candidate who has succeeded under Patriarch 
Shenouda is also important. Many of the new bishops tend to be young and spend only a 
short time in the monasteries in stark contrast to past tradition. While this has resulted in 
several dynamic individuals being given important posts in the church, it also raises concern 
regarding the motivation of some novices who may be attracted by the apparent quick rise to 
success. The majority of the new bishops can be called the "spiritual sons" of Patriarch 
Shenouda. 63 Their loyalty to the patriarch means that the Holy Synod is dominated by his 
proteges. This diminishes the ability of the Synod to fulfil its role as an independent voice in 
church administration. Instead, the patriarch has the influence to ensure that his decisions are 
implemented. According to Watson, "Shenouda has placed his imprint decisively on the 
Coptic Orthodox Church by filling the Holy Synod with educated executives who are more 
like personal disciples than products of the established monastic system". 64 
By placing his proteges at the head of important general bishoprics and church committees, 
Patriarch Shenouda is able to ensure that all sections of the church follow his vision of the 
role of the church. An inner circle of bishops who act as the patriarch's close advisers can be 
identified. Yet, simultaneously, this centralisation process of allocating the responsibility of 
many tasks to the patriarchate has been accompanied by decentralization within the high 
echelons of the church hierarchy. Due to the vast increase in duties undertaken by the 
patriarchate, the patriarch has actually had to delegate some of these. The amount of 
demanding tasks given to certain bishops has challenged their ability to perform at the highest 
level in every area. For example in the 1990s, Bishops Serapion and Musa were the direct 
150 
papal representatives to the churches abroad while simultaneously heading the Bishopric of 
Public, Ecumenical and Social Services and the Bishopric of Youth respectively. 6 5 Similarly, 
the appointment of Metropolitan Bishoi as the chair of various committees, the Secretary of 
the Holy Synod and the papal delegate on ecumenical matters obviously adversely affects the 
amount of attention he could personally give to his diocese. 66 Consequently there has been 
an expansion of this inner circle in order to share realistically the workload of the church. As 
will be discussed in Chapter Six, several bishops have been appointed to cater directly for the 
needs of the diaspora communities. However, it must be noted that this apparent 
decentralisation while certainly increasing the number of key figures in the church hierarchy, 
in reality still reinforces the authority of the patriarch as these activities are carried out by 
bishops who are regarded as sharing the patriarch's vision of the role of the church. 
Within church governance, the other main challenge to patriarchal authority is the al-majlis 
al-milli (the community council). This body has been a source of intra-communal conflict 
for much of its existence. Although dissolved in 1962, it was reintroduced by Sadat partly in 
the hope that it would counter the authority of the patriarch during this turbulent period. 67 
However, important changes had taken place within the community. The previous councils 
had mostly consisted of the Coptic elite. They were replaced by middle class representatives 
who generally shared the views and aims of the church hierarchy. In the contemporary 
Coptic Orthodox Church, it is apparent that the independence of the al-majlis al-milli has 
been severely curtailed. An "unofficial" list of preferred candidates is made public, thus 
ensuring that the majority of these lay members are duly elected . 
68 Its functions have been 
limited to administrative duties. Furthermore, its monthly meetings are chaired by the 
patriarch himself. Consequently, the role of the council has been clearly defined. "The laity 
have the right to air their views; but not to govern the church". 69 Although disagreements 
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still arise between the al-majlis al-milli and the church hierarchy, especially over financial 
matters, it is clear that the laity have little power to affect key policies. 
Instead, there has been a general trend of incorporating the laity into the church hierarchical 
system. Male volunteers are urged to become deacons and a new position of mukarassat 
(deaconesses) has been created for women. 70 The traditional post of church servant 
(khuddam) has also been affected by this centralisation process. The khuddam are regularly 
rotated around the dioceses. This ensures that pastoral care is standardised throughout the 
country. However, by removing these workers from their home church or diocese, it also 
ensures that allegiance is given to the central church and thus the patriarch. Services which 
were traditionally performed by the laity have also come under the auspices of the church 
hierarchy. 
Since the reign of Patriarch Kyrillos VI, general bishoprics have been established. These 
bishops are given clear duties but no diocese, a system which can be seen as similar to the 
Vatican Curia. 71 Several bishoprics have been created to cater for specialised tasks which 
were previously left to the laity. The Bishoprics of Church Education, Public, Ecumenical 
and Social Services and Higher Studies, Coptic Culture and Scientific Research, were all 
created by Kyrillos VI. In 1980, the Bishopric of Youth was established by Patriarch 
Shenouda in order to incorporate the next generation of believers into the church. Under the 
dynamic Bishop Musa, it provides a space for the Coptic youth to discuss challenges facing 
them and reinforces a sense of belonging to the community. 72 Although such activities could 
be undertaken by priests, Bebawi suggests that the authority exercised by bishops allow these 
73 initiatives to be more successful . The 
leaders of the Sunday School generation are now 
members of the clergy but they have retained control of this essential aspect of ministry. 
Patriarch Shenouda is the official head of this institution and children's activities are 
prioritised by all clergy. 74 Consequently, during the reign of the present patriarch, the laity 
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have been integrated into the church system and while not completely subservient, no longer 
pose the threat to patriarchal authority experienced by previous patriarchs. 
The authoritarian nature of church governance under Patriarch Shenouda serves to 
discourage criticism of the head of the church or his policies. For example, the members of 
the 1981 Papal Committee (set up by Sadat to govern church affairs in the enforced absence 
of the patriarch), experienced varying levels of punishment. Bishop Johannis was forced to 
give up his position as Secretary of the Holy Synod, while Bishop Athanasius was confined to 
his diocese and the work of Bishop Gregorius was limited to scientific research only. 75 
Another prominent critic Father Matta al-Meskeen was subjected to similar treatment 
including having his books banned from the patriarchal library and church shops. 76 The 
divisions between Father Matta and Patriarch Shenouda can be seen as illustrating two 
different visions of the role of the Coptic Renewal. As detailed earlier, Patriarch Shenouda 
believed that the church should use its resources to improve the situation of the Coptic 
community in all aspects. In contrast, Father Matta was concerned that this approach would 
detract from the main essence of the revival - the spiritual heritage of the Coptic Orthodox 
Church. He was also wary that the social services provided by the church combined with its 
efforts to be the sole representative of the community would attract Copts to the church for 
material not spiritual reasons. After the forced removal of the patriarch to Wadi Natroun, 
Father Matta gave an interview to Time Magazine suggesting that there was now more chance 
of peaceful relations between the church and the state. 77 Consequently, Father Matta and the 
monastery of Abu Maqar have been mostly ostracised from wider involvement in the church. 
This type of treatment of internal critics has become normal during the reign of Patriarch 
Shenouda. The refusal of Bishop Arsanios to agree to the excommunication of a monk-priest 
meant that he was not only ostracised by the patriarch and his immediate circle of bishops but 
78 
also lost his position as Abbot of the Monastery of Baramous in 1992 . While bishops 
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cannot be removed from office apart from in exceptional circumstances, several priests have 
been excommunicated from the church by the patriarch. As a consequence of a crackdown 
on corruption amongst the clergy, there has been a substantial decrease in the loss of church 
funds. 79 However, some of those excommunicated appear to have been punished primarily 
due to disagreements with the patriarch. For example, the dismissal of Father Aghathon, a 
priest at a historic church in Old Cairo was regarded by his parishioners as purely due to 
differences over financing renovation work . 
80 There is some unrest concerning the conduct 
of influential figures within the church such as Metropolitan Bishoi. In such instances, the 
patriarch has no hesitation in appealing to the traditional respect given to the head of the 
church to counter dissent within the church or the community. The patriarchal finances raise 
further problems. Several members of the laity constantly demand that these accounts should 
be made transparent. However, Patriarch Shenouda has replied that this suggests a lack of 
trust in the patriarch. Consequently, this ensures that few Copts, especially within the 
hierarchy, are likely to outwardly criticise the policies of the patriarch due to the potential 
outcome of this action -a swift end to their position and status. From this discussion, it is 
apparent that Patriarch Shenouda has established himself as the undisputed leader of the 
Coptic Orthodox Church. Furthermore, the success of the Coptic renewal process has 
ensured that in the twenty-first century, the church is at the centre of the community. 
Consequently, it is clear that these strategies have provided the foundations for Patriarch 
Shenouda to develop the temporal dimension of the office. 
The Political Role of Patriarch Shenouda in the Mubarak Era 
In contrast to his predecessors, Patriarch Shenouda has proved willing to address political 
issues. Since his release in 1985, it is clear that the patriarch has modified his political 
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strategy to become less confrontational. Hasan suggests that while the tactics of the patriarch 
may have changed, so too have the circumstances. While it is evident that a gradual 
Islamization of Egyptian society has occurred under Mubarak, the president has not actively 
pursued this. Unlike Sadat, Mubarak did not use the Copts as scapegoats or declare 
communal clashes a result of Coptic conspiracies. 81 Thus, the patriarch adopts a particular 
approach to correspond to the attitude of the governing authorities. The patriarch himself 
highlighted the importance of the personality of the ruler. In an interview on the occasion of 
his eightieth birthday, he said "Sadat easily got angry and annoyed and might make violent 
decisions. However, President Mubarak thinks twice before becoming irritated and his anger 
is not as dangerous as that of Sadat. Sadat tended to destroy his opponents. But President 
Mubarak tends to engage in dialogue with them and give them a chance". 82 As both 
Mubarak and Pope Shenouda acknowledged that they shared the same enemy - Islamist 
extremism, the patriarch no longer called for demonstrations after attacks on Christians but 
instead accepted that diplomacy was the only means to solve these problems. 
The abandonment of his earlier confrontational approach does not mean that Patriarch 
Shenouda has relinquished his political presence. In interviews, he frequently answers 
questions regarding political issues. Until recently, the church hierarchy did not support 
specific candidates or parties instead solely advising that the community should participate in 
national life. While this remained true in the 2005 parliamentary elections, the patriarch 
controversially gave his full support to President Mubarak in the first presidential elections 
held in 2005. In an edition of al-Keraza, (the official church magazine) an article described a 
document signed by the Holy Synod before Mubarak had even annouhced his nomination. 
This declaration expressed their contentment with the Mubarak years and listed his electoral 
strengths - political wisdom, tolerance and experience. 
83 The patriarch has frequently 
complimented the President, stating that he is attentive to Coptic concerns. "Relations 
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between Muslim and Coptic figures are excellent. President Mubarak is an enemy of all sorts 
9 84 of extremism, bigotry and discrimination' . Thus, this strategy 
illustrates the political 
astuteness of the patriarch as he is aware that while conditions may not be perfect, the 
Mubarak regime has proved relatively tolerant to the Coptic community which could not be 
guaranteed under other candidates. 
Concerning Coptic electoral participation, the patriarch has used his authority to encourage 
the community to take part in elections. On a trip to Upper Egypt in 2004, he asked the 
crowds to hold up their voting registration cards and congratulated them for performing what 
85 he termed their national duty. He argues that if Copts continue to be unsuccessful at 
winning seats, it is no surprise that they are becoming politically apathetiC. 86 While the 
election of Youssef Boutros Boutros Ghali in 2000 was welcomed, the patriarch highlighted 
that this government minister needed two rounds to succeed even though he stood in a 
predominantly Coptic area. Regarding the controversial option of quotas, which was rejected 
by Coptic politicians in the Wafd, he refuses to specify a preference but is adamant that the 
state must find a system that guarantees suitable Coptic representation. In an interview on 
the occasion of his eightieth birthday in October 2003, he stressed that it was "the duty of the 
state to find a practical solution" and that "it is unacceptable to tell foreigners that Copts have 
only 0.5% of representation in the People's Assembly" (parliament). He also mentioned that 
"President Sadat had allocated a certain percentage of seats to youth and women". 87 
Although he has refrained from further elaboration, these comments illustrate the concerns 
held by Patriarch Shenouda regarding Coptic representation and the apparent lack of 
government interest in solving this issue. He emphasises that Copts are not seeking special 
privileges but instead, only wish to enjoy full participation in Egyptian society. He also 
rejects the notion of a Coptic political party because religion should not dictate politics and a 
88 
party should serve the whole community not just one segment . However, it should be noted 
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that this party would challenge the authority of the church in the Coptic community, thus it is 
unsurprising that the patriarch cautions against its formation. 
On the issue of discrimination, the patriarch has made a few selected comments. He has 
highlighted the difficulties facing ordinary Copts in gaining employment in sectors such as 
thejudiciary and universities, contrasting this with the situation from the 1930s-1950s. 
While there have been several disturbances over disputed conversions to Islam, the patriarch 
has mostly refrained from making public statements and instead, relied on private liaisons 
between senior clerics and government officials. This is often the preferred method of the 
patriarch in dealing with many of the contentious issues e. g. conversions and church building. 
One notable exception was the Wafaa Constantine affair in December 2004. In brief, the 
wife of a Coptic Orthodox priest purportedly converted to Islam. Rumours immediately 
spread in the Coptic community that she had been abducted and forcibly converted. 
Protestors gathered outside the patriarchate in Cairo and clashed with security forces. 
Eventually, the woman was returned to the church authorities where she eventually 
announced that she had not changed her religion after all. However, this was not before the 
patriarch had retreated to Wadi Natroun apparently in distress that the event had not been 
resolved quickl Y. 89 The significance of this symbolic act cannot be overemphasised as this 
was exactly the type of method employed by Patriarch Shenouda during the tense Sadat years 
to draw attention to Coptic grievances. The next edition of al-Keraza (which is edited by the 
patriarch) concentrated on the disturbances. Firstly, Coptic fears over this issue were claimed 
to be directly linked to communal tension in other regions including Sarnalut and Assiut. 
Secondly in the account of the affair, the security services are clearly blamed for their 
tardiness in resolving the problem i. e. finding and returning Wafaa Constantine to the church 
authorities. This is in sharp contrast to the praise given to President Mubarak who was out 
of the country at the time but instructed his officials to ensure a quick solution. Thirdly, the 
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theme of police brutality is extremely strong. Several pictures are enclosed of bloodied and 
bruised Copts including a priest. 90 Clearly, this response can be regarded as a message from 
the patriarch to the authorities that conversion issues should be between the church authorities 
and the individual concerned. Any indication that the security forces were not acting within 
the legal framework which accords them the responsibility of recording any conversion, could 
result in public protests which could only be dispelled by Patriarch Shenouda. On the other 
controversial issue of church building, again the patriarch rarely comments. However, each 
new permit for construction or repair work is mentioned in al-Keraza and accompanied by a 
message of appreciation to President Mubarak. 91 
On security issues, the patriarch does voice his concerns when deemed necessary. After the 
escalation of events at al-Kush in 2000, an article in al-Keraza urged the government to 
resolve issues rather than reverting to the traditional response of covering up problems. The 
church hierarchy justified these comments as necessary to counter the inaccurate reporting 
about this event. The patriarch expressed his confidence in the central government in Cairo 
and stressed that the problem lay with local authorities. The final sentence illustrates the 
view of Patriarch Shenouda on such incidents. "True reconciliation can take place only after 
the blood of these victims receive justice". 92 The patriarch also made known his 
dissatisfaction after the subsequent trial when 92 out of the 96 defendants were acquitted. 93 
While this may have been a factor in the government decision to order a retrial, its failure to 
convict the suspects has left bitterness among the Coptic community at the apparent inability 
to achieve justice in this case. 
Patriarch Shenouda is also keen to highlight that Copts are an integral part of Egyptian 
society. Various statements are made stressing this "national unity" e. g. "sons of a single 
homeland". 94 He clearly rejects the idea that Copts are a minority, stressing that they are part 
of the Egyptian nation and wams against any outside interference regarding Coptic 
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concerns. 95 "We do not accept any foreign interference in our internal affair, which we are 
solving in peace with the responsible persons in our country9t. 96 There has also been 
increased effort to foster close links with Islamic religious representatives, particularly the 
Grand Sheikh of al-Azhar. The patriarch perceives that these activities particularly at festive 
occasions, can help to strengthen communal ties. Regarding communal iftars, he said, 
"Muslims and Copts sit side by side in these dinners which gives a good impression and 
picture to the west about Egyptians and the good relations they have". 97 
The patriotic credentials of Patriarch Shenouda are also widely recognised due to his firm 
commitment to the Palestinian cause. The patriarch has banned any pilgrimage to Jerusalem 
until it is once more under Arab control. Although some Copts still go, this is at the risk of 
excommunication from the church. While this strong appeal against Zionism does enhance 
the notion of the Coptic community as loyal Egyptians supporting one of the major Arab 
political issues, it must also be mentioned that other motives such as the ongoing struggle 
over Deir as-Sultan may influence the stance of the Coptic Orthodox Church towards the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In conclusion, since his return from the desert monastery in 1985, 
Patriarch Shenouda has adopted a pragmatic approach towards the government and reinforced 
the idea of Copts as loyal Egyptians, an image that had become eroded during the tensions 
with Sadat. However, this has not been at the expense of voicing his concerns at times of 
crisis. 
The Response to the Political Role of Patriarch Shenouda 
Although the experience of the Coptic Orthodox Church in recent decades would suggest 
that its political role would automatically be acknowledged, in practice, there is still debate 
within Egypt, on whether the church actually is involved in politics. The patriarch himself is 
159 
ambiguous concerning the evolution of his office from a religious to a religio-political 
symbol. Patriarch Shenouda asserts that the Coptic Orthodox Patriarch cannot be separated 
from the state because it is part of it. He also argues that the state should deal with one 
person i. e. the patriarch in order to successfully resolve problems rather than appealing to 
each individual member of the community. 98 However, he claims that the call of the church 
is spiritual and states that the church is not political but instead, has a responsibility to 
perform its national civic duty. 99 Members of the church argue that although the patriarch is 
certainly the Coptic spokesman to the state, this does not automatically make him a political 
leader. Instead, many agree that the church only becomes involved in political matters when 
politics infringes on religious freedom. Furthermore, it is argued that as an Egyptian citizen, 
the patriarch has every right to give his opinion on political issues. However, this does not 
mean that this is the official stance of the church. While this may theoretically be true, the 
stature invested in the office of patriarch, means that in practice, comments by the patriarch 
can be seen as guidance for the community. After his statement of support for the candidacy 
of Mubarak in 2005, the media provided various quotations from ordinary Copts willing to 
replicate the political choice of their spiritual leader. For example, "Pope Shenouda has 
pledged his support to Mubarak and he absolutely knows what is best for his sons". 100 
Concerning the impact of this apparent political role, opinion appears to be divided. 
Clearly, the strong leadership of Patriarch Shenouda has contributed to the community 
rediscovering its identity not just as Coptic Christians but also as Egyptians. Thiscanbe 
seen as a product of the Coptic Renewal which affected the whole community not just the 
church, thus allowing the patriarch to undertake the leadership role of the community. 
However, concern has been raised that under Patriarch Shenouda, the church has become 
politicised. Although the patriarch has acted against his critics within the church, it is clear 
that the two contrasting visions of the Coptic Renewal can still be identified. Consequently, 
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the influential Father Matta al-Meskeen argues that the church should not seek power on earth 
as it is responsible not to the state but to God alone. 101 He warns that involvement in political 
issues will adversely affect the spiritual role of the church as the hierarchy will become 
concerned with worldly matters and endanger the whole religious reform movement. 102 The 
tendency of the patriarch to concentrate on Coptic concerns is also criticised. Although he 
employs the "national unity" rhetoric common to most Egyptian public figures, his political 
statements generally refer to exclusive Coptic issues. A book written anonymously but 
presumed to be by a monk from Deir Abu Maqar stresses that the church must stand up for 
any injustice not just those which affect Copts. "The church's credibility depends upon 
defending anyone who is persecuted, without regard to religion or race". 103 
Others within the community feel that the patriarch is too concerned with politics. While 
some church leaders have certainly become more politicised, it is extremely difficult in the 
Egyptian context to separate reli gious and political issues especially as the head of the church 
is more or less recognised as the legitimate leader of the community and therefore, 
responsible for all issues affecting it. Arguing that Christianity separates religion and 
politics, some Coptic intellectuals criticisc church involvement in sensitive issues, stating that 
this does more harm than good. 104 For example, some suggest that the involvement of the 
church is partly why Coptic issues are mostly viewed as security matters because of the 
likelihood of communal clashes occurring. Yet, it can also be seen that the traditional Coptic 
elite has mostly endorsed the return of the millet partnership between the Coptic Orthodox 
Church and the state. This is primarily because any alternative would involve the increased 
participation of middle class laity, which would impact on the power and influence of this 
elite. 105 Some human rights activists also appeal to the church to withdraw from the political 
sphere. "The Church should confine itself to religious matters and politics should be dealt 
with by civil society organizations". ' 0' However, it must be noted that such figures would 
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gain extensively from a decline in the political role of the church as they would attempt to fill 
this vacuum, just as the clergy did in the 1970s. 
Since the return of Patriarch Shenouda in 1985, cordial relations with President Mubarak 
have allowed the millet partnership to re-emerge. Mubarak appears comfortable working 
within this historic system on issues relating to the Coptic community. 107 Yet as outlined 
earlier, Coptic concerns are not a high priority for the government. When Mubarak came to 
power, the main aim was to combat the militants who advocated the overthrow of the state. 
The quest for peace and stability has remained an integral policy of the Egyptian authorities. 
According to Watson, the patriarch remained in his desert monastery until 1985 partly due to 
threats to his personal safety and the impact any attack would have on communal relations. 108 
Political stability and economic growth are key aims of the regime. Hence, government 
attitudes to Coptic concerns primarily depend on the likely effect these will have on the above 
goals. As has been seen, the crackdown on militants in the late 1990s has been attributed to 
the adverse impact these attacks had on tourism -a crucial source of revenue. Although this 
action was not taken as a direct response to the threat posed to Copts by militants, the removal 
of these groups obviously benefited the Coptic community, especially in Upper Egypt where 
the majority of these attacks occurred. 
Consequently, Christian-Muslim tensions tend to be seen as part of a bigger picture. 
Ayalon states that there was an assumption that once the Islamist militants had been 
contained, the Coptic problem would also subside. 109 While this maybe partly true regarding 
security matters, it is clear that Coptic concerns cover a wide range of subjects including 
political representation, discrimination and church building. The insistence of the 
government in dealing with all of these as security matters rather than as socio-political ones 
has had a major implication on relations between the state and community. There is a clear 
pattern to the government response to violent incidents. Individuals from both sides are 
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spoken to by the police, public reconciliations arc held and statements given by key political 
and religious leaders that such acts detract from the "national unity" found in Egypt. This 
unwillingness to separate the victim from the perpetrator has caused anger amongst the Coptic 
community. It is apparent that the government response still tends to be reactive. According 
to O'Mahony, the policy is still only to "reprimand where absolutely necessary". ' 10 Atthe 
outbreak of trouble, the authorities do attempt to prevent further confrontation or a re-run of 
the al-Kush incident but these can be categorised as reactive measures only. There has been 
no concerted campaign by the central government to tackle the underlying factors behind 
these incidents (suspicion of the other, political alienation, economic hardships etc). Instead, 
the authorities in Cairo regularly have to intervene in goverriates particularly in Upper Egypt 
to avoid further escalation. 
In recent years, the Mubarak government has been keen to cmphasise that Copts are an 
integral not just tolerated part of the Egyptian nation. Several issues raised by Copts have 
been addressed. As discussed above, the 2000 elections witnessed an increase in Coptic 
candidates for the NDP and Youssef Boutros Ghali was appointed head of a crucial ministry 
(finance) -a significant move when viewed in the context of the Islamic tradition of dhimmi. 
The increase in licenses for building new churches is an important measure. Another 
significant move was the declaration of 7h January - Coptic Orthodox Christmas - as a 
national holiday in 2003. In general, the Coptic community was delighted by this symbolic 
step. The patriarch proclaimed it a beautiful decision while Yousscf Sidhorn stated, "What is 
particularly important in the president's announcement is that it gives Copts the sense that all 
citizens are treated equally, because their religious feasts are worthy of national 
recognition". "' Christians had always been able to take the day off but some Copts had 
protested in the past when school exams were scheduled on 7 th January. Other actions to 
improve national unity include the review of history textbooks in schools to include sections 
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on the Coptic era which were previously ignored! 12 The Minister of Awqaf formed a joint 
committee between the Ministry and the Coptic Orthodox Church in order to return some of 
the church property confiscated by the regime in the 1950s. 113 The government has also 
promoted Christian pilgrimage on the Holy Family route in Egypt and is renovating Old 
Cairo, an area with several ancient Christian churches. 114 
In recent years, the government has sought to increase the visibility of Patriarch Shenouda 
and hence the Coptic community. For example, he was nominated for the UNESCO- 
Madanjeet Singh Prize for the Promotion of Tolerance and Non-Violence in 2000. Pope 
Shenouda became the first individual to receive this award! 15 At religious celebrations, 
effort is made to give the patriarch the same respect shown to his Muslim counterparts. At 
the annual National Unity Iftar banquet held by the Ministry of Religious Endowments during 
the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, Patriarch Shenouda is placed at the top table alongside 
the Prime Minister, President of Parliament, Minster of Religious Endowments and the 
116 Sheikh of al-Azhar. Similarly, on the occasion of Easter, the patriarch receives several 
delegations including amongst others, the Prime Minister, Head of the Consultative Council, 
cabinet ministers, political party leaders, the governors of Cairo and Alexandria and the head 
of the Cairo Security office. ' 17 Patriarch Shenouda, like Sheikh Tantawi is invited to key 
events such as the Police Forces Day and the July Revolution celebrations, both held at the 
Police Academy in Cairo. ' 18 A pattern has emerged that both religious representatives are 
invited to speak at conferences and lectures. 
Consequently, the above measures can be interpreted as illustrating not only the importance 
of the office of patriarch but also that he is seen publicly as enjoying the same privilege and 
status as exercised by the Sheikh of al-Azhar. On any pastoral visits undertaken by the 
patriarch, he is greeted by regional government officials. For example, in Upper Egypt in 
March 2004, he was welcomed by the governors of Sohag and Qena, given civil awards and 
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met many state representatives. ' 19 These measures can be seen as a government attempt to 
prove to all Egyptians that Copts are regarded as equal and full contributors to Egyptian 
society. Yet at the same time, they can also be categorised as merely cosmetic measures to 
placate the community rather than wholeheartedly addressing the complex issues as the heart 
of Muslim-Christian relations in Egypt. Furthermore, these improvements do not mean that 
President Mubarak and Patriarch Shenouda meet regularly or necessarily enjoy close 
relations. Instead, discussions between the church and state are generally conducted by 
advisers to the two men. 
The Consequences of the Political Role of the Patriarch and Future Prospects 
Upon entering the patriarchate, Patriarch Shenouda embarked on two missions. The first 
was to assert patriarchal authority over the community not just the church. Hissuccessin 
this endeavour through the total renewal process of the Coptic Revival has been illustrated. 
The second aim was to use this influence to become the sole civil representative of the Copts 
and articulate their concerns in order to achieve full rights for the community. In this area, 
the verdict is mixed. Hasan argues that Patriarch Shenouda has certainly succeeded in 
transforming the Coptic Orthodox religious space into a political countcrspace. 120 The initial 
assertive approach undertaken by the pope when he first took office, may have highlighted the 
political functions of the head of the Coptic Orthodox Church but failed to produce any 
significant improvements for the community. In fact, some argued that it was 
counterproductive as it served only to further antagonise Muslim public opinion. Under the 
Mubarak presidency, the strategy adopted by Patriarch Shenouda would appear to reflect his 
acceptance of the rules of the millet partnership that allows the patriarch autonomy over the 
Coptic community in exchange for support of the regime. 
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There have been some moves to address concerns raised by the patriarch and the 
community. Concerning relations between the Coptic community and the state, many regard 
the Mubarak era as the best since the Revolution. Yet there is still awareness of the many 
issues not addressed. This is demonstrated by the titles of Watani-editorials which deal with 
these -'Troblems on Hold". 121 The Mubarak presidency can be summarised as attempting to 
appease Muslim opinion while preventing communal tension which could jcopardise political 
and economic stability. The benefits that the community has received in recent years 
represent the rewards of co-operating with the authorities and advocating participation in 
national affairs. A brief mention of key events in church-state relations in 2005 serves to 
illustrate the manner in which the millet system operates. Firstly, the state authorities 
resolved the Constantine affair according to the wishes of the patriarch. This was followed 
by the ringing endorsement of President Mubarak in the presidential elections. During this 
period, there appeared to be a significant increase in the number of building permits granted 
to the church. Finally, in the aftermath of the success of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 
parliamentary elections, the presidential decree to ease aspects of the restrictions on church 
building can be interpreted as a mode of appeasement. Hence, it can be argued that the 
Mubarak government has been able to co-opt the Coptic Orthodox Patriarch in a similar 
manner to the Sheikh of al-Azhar. A well-known Coptic intellectual remarked that 
"Shenouda has kept the Copts in his pocket, and Mubarak has kept Shenouda in his 
pocket". 122 The 2005 electoral success of the Muslim Brotherhood will further ensure that 
this situation remains the status quo. It would be surprising if the church hierarchy supported 
any major political challenges to the NDP as the ruling party is considered to be the only force 
which can prevent an Islamist victory. 
However, one consequence of the church renewal process is the increasing activism of the 
Coptic community. When events arise that are perceived as damaging the Coptic Orthodox 
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faith or the reputation of Copts, the passive response of the past is no longer adopted. While 
the more militant tendencies of the church leadership halted after 1981, aspects of these can 
be found in the communal response to certain incidents, particularly in the twenty-first 
century. Such reactions have the potential to adversely affect church-state relations. In the 
al-Nabaa scandal, this Egyptian newspaper published allegations and photographs in 2001 of 
a defrocked monk said to be sexually targeting women at the Monastery of Deir al-Muharraq, 
regarded a holy site by Copts. 123 In response, thousands of Copts flocked to the patriarchate 
to hold demonstrations that lasted for four days to condemn the newspaper. One significant 
aspect of this incident was that for the first time, Copts protested alone in the streets of Cairo 
beside the patriarchate, resulting in skirmishes with the police. 124 While obviously 
condemning the journal, the church hierarchy struggled to pacify the crowd to the extent that 
the weekly bible meeting held by Patriarch Shenouda was cancelled and he remained in 
Alexandria. The incident was resolved when the government closed down the paper and 
suspended its editor. 
A further example is the reaction of some Copts to an Egyptian film released in the summer 
of 2004, which featured a Coptic family in the 1960s. While some saw it as exploring social 
issues, certain scenes of Baheb es-Sinema (I love the Cinema), especially those set in a 
church, were regarded by others as marring the reputation of Copts. A small amount 
(estimated around one hundred) demonstrated at the patriarchate for the removal of the film 
even although some admitted they had not actually viewed the film themselves. 125 The 
church hierarchy tried to avoid involvement on this issue stating that although it did not wish 
a censorship role, the church should have the right to voice its opinion if religious beliefs are 
believed to be violated. 126 Finally, the Wafaa Constantine affair discussed earlier illustrates 
the potential for clashes with state authorities over such incidents. These incidents have 
attracted substantial press coverage in Egypt and raised the notion of Christian extremism. It 
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is apparent that the Coptic renewal has resulted in the increase of strict religious adherence 
among some Copts that could explain this more assertive response to such incidents. In 
general this "extremism" does not take the violent form which is associated with Islamic 
extremist groups. However, some Copts feel that there is a danger that the above attempts to 
defend their community will become interpreted in the same way. 
There would appear to be an ambiguous relationship between the church leaders and these 
activists. While not openly supporting such protests, there has been little official 
discouragement. Sedra states that the patriarch cannot reverse this political mobilisation of 
the community especially of the middle class. 127 However, due to the extent of power that 
the patriarch enjoys within the community, it would be expected that this activism would 
mostly be guided and controlled by the church hierarchy. The outcome of the incidents 
examined above would appear to suggest that a public show of force from the community can 
lead to concessions from the authorities. Yet, this is a risky course to follow. Similar 
strategies employed by the church during the Sadat years served only to intensify the anger of 
many Egyptians and escalate tense situations. Consequently, this increase in activism could 
potentially cause great damage not only to the present version of the millet system but also to 
the Coptic community at large. 
The future relations between the Christian community and the state also depend on the 
personality of the leaders. The stability enjoyed in recent years owes much to the 
understanding between Mubarak and Patriarch Shenouda. However, under their successors, 
this could change. The events that occurred under Sadat illustrate the dangers posed to 
Egyptian Christians when a new ruler seeks to consolidate his power. In many Muslim 
countries, Islam is still used as a means of achieving popular legitimacy. Consequently, 
under a future Egyptian leader, there is no guarantee that the Sadat scenario will not re- 
emerge. Similarly, the confrontational approach of Patriarch Shenouda in his first ten years 
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of office also contributed to the events in this tense period. Hence, the response of a new 
patriarch to any changes undertaken by the state, will determine relations not only between 
the church hierarchy and the government but also among ordinary citizens. However, it 
would appear that likely patriarchal candidates would favour the continuation of the status 
quo and follow the approach adopted by Patriarch Shenouda since 1985. 
Future developments in wider Egyptian society will also affect the political role of the 
patriarch. There has long been talk of the need for political reform in Egypt. Such measures 
would be likely to include lifting the Emergency Law and establishing a credible party system 
where different parties could pose a genuine challenge to the ruling NDP. A by-product of 
increased political participation among all Egyptians could be the integration of Copts into the 
political system in contrast to the current situation. This would be aided if a future Egyptian 
government were willing to address Coptic concerns and refrained from perceiving these 
solely as security issues. However, at present, the Muslim Brotherhood is likely to be the 
main beneficiary of any liberalization of the electoral process. Thus, political reform would 
not necessarily lead to a situation which would be considered an improvement by the Coptic 
community. As demonstrated earlier, many support the status quo out of fear of their 
treatment under a Muslim-Brotherhood-led regime. If the crisis of state conditions were to 
ease, this could lead to other actors challenging the patriarch as the sole legitimate civil 
representative of the Coptic community. The response of the church hierarchy to these 
developments is likely to be mixed. Since the church leaders mainly entered the active 
political sphere to prevent the Islamization of the state, it is possible that they would agree to 
return to a more exclusively spiritual role if they perceived that their rights had been 
safeguarded (unlikely if the Muslim Brotherhood gained power). It is equally likely that 
regardless of the nature of the government (secular or religious), the hierarchy, particularly 
Patriarch Shenouda may hesitate to voluntarily cede the communal authority currently 
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exercised, which is often regarded as a vital element of the renewal process. Furthermore, 
the appearance of credible lay representatives would heighten tension between the church and 
the community as illustrated by the al-majlis al-milli experience. While these developments 
could challenge the authority of the patriarch, this is unlikely to occur in the immediate future 
as the catalyst required - significant political reform - has yet to move beyond the rhetorical 
stage. 
It is also possible that the general problems affecting Egyptian society as well as those 
related to Copts, will continue to grow. Increased threats to security and perceptions of 
vulnerability can encourage a more intolerant atmosphere affecting both sides, where 
communal violence becomes a frequent occurrence. As has been seen, some elements in the 
community already urge its leaders (i. e. the patriarch) to adopt a more vigorous policy and 
demand that the government address these concerns. In this context, the church hierarchy 
would be faced with a dilemma. With an increasingly activist middle class, they may feel 
that the church needs to accurately reflect the mood of the community. Yet, this is likely to 
adversely affect church-state relations as occurred in the turbulent period of 1971-1981. To 
avoid this, the church hierarchy would need to demonstrate that its broadly co-operative 
approach to the government, is indeed beneficial to the community. Therefore, the extent of 
the temporal authority of the patriarch depends not only on the measures undertaken by the 
church hierarchy but also developments in wider Egyptian society. 
SUMMM 
It is clear that the long reign of Patriarch Shenouda has had a monumental impact not only 
on the Coptic Orthodox Church but also on the community. The traditional leadership 
contributed by the patriarchate in history combined with the pivotal role of the church in 
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Coptic identity especially since the Coptic renewal, provided the legitimacy required for 
Patriarch Shenouda to pursue his vision of the Coptic Orthodox Patriarch assuming 
responsibility for the entire community. The patriarch personifies the success of the Sunday 
School generation in enacting the Coptic Renewal -a process which affected all strands of the 
community and whose fruits are still being experienced. This renewal process has been 
utilised to ensure that the church is perceived as the focal point for the community in both 
spiritual and civil matters. The absence of credible Coptic laity leadership has allowed 
Patriarch Shenouda to use the resources of the church to fill this vacuum. His patriarchy has 
been greatly affected by political developments in Egypt, particularly outbursts of communal 
violence. The assertive polices undertaken between 1971-1981 failed in terms of achieving 
equality and security for Copts. Yet, Patriarch Shenouda was able to maximise his role as 
head of the community. This has been reinforced since 1985. The incorporation of 
communal activities under the auspices of the church and the centralization process within it 
have ensured that the patriarch enjoys near total control over the community. Thus, he acts 
as their civil representative and is a leading advocate of Coptic concerns to the state. While 
some patriarchal statements are considered controversial especially those addressing party 
politics, on the whole, this political role is accepted in the context of the millet system of 
church-state relations. 
In this case study, the participation of a religious leader in political affairs has not caused a 
major upset to communal relations in post-Sadat Egypt even although the patriarch is widely 
regarded as articulating the specific views of the Coptic community rather than those of wider 
Egyptian society. This is partly due to the general consensus in the country that the head of 
the Coptic Orthodox Church is expected to have a temporal dimension. Under the millet 
system, the patriarch is recognised as the civil representative of the Copts. This arrangement 
has suited both parties. During the Mubarak years, this role has been recognised by the 
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government almost to the extent that the patriarch can be regarded as co-opted by the regime. 
However, this also means that the patriarch is vulnerable to being made the scapegoat in times 
of communal tension. Although Patriarch Shenouda may have been successful in 
consolidating power within the community, this has not been transformed into tangible 
reforms from the government. Instead, concessions have primarily been cosmetic acts to 
placate the patriarch and the community. The conciliatory approach has fared little better 
than the assertive strategy in the Sadat era in meeting Coptic needs, especially regarding 
discrimination and security. 
The church hierarchy must perform an increasingly difficult balancing act to reassure the 
community that they are still the most effective institution to represent Coptic interests, while 
simultaneously proving to the government that the community and the church in particular, 
remain loyal Egyptians. As long as the status quo continues especially concerning relations 
with the state, the Coptic Orthodox Patriarch will be regarded as the main legitimate 
representative of Copts on all aspects - spiritual and civil. However, this authority could be 
undermined by the increased activism among some Copts -a by-product of the very process 
that allowed the Sunday School generation to gain this position. In order to retain his 
predominance, the patriarch may resort to more assertive strategies as in the past even 
although he has witnessed the severe repercussions that this could have on both himself and 
the wider Coptic community. In conclusion, Patriarch Shenouda has revitalised the 
traditional predominant role of the office adding a more political activist dimension, but by 
failing to deliver all the promises of the Coptic Renewal, has left a potential opportunity to as 
yet unknown actors, to challenge this temporal authority. 
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Chapter Five - The Political Role of Patriarch Nasrallah Boutros 
Sfeir, Patriarch of Antioch and All the East of the Maronites 
Introduction 
The earlier sections of this study have demonstrated that throughout history, the Maronite 
patriarch has enjoyed a temporal dimension to his role as the spiritual head of the community. 
Furthermore, post war Lebanon can be charactcrised as a crisis of state environment, 
especially for the once dominant Maronite community. Maronite secular leadership 
collapsed precisely when guidance was needed not only to rebuild the war-ravaged nation but 
also to respond to the multiple challenges facing the community. Under Patriarch Sfeir, the 
Maronite Church has enjoyed a reawakening of its political activities as the representative of 
the Maronite people. This thesis proposes that Patriarch Sfeir has filled this leadership 
vacuum with considerable success. Thus, the personal attributes of the patriarch would 
appear significant in determining the extent of this political role. 
This discussion will provide a detailed analysis of the methods used by the patriarch to exert 
his authority over the community. Firstly, a short biography will be given of Patriarch Sfeir 
and the early years of his patriarchy. The spiritual renewal in the Maronite church in the post 
war era that has been guided by Patriarch Sfeir can also be regarded as a strategy to emphasise 
traditional patriarchal authority. By uniting the community under him, Patriarch Sfeir was 
presented with the opportunity to forge a political path for the community as the only 
recognised populist Maronite leader. The church resources have been used to strengthen the 
position of the church in order to maximise its ability to fill this political vacuum. The 
political activities undertaken by Patriarch Sfeir will be examined. His stance on the key 
Maronite grievances highlighted earlier will be analysed, illustrating that the patriarch appears 
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to share many of these concerns. While a significant proportion of this discussion will focus 
on the period from 2000 until the Syrian withdrawal in 2005, his attitudes towards the 
momentous developments in Lebanon since the assassination of Hariri will also be explored. 
This provides an opportunity to contrast the methods adopted by the church hierarchy in these 
two periods to determine if changes in the political situation affect the role of the patriarch. 
The involvement of a religious leader in national affairs has the potential to foster harmonious 
communal relations and stability or alternatively could endanger the fragile peace after the 
civilwar. In order to judge the effect that the political actions undertaken by Patriarch Sfeir 
have had on Lebanon, the response of the following groups will be examined: the Maronite 
clergy and faithful, other Christian communities, politicians of all persuasions, government 
officials and the different Muslim communities. The final section will explore possible 
scenarios for the temporal role of the patriarch in the future, emphasising the significance of 
the personality of the patriarch in determining the outcome of such activities. Thus, this 
chapter will highlight the extent to which religious institutions, represented by the spiritual 
leader, can exercise political authority in a crisis of state environment in a region where the 
effects of the secularization process have not been experienced in a similar manner to the 
West. 
A Brief Biography of Patriarch Sfeir 
The path of the Maronite Church in Taif Lebanon has been greatly shaped by Patriarch 
Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir who was elected during the last phase of the civil war. Born in 
Rayfoun, Kesrouan in 1920, Nasrallah Sfeir was educated at the St. Maron Seminary in 
Ghazir and studied Philosophy and Theology at the University of St. Joseph in Beirut. In 
1950, he was ordained into the priesthood and served in his home parish of Rayfoun. From 
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1956 until 1961, he was professor of translation in literature and philosophy at the Maronite 
Brothers School inJounieh. After being ordained Bishop of Tarsus in 1961, he served as a 
Patriarchal Vicar and continued to be the Secretary of the Maronite Patriarchate until his 
election in 1986.1 During this period, Nasrallah Sfeir was known for his moderate political 
views in contrast to the radicalization that affected many in the community as a consequence 
of the Lebanese civil war. Helmick states that this bishop represented those in the Maronite 
community who were not frightened of their Muslim neighbours but instead worked to restore 
harmonious relations. 2 According to Valognes, Nasrallah Sfeir was elected to the highest 
Maronite office because the Synod was unable to choose between the declared candidates 
who represented specific political factions. Having served under his two predecessors, he 
was extremely experienced in the spiritual and civil activities of Bkerke (the Maronite 
3 
patriarchate). Patriarch Sfeir is also the author of several books and translations on the 
Maronite faith. His position as head of the Catholic communities in Lebanon was reinforced 
when he was made a Cardinal by Pope John Paul II in 1994 and appointed President of the 
Special Assembly of the Synod of Bishops for Lebanon one year later. 
The Early Years as Patriarch (1986- 1989) 
On his election, the patriarch was aware of the acute problems facing the Maronite 
community. The setbacks experienced during the civil war led to a crisis of identity - of 
which the Maronite faith had long been regarded as a core element. Both the community and 
church hierarchy were divided over what factions to support. As Patriarch Sfeir was not the 
candidate of the Lebanese Forces, the dominant Christian group at this time, he immediately 
faced opposition to his policies. Once elected, he tried to continue reconciliation measures 
sponsored by his predecessor. Through his pastoral letters, he indicated his position on 
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several issues including the need for unity, supporting a multicultural Lebanon, opposition to 
Islamic theocratic rule and condemnation of both Israeli and Syrian intervention in Lebanon. 4 
He received religious representatives of other communities when possible including a meeting 
with the Sunni mufti shortly after his election. 5 On a visit to Algeria in 1987, he met the 
leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) Yasser Arafat and later declared that 
P6 the Palestinian cause was "sacred'. This diplomacy did not gain a favourable response from 
many sections of the Maronite community who still blamed the Palestinians for the outbreak 
of violence in Lebanon. 
After the mandate of President Amin Gemayel expired in 1988, the patriarch (with Vatican 
support), was eager for elections to be held. Receiving an invitation from the Arab League to 
go to Kuwait to meet the other religious heads of the Lebanese communities in order to foster 
a peace process, he held a summit with Christian politicians. 7 This was in order to gain a 
mandate to undertake this mission and avoid being accused of betrayal of the community by 
participating in an Arab peace initiative. Patriarch Sfeirjustified this approach by stating 
that Lebanon needed liberation by reason and dialogue. 
8 Acknowledging the grave situation 
of the Christians, he supported the 1989 Document of National Understanding (the Taif 
Accord) -a revision of the National Pact but one that sanctioned the presence of the Syrian 
army. In doing so, he gave the agreement enough legitimacy in Christian circles to allow it a 
chance to succeed. 9 Like some Maronites, the patriarch believed that at this specific period, 
it was best to accept a pro-Syrian president and consequent Syrian influence in order to 
preserve the Lebanese state. However, his position contrasted with many ordinary 
Maronites, especially the followers of General Aoun (the caretaker Prime Minister), whom 
Patriarch Sfeir criticised for launching his War of Liberation in 1989. He believed that this 
could lead to the partitioning of the country - an outcome that the patriarchate had always 
been against since the establishment of the mandate. Incensed at the acquiescence of their 
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patriarch to what they perceived as Syrian hegemony, the patriarch was jostled by 
demonstrators and consequently sought refuge in the Syrian occupied sector. 10 This was the 
first time that the moral authority of the patriarch had been seriously challenged by the 
community. The patriarch publicly condemned the subsequent intra-Christian fighting 
between the Geagea (leader of the Lebanese Forces) and Aoun factions, deeming it 
"collective suicide". II By the end of the civil war, the patriarchate resembled the wider 
Maronite community -weakened, disunited and defeated. Therefore, the main aim of the 
patriarch in the post-war era was to oversee the rejuvenation of the Maronite church and as a 
consequence, the entire community. 
The Post-War Spiritual Renewal of the Maronite Church 
Since the civil war, both the Vatican and the Maronite hierarchy have addressed the 
divisions within the church in order to rebuild communal unity. During the conflict, the Holy 
See encouraged mediation between the different factions and sent reconciliation missions 
under the command of veteran Vatican diplomats. The attitude of the Holy See was affected 
by wider aims regarding the Middle East. Lebanon was perceived as a living model of 
coexistence between Christian and Muslims that should be ardently defended by Rome. The 
Pope warned that the events in Lebanon could have considerable implications on Christian 
communities throughout the region. In the 1984 Papal letter to the Eastern Catholic 
Patriarchs and Bishops in Lebanon, the Pope reminded Lebanese Christians that the fate of 
other Middle East Christians was directly linked to them and that they should remember that 
they were responsible for more than just their own concerns. 12 Some Maronites regarded this 
attitude as tantamount to a betrayal by the spiritual authorities of their church. Being the 
largest Catholic community in the Middle East, many Maronites had expected automatic 
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support from the Vatican in their effort to ensure Lebanon remained a refuge for Christians 
and did not become just another Arab Muslim dominated state. Consequently, there was a 
fundamental clash between the policies of the Vatican and the Maronite community. 
According to Irani, many Maronites felt that "Lebanese Christians were being sacrificed on 
the altar of Christian-Islamic dialogue". 13 For example, President-Elect Bashir Gemayel 
stated that the Vatican must understand that Lebanese Christians were not "guinea pigs" for 
interfaith dialogue. 14 Vatican policy was perceived as out-of-touch with the actual situation 
in Lebanon. This was highlighted by the meeting between the Pope and the Palestinian 
leader Yasser Arafat only one day after the assassination of Bashir Gemayel. Once the civil 
war was over, the Vatican recognised that it was vital that measures were instigated to prove 
to the disillusioned Maronite community that it could still represent their interests. 
Consequently, The Special Synod for Lebanon (1991-1995) was convened and stressed the 
need for all Catholic communities in Lebanon to join together to attain spiritual renewal. It 
outlined the Papal vision of the Lebanese future - one where Christians and Muslims work 
together to rebuild their country. A quote from the Pope "Lebanon is more than a country: 
Lebanon is a message" became the inspiration for many Lebanese - Christian and Muslim 
alike. 15 This was followed by the Apostolic Exhortation "A New Hope for Lebanon" which 
was signed by the Pope during his visit to Lebanon in 1997. The Apostolic Exhortation acts 
as a guide to the situation of the church, its mission and Lebanon, calling for dialogue 
between the Christian churches, the Muslim communities and the need to work together for 
national reconciliation. 16 
The post-civil war era has also seen the Maronite Church enact its own initiatives for church 
renewal. For many decades, elements within the church had called for a Maronite Synod to 
take account of the many changes since the last council in 1856. Writing in 1983, three years 
before he was elected patriarch, the then Bishop Sfeir stated that in the past, councils had 
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great influence on church life, especially the 1736 Mount Lebanon Synod. As the church 
was in need of renewal, not only because of Vatican II but also due to events in Lebanon, he 
argued that the best way to achieve this was through a new council. 17 The wish of his fellow 
campaigners was finally granted in 2003. The Maronite Synod is regarded by the faithful as 
a defining moment for the modem Maronite Church. Its importance is shown by the opinion 
of one participant who described it as "something like Vatican II for the Maronite Church` .18 
It is the first time that members of the "Maronite family" have been brought together from 
around the world to discuss the affairs of their church. Patriarch Sfeir was also keen to 
encourage the involvement of all Maronites in the event. Thus, the faithful are invited to 
pray for its success, seek spiritual renewal in their personal lives and discuss the topics 
addressed by the council. 19 The Synod also enjoyed media coverage and setup its own 
website to inform those interested in the latest developments. Following the precedent 
established at the Special Synod for Lebanon, representatives of other religious communities 
in Lebanon - Christian and Muslim - were invited to attend. During the first session in June 
2003, the participants discussed the preparatory texts and agreed amendments. This 
methodology differs significantly from that of the Special Synod for Lebanon where the 
Synod followed the guidelines set by Pope John Paul II. Instead, the continual consultation 
and revision of texts by all members of the Maronite Council, emphasiscs that this process is 
by all the Maronite faithfulfor the Maronite faithful. 
The topics addressed in the first session were divided into five files. The first file examined 
the identity and mission of the Maronite Church, affirming its Eastern identity, Antiochian 
roots and Syrian tradition. Reflecting the tone of the Apostolic Exhortation, the Synod also 
stressed the ecumenical vocation of the Maronite Church and sought to continue efforts to 
reconcile the different Christian churches and to fully participate in Christian-Islamic 
dialogue. 20 The second file covered issues relating to pastoral renewal, stressing the 
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importance of education among the clergy. This section also affirmed that the office of 
patriarch acts as a reference point for all believers and combined with the liturgy, ensures 
Maronite unity. The third file entitled "The Maronite Church in Today's World" addresses 
issues relating to political, social and economic questions. The Synod clearly defined its 
view on the Maronite role in Lebanon - Maronites should strive for "coexistence and 
intercommunity harmony". 2 1 They stated that in the political sphere, the Maronite Church 
has no wish to be seen as "a national church and its vocation has never been to lay hands on a 
land of its own to the exclusion of others". 22 The contents of the fourth section were more in 
line with previous church councils, examining canonical matters. However, the fifth file 
reflected the changes which have occurred in the Maronite Church by addressing the 
important topic of emigration and the consequent expansion of the Maronite Church outside 
of the traditional homeland. The Synod agreed that it was vital to preserve Maronite identity 
and stressed the need to retain close links between the church in Lebanon and its adherents 
outside the patriarchal territory. 
Consequently, it is clear that this Maronite Synod in the twenty-first century has the 
potential to be as significant for the Maronite Church as the influential 1736 Mount Lebanon 
Synod. The continual calls for church reform through the holding of a Maronite council, 
voiced since the 1920s, have eventually been answered. Its participants are eager that their 
efforts to reform the church from inside will not only allow spiritual renewal but also bring 
new hope and impetus to the community, whether in Lebanon or elsewhere. However, it 
must be noted that it took over one hundred years to implement the changes agreed by the 
1736 Synod. Therefore, it is hoped that the Maronite Church will experience the bencfits of 
the reforms of this council significantly quicker than occurred regarding the preceding one. 
This Maronite spiritual renewal is also apparent when examining the devotion to the saints. 
At the canonization of the nineteenth century monk Neamatallah Kassab Hardini in 2004, 
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50,000 Lebanese pilgrims travelled to Rome while thousands more attended celebrations in 
the Monastery of Kfifane. This canonization and that of St Rafqa in 2001, are viewed by 
Patriarch Sfeir as illustrating that God will not abandon his people and a great event for all 
Lebanese. 23 While the above spiritual renewal is not comparable to contemporary 
movements such as the Coptic revival since the mid twentieth century, this focus on 
spirituality can provide solace for the Maronite community in times of difficulty. 
The social role of the church is also important in preserving Maronite identity. In the post 
war era, the church has tried to maintain its presence throughout the country by repairing 
institutions and supporting the return of refugees in areas that have been depopulated of 
Christians. Aware of the economic plight of the country, the church, particularly through the 
monastic orders, has continued its key role in education and health as well as providing land 
for affordable housing. While the hierarchy has tried to provide for the needs of the 
community, some Maronites have criticised these efforts as inadequate considering the extent 
of resources that the church possesses especially land and institutions. 24 Patriarch Sfeir also 
seeks to encourage Lebanese Christians, especially the youth, to resist the attractions of 
emigration. He welcomes initiatives that create jobs and ease the pressure on young 
Lebanese, urging them that "the attachment to the homeland, especially in times of trial, is 
one of your first duties". 25 It is clear that the Maronite Church has tried to address the post- 
war situation through spiritual renewal and social means - seen as acceptable activities by a 
church. However, by uniting the community around him, the patriarch has not only been able 
to re-establish patriarchal authority over his flock but also tried to use the church resources to 
re-emphasise his temporal role. In this "crisis of state" environment, the church certainly has 
the potential to fill the Maronite leadership vacuum. It is the political role of the Maronite 
Church - so significant in its past - that has received most attention both within the church 
and in Lebanon in general. 
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The Political Role of Patriarch Sfeir in Post-War Lebanon 
Under Patriarch Sfeir, the church has rediscovered its voice as the leader of the Maronite 
community. However, it is unclear whether this has developed into temporal authority as in 
the past. In the post-war era, the Maronite Church has been consistent in its call for the full 
implementation of the Taif Accord. The methods used to achieve this aim have varied 
depending on events in the country and the wider region. According to the rational choice 
approach, these different strategies can be seen as the most fruitful for each circumstance. 
For most of the 1990s, the patriarch pursued a diplomatic approach; still speaking out against 
injustice such as the electoral laws and supporting the 1992 opposition boycott, yet being 
careful not to intentionally cause any controversy for the church or the community. The 
views of the patriarch were given through the monthly communiqu6s of the Bishops' 
meetings, sermons and messages at feast times. For example, several sermons in 1992 
concentrated on Christian concerns regarding the Taif Accord, in particular, the electoral 
conditions explained in Chapter Three which were seen to disenfranchise opposition voters 
(many of whom were Christian). 26 This diplomatic approach can be explained by the relative 
weakness of the Maronite community in the immediate post-war period and the eagerness of 
ordinary Lebanese citizens to avoid any return to the years of conflict that was still a fresh 
memory. 
However by 2000, the political comments by the patriarch had become more pronounced. 
This change can be attributed partly due to the deteriorating economic situation and the failure 
after ten years to implement many of the Taif provisions. The Israeli withdrawal from South 
Lebanon in May 2000 acted as a catalyst for opposition activists to increase their campaign 
against Syrian influence in Lebanon. Hence, the church hierarchy was keen to avoid being 
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out of touch with popular opinion in the community as occurred in 1989 over support of the 
Taif Accord. It had been hoped that the 2000 elections would prove fairer than previous ones 
held under Syrian tutelage and enable parliament to be more representative of the different 
views and ideologies present in Lebanese society. However, few members of the anti-Syrian 
opposition were successful in gaining office. 
Combined with the absence of influential Maronite figures in the cabinet, a shift towards a 
more pro-active role for the patriarchate occurred during this period. Therefore, in 
September 2000, the monthly communiqu6 was used as an appeal to all Lebanese, listing 
complaints concerning elections, the economic crisis and calling for Lebanese sovereignty 
while retaining close relations with Syria. The contents of the communiqu6 were not new 
and had been stated previously by Patriarch Sfeir and other clergy. However, it was the first 
time that they had been listed together and published as an official document. 27 In fact, the 
manner in which it was presented, led some to regard it as identical to afatwa (Islamic 
28 
ruling). The impact of the appeal was reviewed one year later in another communiqu6 
which stated that instead of the concerns being considered, the authorities actually reacted 
against any consequent dialogue initiatives. It was also acknowledged that the people had 
supported the appeal and thus, the church hierarchy reiterated their demands. 29 From the start 
of these appeals, patriarchal messages and especially the communiqu6s, have become 
substantially more politicised than previous ones. However, these are not addressed at the 
expense of exclusive church and spiritual matters. 
The patriarch and the Maronite hierarchy have issued numerous statements on the political 
situation in Lebanon. In particular, these focused on Syrian influence in Lebanon. The 
repeated calls for the withdrawal of Syrian troops were always placed in the context of 
regaining sovereignty as outlined in the Taif Accord. The bishops rejected the notion that the 
Syrian presence was necessary to ensure stability in Lebanon. "When people say "it's either 
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the Syrian army or chaos", it is an argument that simply does not stand up". 30 This campaign 
enjoyed limited success with the gradual redeployment of troops from Greater Beirut, Mount 
Lebanon and the North since June 2001. However, many Syrian troops remained in the 
Beqaa region and it was not until the developments set in motion by the assassination of 
Hariri in 2005 that a complete withdrawal took place. Syrian political influence over 
Lebanon was also identified by the bishops as eroding the distinct characteristics of Lebanon. 
"Lebanon is vanishing little by little, losing its identity; its peculiarities, the constitutional 
institutions and even its entity". 31 Patriarch Sfeir has remained adamant that historically 
Lebanon was and should continue to be, an independent country. The hierarchy accepts that 
the two countries should be close but not at the expense of sovereignty. Therefore, they are 
consistent in their calls for the full implementation of the Taif Accord in order to achieve 
these aims. In one communiqu6, the bishops asked for the help of God, "we ask him to 
restore our affairs, clean our hearts from grudge and hatred, unite our ranks for our own good 
and the glory of our country, the recovery of its proper conditions, especially its dignity as a 
state having its own identity enjoying independence, sovereignty and free decision". 32 Syria 
is indirectly blamed for the problems faced by Lebanon. Speaking in May 2004, Patriarch 
Sfeir said that "The fact that this country cannot operate safely without foreign assistance 
should be blamed specifically on ....... outside 
interference". 33 
Regarding the scheduled 2004 Presidential elections which were postponed in favour of an 
extension of the existing mandate for President Lahoud, the bishops stated, "It has become 
known that the Lebanese do not have the last say in the presidential elections and a lot of 
them have started to see it as a natural thing ...... which 
indicates a reduced sense of dignity 
and an absence of national Will99.34 In a sermon, the patriarch stated that the amendment 
"would destroy, once and for all, the little democracy that we pride ourselves on" . 
35 At the 
time, he voiced his concerns about the impact of the extension. Due to international 
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condemnation, the reputation of Lebanon would be adversely affected, adding more 
difficulties to an already dire political and economic situation. 36 The patriarch supported the 
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1559 which was co-sponsored by the 
United States and France as a consequence of the constitutional amendment. He indicated 
that it sought the same measures as the Taif Accord, namely the restoration of Lebanese 
sovereignty and the withdrawal of foreign forces. 
Throughout this tense period, the patriarch continued his constant campaign to fulfil these 
demands including a visit to the French President Jacques Chirac in January 2005 where he 
thanked the French government for their support in the Lebanese quest to regain 
sovereignty. 37 The Maronite Council response to the assassination of Hariri acknowledged 
the huge loss for the country and urged all Lebanese to restrain emotions, act in unity and end 
foreign interference. 38 While recognising the subsequent street protests against the killing 
and the Syrian presence, Patriarch Sfeir warned that all sides must be cautious and solve 
problems peacefully in the political arena rather than allowing demonstrators to take the lead 
as this could lead to dangerous unrest. In March 2005, the patriarch visited Washington DC 
and met with President George W Bush at a crucial turning point in Lebanese political 
developments. He emphasised to all his audiences that Lebanon, just like any other country, 
desired freedom and independence and was capable of fulfilling these ideals. While other 
Lebanese leaders had also met with influential officials in the State Department and Bush 
administration, the prominence given to the patriarchal visit, ensured that Patriarch Sfeir was 
publicly recognised, both in Lebanon and abroad, as a key figure in the delicate negotiations 
concerning the future of Lebanon. This was in contrast to previous visits to the United 
States, which had not included an audience with the president, reflecting the different 
situation in 2005. 
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Once a caretaker government was in place in April 2005, the patriarch turned his attention 
to the electoral system. Political participation had long been a subject addressed by the 
patriarch. Throughout the Taif era, he encouraged Lebanese to take part in elections as part 
of their democratic duty. However, this did not deter criticism of government conduct during 
elections. Concerning the 2000 parliamentary elections which were deemed to be relatively 
fair on the actual election days, the bishops stated that "The results of the elections were 
known by the time election day arrived". 39 In the tense atmosphere from September 2004 
onwards, the bishops demanded international monitoring for the 2005 elections in order to 
prevent yet another rigged electoral law and reiterated their support for an electoral system 
based on small districts (known as the qada system). 40 In contrast to the existing system 
where constituencies were drawn to favour particular groups or individuals, the qada system 
(as explained in Chapter Three) was perceived to allow a greater number of votes to directly 
affect the election result. The retention of the previous electoral system for the first elections 
free of Syrian dominance was met with bitter disappointment, echoing the general sentiments 
of the Maronite community. In an emergency meeting, the bishops stated that this electoral 
law contradicted the Taif Accord and would lead to a negative reaction from Christians who 
would be justified in thinking that little had changed. As before, Christians would not be 
able to elect their preferred representatives. 41 Although they refrained from advocating a 
boycott, this issue has constantly been referred to in subsequent statements. 
The patriarch has also become attentive to the controversy over the presidency. As stated 
earlier, there was a clear condemnation of the constitutional amendment which extended the 
term of President Lahoud. However, once this law was passed, his position was accepted - 
albeit grudgingly - as a fait accompli. The policy of the patriarch has been to stress the 
importance of the institution of the presidency. During the time of the street protests in 
March 2005, the patriarch made it known to the opposition that he was not in favour of 
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forcing Lahoud to resign as had happened with Prime Minister Karanu. Instead, lie urged 
that they should work within the constitution as the removal from power of all tile previous 
42 incumbents would leave a vacuum that could be filled by political unrest . Again when 
clamours for the ousting of Lahoud grew as the release of the Melifis report drew near, 
Patriarch Sfeir made his position clear. In the Annual Maronite Bishops Declaration released 
in September 2005, the bishops demanded that Lebanese citizens stopped attacking tile 
presidency - an institution which should be "surrounded by a halo of respect". 
43 The 
patriarch welcomed the Mehlis report released in October 2005 but stated that some elements 
needed to be clarified. This can be regarded as a reference to the rumours that tile president, 
like other pro-Syrian officials, was in some way, party to the developments which led to tile 
assassination of Hariri. 
The patriarch's protection of the presidency must be examined in the context ofthe 
confessional system. Ever since the institution was established in tile mandate era, it has 
been recognised as a Maronite post. Thus, Patriarch Sfeir has endeavoured to ensure that this 
access to power will remain. He has been careful to clarify that the issue of the presidency 
affects all Lebanese not just the Christians and has discouraged any n1ovcs that could be 
interpreted as one sect (the Maronites) determining tile identify of the next president (head of' 
the entire Lebanese state). To this end, he refused to sponsor any meetings ofChristian 
politicians at Bkerke to discuss these issues and publicly at least, will not nominate one 
candidate. 44 This illustrates the desire of the patriarch to remain above party politics. 
Instead, he has kept close relations with leading figures and potential rivals e. g. Michel AOU11 
and Samir Geagea. Consequently, he would appear to wish that the fate of President Lahoud 
be deten-nined by the political situation of the country rather than pre-eniptcd by others Nvho 
may be acting in their own interests rather than those of the country as a whole. 
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This issue of self-interest has become a key concern to the patriarch. With the departure of 
Syrian troops and the election of a new government, many had hoped that this would lead to a 
new era in Lebanon. Yet the immediate period since the elections in June does not appear to 
have fulfilled this hope. Political actors from all confessional groups are accused of 
furthering their own interests at the expense of national unity and reconciliation. Although 
the vast majority of Lebanese agreed that a new government needed to be formed instantly 
after the elections, disputes over the allocation of certain posts meant that the country was 
without a cabinet for over one month. The hierarchy voiced concern at this "rush" to secure 
positions according to confessional status. "Bickering between political parties and blocs 
inside Parliament increases tensions while a true refon-n needs the achievement of national 
accord and reconciliation". 45 In the Annual Declaration and subsequent statements, the 
bishops have despaired of the inability and perhaps unwillingness of the politicians to 
implement promised reforms. The patriarch has constantly stated that any true relationship 
between the govcrnment and the people must be based on truth and integrity. Yet, to his 
dismay, the primary aim of political actors still seems to be the protection of their own 
interests. 
The patriarch has been particularly scathing of Christian disunity. He ascribed the weak 
position of the Maronite community in post-war Lebanon to the inherent factionalism 
experienced during the civil war. With the return of populist Christian leaders (Michel Aoun 
from exile and Samir Geagea from prison), there was initial hope that Christians would be 
able to return to full participation enjoyed under the first republic. Yet, the Christian 
community was sorely divided at the 2005 elections. Several groups including Geagea's 
Lebanese Forces allied with the recognised opposition led by Saad Hariri and Walid Jumblatt. 
However, opposition negotiations with Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement could not reach an 
agreement. Thus, in the Mount Lebanon and Zahle districts, Aoun allied with Michel Murr, a 
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key figure in the previous pro-Syrian regime and defeated several Christian opposition 
politicians. 46 In response to this lack of unity, Patriarch Sfeir lambasted the "chaos prevailing 
within Christian ranks". 47 As with his cautious approach concerning the presidency issue, 
this can be seen as a warning to the Christian leaders that disunity could lead to a loss of their 
political status and power. 
The Maronite bishops have also addressed security issues. Under the pro-Syrian regime, 
the erosion of freedom and lack of respect for human rights in Lebanon was a key concern. 
Stressing the history and identity of Lebanon, they argued "What worth is Lebanon without 
9.48 -f freedom? ' The patriarch continually called for the release of political prisoners rom all 
communities not just individuals such as Samir Geagea. 49 Patriarch Sfeir has also been 
outspoken about the use of repression against protestors and opposition activists. During the 
Murr affair in 2002 when Gabriel Murr an opposition politician, was removed from his seat 
and his television station was closed, the bishops stated that "measures are being taken to 
silence every free voice, although the constitution secures free speech". 50 The patriarch has 
not been afraid to highlight what he perceives as double standards even if it could potentially 
aggravate the religious divide e. g. the unequal treatment of protestors. With the changes that 
have occurred in 2005, new concerns have been added to their list, most notably insecurity 
due to a series of bomb attacks. On the whole, these have targeted Christians, whether aimed 
at specific individuals or residential/shopping areas. Unsurprisingly, these developments 
have led to general unease and feelings of vulnerability, affecting not just Christians but all 
Lebanese. The response of the patriarch has been to focus on the inability of the government 
to prevent these attacks and discover the identity of the perpetuators. He has restated his 
belief that the priority of the political elite must be to restore confidence in the government, 
which must involve tackling security concerns. 
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The patriarch has also publicised his views on the controversial Shiite resistance movement 
Hizb'allah. He h as always been keen to emphasise the patriotic credentials of the Maronite 
Church. Thus, the church released a statement which rejoiced at the Israeli withdrawal from 
South Lebanon in May 2000. Although stressing that all Lebanese suffered due to the 
occupation, the hierarchy recognised the role of the resistance movement and praised its 
5 
willingness to conduct celebrations as a national not confessional victory. 1 Similarly, the 
bishops welcomed the successful negotiations between Hizb'allah and Israel in 2004 which 
resulted in the release of some Lebanese prisoners. However, they also use such occasions to 
stress that these actions affect all Lebanese not just one confession. Thus, the hierarchy took 
the opportunity of the above prisoner release to reiterate a demand that the Lebanese and 
Syrian governments investigate cases of people missing since the civil war era. 52 This 
message has continued since the withdrawal of Syrian troops. This period has also witnessed 
more critical statements towards Hizb'allah. During the tense period of street demonstrations 
after the assassination of Hariri, Patriarch Sfeir urged Hizb'allah to fully participate in the 
Lebanese political system and help solve problems affecting all Lebanese rather than dwelling 
on the Syrian issue. This was in the context of counter demonstrations organised by 
Hizb'allah which rallied support for the pro-Syrian status quo at that time. 53 The Annual 
Bishops Declaration of September 2005 indirectly called for the disarmament of Hizb'allah as 
a constitutional requirement. It is clear that the patriarch is aware of the international climate 
and the constant calls from powerful Western states and the United Nations that the remit of 
the Lebanese Army should extend to the entire state and consequently, result in the 
disarmament of any remaining militias. Again, this illustrates that the political strategy 
pursued by the patriarch is highly dependent on the political situation encountered at a 
specific time. 
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On economic issues, Patriarch Sfeir has been scathing about the inability of successive 
governments to solve the severe economic problems facing the country. In the July 2004 
Communiqu&, he stated, "Officials do not seem concerned with the lack ofjob opportunities, 
exorbitant taxes, the corruption spread in the mobile (phone) and electricity sectors, the 
endless squandering, chaos in public departments and debts". 54 The patriarch has given his 
support to various strikes and consistently spoken out for workers' rights, economic justice 
and tackling the crippling national debt. He stresses that it is the responsibility of the 
government to combat these issues especially unemployment -a major factor for emigration. 
"Lebanon sinks day after day in the ocean of excessive debts, while his active forces emigrate 
abroad, maybe never to return". 55 
One of the major criticisms of the Siniora government has been the lack of tangible 
improvements in everyday life of the Lebanese. Although the constant security fears have 
heightened this challenge, the patriarch believes that economic security is vital to ensuring the 
stability of the country. It is evident that the concern of the patriarch regarding the impact of 
the economic crisis on ordinary citizens extends to Lebanese from all communities - not just 
Maronites. Indeed, almost all of the issues raised by the patriarch, particularly those 
concerned with daily life, are stated on behalf of all Lebanese. As an example, the Final 
Communiqu6 of the Maronite Synod in 2003 asserted that "the invitation of the Church to 
embrace the values of participation and liberty in order to restore to Lebanon all the 
components of its sovereignty, independence and autonomy of decision is addressed to all,,. 56 
Throughout these many declarations on significant issues in Lebanese political affairs, the 
bishops have been eager to clarify that their vision of a sovereign Lebanon is one of national 
unity and reconciliation where all Lebanese regardless of their sect can enjoy equal 
participation, representation and a decent standard of living. Regarding national 
reconciliation, the hierarchy acknowledges that terrible acts were committed by some 
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Maronites during the civil war, just as occurred in other communities but urges all groups to 
look to the future together. "It is time for us to be conscious of and learn from our mistakes, 
to unite in order to seek the right solutions for our country before it disintegrates". 57 many 
public statements have been made stressing that the Maronite Church perceives Lebanon as a 
living example of Christian-Muslim dialogue and coexistence. "Lebanon is the nation of 
freedoms and of religious diversity ... it is the country of Islamic and 
Christian coexistence". 58 
Similarly, "Even if there have been ups and downs in the history of relations between 
Christians and Muslims, Lebanon can and must be an example of how well Muslims and 
Christians can live together". 59 The patriarch clearly believes that conviviality has always 
existed in Lebanon and would continue once outside intervention receded. 
The new government formed in July 2005 was welcomed by the patriarch as a first step 
towards national reconciliation. Its multiparty formation was perceived as positive as 
representatives of many different groups participated in the cabinet, including for the first 
time, a ministerial portfolio for Hizb'allah. One of its first steps added to this favourablc 
impression - the release of several detainees 
including Samir Geagea. However, relatively 
little progress has been made in the following months and consequently, the patriarch made 
clear his concern at the spread of sectarianism once more. 
Personal reconciliatory initiatives of the patriarch include an extremely symbolic visit - the 
first of a Maronite patriarch for 200 years - to the Chouf area, the scene of Christian-Druze 
conflict several times in the recent history of Mount Lebanon, including the 1860 Massacres 
and the 1983 Mountain War which left the area almost depopulated of Christians. 
60 While 
not against deconfessionalism, he states that it first must be abolished from the soul before 
political deconfessionalism occurs. This is an extremely important issue for Christians. 
Many Lebanese Christians believe that Christians in other Middle East countries (i. e. with an 
overwhelming Muslim majority) do not enjoy full equality and political rights under the 
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different governing systems. Desperate to retain their active participation in the Lebanese 
state, they are against any changes which would hinder their position. 
To gain Christian support for deconfessionalism, the Lebanese authorities would have to 
implement a widespread secularization process in an attempt to confine religious identity to 
the private sphere only. Considering the history of the Lebanese state and the general failure 
of the secularization process in the Middle East to replicate its success in the West in 
relegating religion to the private sphere, this would appear to be an unlikely development. 
Without this process, Christians would regard the abolition of the confessional system as 
removing the safeguards that allow them to significantly influence decisions on Lebanese 
national affairs. Instead, the Muslim majority population would be able to exercise political 
power without any institutionaliscd measures to ensure consultation with other groups. 
Patriarch Sfeir is also clearly aware of the xegional environment that is the reality for the 
Maronite community. He has repeatedly condemned frequent violence in the Holy Land and 
Iraq. The patriarch reiterated the anti-war stance of the Pope regarding Iraq. This reflects 
the attentiveness of the patriarch to Christian fears that Middle East Christians could become 
scapegoats due to Muslim anger at the continual cycle of violence in the Holy Land and Iraq. 
Instead, the patriarch has stressed that the unity between the different communities illustrates 
that a clash of cultures or religions does not exist in Lebanon but instead all can live together 
peacefully. 61 
The political activities of the patriarch are not solely restricted to issuing public statements. 
He has also used his position to tackle a long-running problem amongst the Christian 
community- unity. Asa response to the lack of genuine political representation in the Taif 
era, the patriarch helped create a political grouping called Qomet Shehwan (The Gathering). 
This group is named after the monastery where it held its first meeting in April 2001. The 
impetus for its formation came from the 2000 communiqu6 calling for the withdrawal of 
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Syrian troops. As the September 2001 statement noted, "The knots in the tongues were 
untied, and people began to voice their convictions, albeit with caution" . 
62 Deploring 
Maronite disunity that had harmed the community so greatly especially during the last years 
of the civil war, the patriarch was eager to encourage the opposition to unite not just within 
Maronite and Christian circles but also to expand to include other communities. As the 
leader of the entire Maronite community, Patriarch Sfeir could not be associated exclusively 
with one faction. Instead, a bishop was initially chosen to chair the group and acted as the 
representative of the patriarch. 
While the patriarch played an instrumental role in creating the conditions for the 
establishment of Qornet Shehwan, the group was not perceived as the "patriarch's political 
party" in the sense of the patriarch being actively involved in politics. Instead, the opposite is 
true. Qornet Shchwan was formed to take the ideas of the hierarchy into the political arena 
precisely because the church believes its representatives cannot be directly involved in the 
actual political system. Once their ideas entered the political process, the hierarchy lost 
control of them because they were often adapted by the politicians to fit into the political 
reality. Furthermore, the church leaders state that they are against the Christian community 
forming one monolithic political bloC. 63 Firstly, this would encourage further division in 
Lebanon along confessional lines and hinder attempts to develop cross-communal alliances. 
Secondly, they also believe that the Christian community, like all groups, has diverse views 
and that these should be given the opportunity to be heard. They stress that this is one of the 
main features of a democratic political system. The role of Qornet Shehwan is to enable 
different political movements and individuals to work together to express common principles. 
Qornet Shehwan can be categorised as an umbrella group of various politicians rather than a 
cohesive organised political party. Its members vary from former participants in pro-Syrian 
governments, those who adopted a policy of soft criticism and others who were more 
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aggressive in their criticism of Syrian influence in Lebanon. It appears that the only issue 
which united them was what they stood against - the Syrian presence. Even their means to 
oppose this differed greatly. Consequently, Qomet Shehwan cannot be viewed as an 
alternative government but instead a loose coalition of individuals. While the group includes 
non-Maronites, there has been little success in reaching out to Muslim politicians. 
The record of Qomet Shehwan can be regarded as mixed. It has been successful in gaining 
publicity and making its views known - probably benefiting from its association with the 
patriarchate. However, it has also been beset with internal divisions. Their poor results in 
the 2004 municipal elections exposed disunity as they failed to organise effective alliances 
with other groups, thus affecting their ability to appeal as a national opposition. Furthermore, 
co-ordination between the patriarch and Qomet Shehwan has also been tested. Qomet 
Shehwan regarded the 2002 Metn by-election as an opportunity to confront the regime. 
Hence, they chose to support one of their members Gabriel Murr. The situation became 
extremely tense as he was running against the daughter of one of the most pro-Syrian 
politicians, the former Interior Minister, who happened to be his brother. Hence, Patriarch 
Sfeir regarded the contest as a family feud and accepted the compromise candidate for the 
disputed Greek Orthodox seat - the nephew of the deceased incumbent. 
64 The success of 
Gabriel Murr, although short-lived, illustrated not only the strength of support Qomet 
Shehwan could attract when united, but also highlighted that the patriarch could not exercise 
temporal authority in the same manner as enjoyed by his predecessors. His wish to field only 
one candidate was not respected by most members of Qomet Shehwan. By 2004, there 
appeared to have been a rapprochement between Bkerke and Qomet Shehwan. The 
extension of the presidential mandate of Emile Lahoud allowed the group to unite with 
Bkerke in their opposition to this development. Qomet Shehwan statements and meetings 
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were co-ordinated with Patriarch Sfeir such as the decision not to join the cabinet unless 
substantial reforms were undertaken. 
The political developments which occurred throughout 2005 are likely to have a lasting 
impact on Qornet Shehwan. Many individual members of the grouping allied with the 
opposition led by Hariri and Jumblatt. The results were mixed. Gibran Tueni and Nayla 
Mouawad were successfully elected (the latter appointed Social Affairs Minister) but Nassib 
Lahoud and Fares Soueid were both defeated. The patriarch appears extremely pragmatic 
about the future of the group. This makes sense if one remembers the circumstances when it 
was formed. A political vacuum desperately needed to be filled. 
With the changed situation and a new vibrant opposition as well as Aoun's Free Patriotic 
Movement, this was no longer the case. Instead, it was hoped that there would be an 
opportunity to expand co-operation outside of Christian political circles - one of the main 
aims of Bkerke. Previously, efforts were made to establish relations with other groups and 
individuals that opposed the constitutional amendment and these have been intensified. 
However, it is clear that there are still substantial differences within the different elements 
which hinders their progress. Consequently, the case of Qornet Shehwan shows that 
Patriarch Sfeir, while keen to use his influence to assist opposition members to maximise their 
efforts against an unaccountable regime, is equally adamant that he will not become 
personally involved in party politics. In this way, he believes that he can better serve not 
only the interests of his own community but all Lebanese. This justification for the political 
role examined above clearly stems from the tradition of the Maronite Patriarch exercising 
civil authority. It is now essential to examine the response to these activities. 
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The Response to the Political Role of Patriarch Sfeir 
In publicising their views on national matters, the Maronite hierarchy is aware that they are 
open to criticism. As has been seen, the use of the Council of Bishops to relay these opinions 
to the public indicates collective responsibility among the clergy. However, they accept that 
naturally, "The Patriarch is the reference point of the Church, its father and its head". 65 Thus, 
the patriarch states that his role as head and father of the community means that he must 
defend his people. Like all spiritual chiefs, he is obliged to take positions on issues such as 
66 freedom, justice and human rights. The 2003 Final Communiqu6 of the Maronite Synod 
also outlines the role the church perceives for itself "The Church position is but a reminder 
of the rights of human beings and their dignity; a defense of freedoms and a warning against 
selfish passions; a call for the sovereignty, independence and free choice of the homeland". 67 
Patriarch Sfeir also defends his right to speak out on issues concerning Lebanon as his 
patriotic duty and denied any external interference in these positions. In answer to 
accusations that he is acting on behalf of foreign interests, he states that, 'Tcoplc say one day 
it is Rome, the next that it's the United States, or even Israel behind our statement, but we 
don't need anyone's permission - not even the president's - to express our opinion on the 
future of the country" . 
68 
In general, the response of the Maronite community and some other Christians, has been 
favourable towards this proactive church role. The majority accept that due to the absence of 
genuine representative Christian civil leaders, the patriarch is attempting to fill this vacuum. 
The fact that Patriarch Sfeir evidently has few personal political ambitions also attributes to 
their willingness to accept his involvement. The patriarch insists on providing general 
principles only rather than intricate detailed programmes. One Qornet Shehwan member 
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described this as giving the "headlines" of the problems facing Lebanon and how they should 
be resolved . 
69 He is also perceived as one of the few Lebanese figures whose political 
discourse has been consistent in the post-war era, always calling for the full implementation 
of the Taif Accord. Furthermore, the history of the Maronite Church ensures that in times of 
crisis, the community expects the patriarch to defend their rights. Consequently, people treat 
him as an influential figure by telling him their grievances in expectation of finding a 
solution, handing over petitions to him and holding rallies at Bkerke. The extent of support 
that the patriarch attracts is illustrated by the large turnout of followers (numbering into 
thousands) during patriarchal visits or on his return from trips abroad. Few other Christian 
leaders could muster such support. A press release by the International Maronite Foundation 
provides a concise summary of the general consensus among the Maronite community 
regarding the role of the patriarch. 
"He has the moral duty to set forth his thoughts as well as the collective 
thoughts of the bishops of his church on the circumstances and 
conditions that impact his people. He further has the inalienable right 
to speak out to redress conditions of wrong that he sees in his 
jurisdiction. This by no means contravenes the national authority to 
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govern but sets out the opinion of the church' . 
While it is true that few Maronites consider this political role of their church to be an ideal 
situation, many accept that until the Maronite secular leadership is in a position to represent 
the community, a politically active church is the best option available. Christian opposition 
politicians, perhaps partly motivated by self-interest, stress that when the Lebanese political 
system becomes fully functioning once more, the hierarchy should return to concentrating on 
pastoral duties. One of the main opposition groups - Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement - 
recognised the influential role of the patriarch during the years of Syrian influence but urged 
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him to use his position wisely and to constantly denounce the situation in Lebanon. " Yet 
others feel that Patriarch Sfeir should be less politically active because they are against the 
involvement of any religious officials - whether Christian or Muslim - in the political system. 
This argument is particularly used by some politicians who are distrustful of the participation 
of Hizb'allah (an Islamist party which has several members of the ulema as party activists and 
leaders) in the electoral system. They fear that the political role of the Maronite patriarch is 
used by groups such as Hizb'allah to justify their direct involvement in political parties. 72 
The reaction of other communities has mostly been favourable. As has been seen, the 
Maronite patriarchate has generally been well-respected - some even go so far as to call the 
head of the Maronite church the Patriarch of Lebanon. Thus, Patriarch Sfeir hears the 
grievances of not just Maronites but also members of other communities. 73 As many of the 
stances taken by the patriarch are regarded as benefiting all Lebanese, especially concerning 
economic matters, this helps to defuse confessional conflict over his role. The absence of 
emotive sectarian language is another factor in ensuring that his views are not disregarded by 
other confessional groups. It is clear to all that he desires a sovereign and independent 
Lebanon. Unlike many Christian political leaders, he is able to articulate these views without 
necessarily being perceived as anti-Syrian or anti-Arab. 
However, the communiqu6s calling for the withdrawal of the Syrian presence did result in a 
predictable inflammatory response and the polarization of public opinion along confessional 
lines. Several influential ulema (Muslim clerics) warned of the danger in blaming Syria for 
Lebanon's problems stressing that Syria guaranteed the security of Lebanon. 
74 Ajoint 
statement by the Vice President of the Higher Shiite Council Sheikh Abdel-Amir Qabalan and 
Sunni Grand Mufti Sheikh Mohammed Rashid Qabbani, expressed their surprise at the 
declaration and emphasised the sacrifices that Syria had made to ensure the survival of 
Lebanon. 75 At the time, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, Secretary-General of Hizb'allah, stressed 
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that the Lebanese people must stop holding outsiders responsible for the situation in Lebanon 
and instead accept that a sectarian problem exists in the country. He added, "Those who are 
asking Syria to leave only represent themselves and not all of Lebanon". 76 This reaction 
reflects the widely held fear by Muslims that without the Syrian intervention, Lebanese 
Christians especially Maronites would revert to their political predominance of the pre civil 
war era. According to Moubayed, "To Lebanon's Muslim religious and political leaders, the 
only balancing force keeping the Christians at bay and preventing them from subordinating 
Muslims was the Syrians". 77 Although there was not a widespread furore over the September 
2005 statement that indirectly called for Hizb'allah to disarm, some Islamic leaders did offer a 
similar response. At a press conference, Sheikh Afif Naboulsi, the president of Jabel Amel 
Scholars' Committee decried the proposal for its "dangerous sectarian strand" and urged the 
bishops to join the resistance movement in its defence of the country. 78 In general, such 
reactions are limited to the core issues which divide the communities. 
While the patriarch enjoys cordial relations with the religious representatives of other 
communities, it has proven difficult to extend these to include co-operation on issues that 
arouse more controversy such as the Syrian presence. The religious leaders did share 
concern about the constitutional amendment to extend the mandate of President Lahoud. One 
day after Patriarch Sfeir denounced the extension during his Sunday scrmon, Sheikhs Qabalan 
and Qabbani in ajoint statement, urged the need "to respect the Constitution with regard to 
the presidential elections or any other issue". 79 Although the absence of one statement from 
all the religious leaders illustrates the difficulties in reaching an acceptable consensus, it is 
still clear that respect exists between the different figures and thus, under certain 
circumstances, it may be possible to co-ordinate a response. Yet, developments in Lebanon 
since the assassination of Hariri would appear to illustrate that confessional identity has 
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increased at the expense of efforts towards national reconciliation, thus damaging attempts at 
co-operation between the main religious leaders. 
In general, the government response (up to February 2005) to the political activities of 
Patriarch Sfeir was a combination of countermoves, exploiting divisions and working towards 
improving relations with Bkerke. Reacting to the communiqu6s regarding the Syrian 
withdrawal, President Lahoud accused the bishops of provoking "confessional, sectarian 
instincts which do not serve the nation's highest interests". 80 The Maronites were also 
reminded by pro-Syrian figures that Syria had actually entered Lebanon in 1976 to save the 
Christians. 81 Reconciliation initiatives between the Lebanese communities were obstructed 
such as the arrest of more than 150 mostly Christian opposition activists, immediately 
following the visit of the patriarch to the Chouf 82 The government tried to exploit divisions 
within the opposition by advocating good relations with Bkerke while targeting activists from 
groups such as the Lebanese Forces and the Free Patriotic Movement. Thus, some prisoners 
were released from Syrian jails in December 2000 as the result of mediation by the Speaker of 
Parliament Nabih Berri, in an effort to appease the hierarchy. 83 
The recognised influence and importance of the patriarchate ensured that government 
figures endeavoured to get close to the hierarchy in order to gain credibility and popularity. 
Thus, the patriarch was "consulted" by the authorities, in the sense that he was often one of 
the first figures to be informed of major decisions. In particular, meetings between the 
patriarch and government ministers increased during times of crisis. For example, during 
Easter 2004, Patriarch Sfeir received separate visits from President Lahoud and Prime 
84 Minister Hariri . This can 
be seen in the context of the debate regarding the presidential 
elections which were scheduled for November 2004. According to 771e Daily Star, "Both 
men seemed convinced that maintaining close ties with such an eminent national figure and a 
prominent Christian authority - who furthermore enjoys the support and respect of Damascus 
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- could only be beneficial to their own images and would provide more legitimacy for their 
political stands". 85 This rapprochement, especially between Bkerke and Damascus, can be 
understood in the context of increasingly tense United States-Syrian relations at this time. 
Analysts suggested that the Syrian government was keen to maintain favourable relations with 
Bkerke because the patriarch was perceived as one of the few leaders who could dampen anti- 
Syrian rhetoric among some Lebanese Christians. For example, The Daily Star suggested 
that by February 2004, such meetings were used by Damascus to illustrate that "this particular 
sword of theirs had been temporarily changed into a ploughshare in appreciation for the 
patriarch's understanding in recent months while Syria faced the discomfort of US forces on 
its border". 86 
Certainly, in early 2004, there were fewer calls for Lebanese sovereignty in some 
communiqu6s. As will be explored in greater detail in Chapter Six, the patriarch also kept 
his distance from opposition groups which successfully lobbied the United States Congress to 
pass the Syrian Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act. One part of this 
law related to the Syrian presence in Lebanon calling for an immediate withdrawal to allow 
the Lebanese to recover their sovereignty and independence. While this aim was supported 
by many Lebanese (not just Christians), few residing in Lebanon were willing to openly voice 
their support as they were aware of the hostility towards US policies in the region. Support 
for measures which involve foreign intervention could have been interpreted by some 
Lebanese as an indication of the lack of Christian loyalty to the country. Due to the 
fragmented Lebanese society, there is always danger that any deterioration in communal 
relations could lead to unrest. Again, this illustrates that the overriding concern of the 
patriarch is the security of his community and that his strategies for dealing with the state are 
dependent on the political climate. However, the hierarchy were quick to assert that they had 
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not retreated from their key demands but were aware of the current situation and thus 
recognised the need to prioritise certain issues such as preserving national unity. 
Significant government concessions to the patriarch included partial troop redeployments 
and the decision to revoke a contentious 1996 naturalization decree. This had granted mass 
citizenship to over 300,000 people without individual investigations as would normally be 
expected. Christians had been particularly outraged as the majority were Muslims of Syrian 
or Palestinian origin. 87 As the Lebanese political system is theoretically based on numerical 
representation of each group, any future changes would take into account this significant 
growth in the Muslim population. Already aware that their proportion of the overall 
Lebanese population was declining, the Christian community had campaigned to have these 
decisions reassessed. 
The views of the patriarch were also taken into consideration concerning the decision to 
extend the mandate of President Lahoud. As has been seen, Patriarch Sfeir condemned any 
attempt to amend the constitution to achieve this aim. However, the authorities used a 
combination of tactics to quieten the reaction of the Maronite bishops. Firstly, a simple three 
year extension was chosen rather than any permanent constitutional changes, in an effort to 
appease Patriarch Sfeir. Another troop redeployment in September 2004 after UNSCR 1559 
was passed, can also be regarded as a cosmetic response to both internal and external 
demands for the withdrawal of the Syrian military. Secondly, the government tried to divide 
the opposition centring on Christian groups and Walid Jumblatt. Many government figures 
as well as the President of Syria, Bashir al-Assad stressed the massacre of the Christians in 
the Chouf in 1982 at the hands of Jumblatt's forces. This selective use of the past can be 
perceived as an attempt to keep the Lebanese people divided along confessional lines. 98 
Similarly, Christians were also warned about relying on the West for support through 
Resolution 1559, citing the failure of Western intervention to come to their aid during the 
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civil war. Finally, the question of abolishing political sectarianism was raised again. As 
Christians perceive that this would lead to the loss of their remaining political power, this 
threat has been routinely used to halt overt Christian opposition to the political situation in 
Lebanon. 
The extension of the presidential mandate clearly dampened the apparent rapprochement 
between Bkerke and Damascus and once more led to a change of political strategies by both 
the patriarch and the government. From January 2005 until the withdrawal of Syrian troops 
in April, there were periodic verbal attacks on the patriarch from groups which were regarded 
as pro-Syrian. An anonymous electioneering leaflet was distributed in the southern suburbs 
of Beirut as well as Jbeil and Kesrouan praising the role of al-Assad, Lahoud and Hizb'allah 
and warning the people to reject Qomet Shehwan candidates. One notable line stated that 
"Conspiracies are being cooked in the kitchen of the Qomet Shchwan Gathering by their 
leader Patriarch Sfeif" while the leaflet later accused anyone associated with Qomct Shchwan 
89 of being an American/Israeli agent . Similarly, 
in the first direct attack on the patriarch, a 
statement from the Ba'th Party in Lebanon in February, shortly before the assassination of 
Hariri, claimed that Patriarch Sfeir took "direct orders from the French and American 
embassies". 90 These accusations were used in a desperate attempt to prevent the notoriously 
divided anti-Syrian opposition overcoming their mutual suspicions. By questioning the 
loyalty of the patriarch, this was calculated to reopen traditional Muslim fears that Lebanese 
Christians would seek foreign intervention to secure their predominance at the expense of 
Muslim political participation as has occurred several times in the past. 
Consequently, these measures demonstrate the extent of recognition given by both 
supporters and critics to the position of Maronite patriarch as a significant influence in 
Lebanese national affairs. This has continued under the new Lebanese government. 
Throughout the crucial developments of 2005, the patriarch has been visited by many political 
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actors and kept informed of events. For example, on his return from abroad, Saad Hariri met 
with the patriarch. Politicians of all persuasions still flock to be seen at Bkerke. While the 
patriarch is naturally associated with the anti-Syrian opposition, to a certain extent, he has 
tried to project the image of being a national leader and the voice of the people rather than 
representing a particular group. Thus, the patriarchate is open to all representatives of the 
Lebanese people. Similarly, the patriarch refutes accusations that due to his political views, 
he disenfranchises a section of the Maronite community which identifies itself with a pro- 
Syrian position. It is clear from this discussion that regardless of the sometimes hostile 
reaction to his involvement in national affairs, the patriarch believes that it is his duty to 
provide guidance not just for Maronites but all Lebanese. However, the strategies pursued by 
the patriarch to achieve this do appear to differ according to the changes in the Lebanese 
political scene. 
The Consequences of the Political Role of the Patriarch and Future Prospects 
This thesis has attempted to demonstrate that during the patriarchy of Nasrallah Sfeir, the 
Maronite Church has rediscovered its political dimension. The crisis of state environment 
which has heightened Maronite feelings of vulnerability has allowed the patriarch to fill this 
leadership vacuum. However, this has not been to the same extent as occurred in the past. 
The church has certainly been vocal and publicises its position on matters that affect the 
church and the country. The methods used by the patriarch have changed in response to the 
volatile political situation. In the immediate years after the civil war, neither the church, 
community or country were in a position to risk mounting a severe challenge to the status 
quo. By 2000, the withdrawal of Israeli forces combined with the desire to recover the 
independence of the country, allowed the patriarch to represent the significant proportion of 
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Lebanese who wished to see substantial changes. Aware that there were relatively few 
immediate threats to the security of the Christian community at this time, the demands in the 
communiqu6s became more blunt towards the Syrian presence. These were tempered during 
2004 when deteriorating relations between the United States and Syria led the church leaders 
to believe that more would be gained by demonstrating their independence from unpopular 
Western policies. However, recognising that the Western powers were intent on forcing 
Syria to reconsider its involvement in Lebanese affairs, the political strategy of the Maronite 
church once more focused on securing independence. 
Yet regardless of the different approaches followed by the church, the announcements have 
had little impact on the realities of the Lebanese political situation. The redeployment of 
some Syrian troops from 2001 onwards can be viewed as a concession to the demands of the 
patriarch. Further measures were rare and can be considered rewards for good behaviour. It 
took renewed international interest in the Syrian presence in Lebanon and the momentous 
events started by the assassination of Hariri to force the withdrawal of Syrian troops and offer 
the Lebanese another opportunity to regain sovereignty. While Patriarch Sfeir can certainly 
take credit for remaining an often lonely voice in the wilderness calling for the recovery of 
independence, it is clear that his role was restricted to rhetoric rather than action. Yet, this 
actually highlights the role that Patriarch Sfeir ascribes to his offlice. Reliant on his moral 
authority alone, Patriarch Sfeir can only draw attention to a specific issue and reiterate his 
demands. Lacking the ability and willingness to force the government and others to fulfil his 
demands, the patriarch will continue to be a spokesperson for the Lebanese rather than a 
political activist. It is clear that Patriarch Sfeir interprets his role as leader of the community 
as meaning that he must fill the present political vacuum until credible civil leaders emerge. 
Thus, the patriarchate is unlikely to revert to the type of temporal authority enjoyed in the past 
by his predecessors. 
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Furthermore, it is evident that the personality of Patriarch Sfeir has significantly affected the 
role played by the church in the post-Taif era. The patriarch is highly esteemed by many 
Lebanese, especially due to his insistence that he speaks out for the good of all Lebanon - 
Muslim and Christian. It is widely held that the present patriarch has used his position wiscly 
and endeavoured to speak on behalf of all Lebanese, thus attempting to prevent any sectarian 
backlash to the political involvement of Christian religious leaders. Consequently, the 
character of the eventual successor to Patriarch Sfeir will be a major factor in determining not 
only the future role of the church but also relations between the different communities. As 
has been seen, the Maronite patriarch has the power to mobilise the entire community. 
Although the ideas of the isolationist current in the community, which supported a smaller 
Maronite state (either through separation or federalism) were discredited in the aftermath of 
the civil war, this approach still has substantial support among sections of the Maronite 
community. If in contrast to Patriarch Sfeir who has repeatedly dismissed any calls for 
cantonization and urged all Lebanese to work together in shaping their state, a future patriarch 
was receptive to these isolationist ideas, there is a danger that the political role would be 
interpreted as solely in the interests of the Maronites, rather than for all Lebanese. This 
would once again raise the spectre of confessional conflict, as each group would fccl the need 
to protect its own position and interests. An increase in political activism could have a 
negative impact on the stability of the country. As well as increased friction with the 
different confessions, the involvement of the Vatican would also be expected. As occurred 
during the civil war, conflicting aims between the Maronite community and Rome could 
cause disunity in the church and community, further complicating the situation facing the 
Maronites. However, in general the Christian population is unlikely to be supportive of an 
assertive approach that could reawaken mutual antagonisms and endanger communal relations 
as the memories of the civil war arc still raw and the likelihood of success slim. 
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The political role of the patriarch is likely to be affected by the changes that have occurred 
in Lebanon after February 2005. The withdrawal of Syrian forces and decline of its influence 
seemed unlikely even after the UN Resolution 1559 was passed. However, the process set in 
motion by Hariri's death led to a rapid upheaval of the status quo. This thesis has proposed 
that Patriarch Sfeir became an outspoken figure in Lebanese politics in order to fill the 
leadership vacuum left vacant by the deep splits amongst the Maronite elite. The 2005 
parliamentary elections were the first in the Taif era which were not held under Syrian 
tutelage. This decline in Syrian influence would be expected to lead to the emergence of 
other political figures. The elected Christian politicians included representatives of different 
factions such as the Lebanese Forces, Free Patriotic Movement and Qornet Shehwan. With 
the return of Michel Aoun and the release of Samir Geagea, the Christian community now has 
two credible leaders who enjoy popular support, especially amongst Maronites. The success 
of Aoun in the Mount Lebanon district at the expense of the mainstream Christian opposition 
demonstrated that he is regarded as the voice of the Christian street. His insistence that his 
party is a non-sectarian grouping could also enlarge his support by appealing to members of 
other confessions weary of parties based solely on communal affiliation. It is clear that Aoun 
would be willing to present himself as a candidate to replace/succeed Lahoud. After being 
released from prison in July 2005, Geagea has remained publicly aloof from political events. 
However, it is apparent that he still enjoys a substantial following and would be expected to 
be a natural rival to Aoun. The strength of his support was illustrated in June 2005 when his 
wife was elected to parliament unopposed. 
It would be expected that the reintroduction of these political actors would impact 
negatively on the role of the patriarch as the representative of the Maronites. The community 
would be able to return to "secular" leadership, leaving the church to reflect on spiritual 
affairs. If this occurred, it would not necessarily be greeted with hostility by the patriarch as 
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on several occasions, Patriarch Sfeir has indicated that he is only attempting to fill the 
political vacuum left by the collapse of civil leadership rather than claiming permanent 
temporal authority. It is impossible to predict future developments but a few clarifications on 
this rather idealistic response can be made. 
Firstly, while Patriarch Sfeir has stated that he has no wish to be involved in the Lebanese 
political system, it is clear that he believes that one of his duties as patriarch is to give 
guidance on both spiritual and civil matters. Thus, it is unlikely that the political tone of the 
bishops' statements will change. Consequently, with the challenge from credible politicians, 
this could develop into the re-emergence of communal tension between the church and elite as 
occurred in the past. Again, it would appear that this is the normal situation within the 
Maronite community due to the historic role of the patriarch. Secondly, populist Maronite 
leaders may have returned to the political arena but so far, this does not seem to have had an 
adverse effect on the patriarch. Instead, all actors have continued to consult the patriarch and 
recognised his role in remaining constant to the belief that Lebanon should be a fully 
independent sovereign state. The patriarch is clearly respected as a figure who can help unite 
various factions -a skill that is in great need to ensure that Lebanon remains a stable and 
peaceful environment. Thirdly, many of the figures politically active today were prominent 
actors in the civil war era. Bitter memories and long-lasting feuds are unlikely to be 
forgotten. Thus, the return of Aoun and Geagea could actually intensify factionalism within 
the Maronite community. It is in this type of climate that the patriarch's political role can 
prove useful not just for the Maronites but all Lebanese. Throughout his long reign as head 
of the Maronite Church, Patriarch Sfeir has demonstrated the ability to adjust his view on the 
correct measures to be taken to further his aims according to the political situation. Yet, hc 
has still remained true to his goal of resurrecting a sovereign Lebanon. While the political 
situation remains unstable and the security situation continues to deteriorate, the crisis of state 
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conditions still exist and consequently in this enviromnent, the political role of the patriarch is 
likely to remain constant. 
summ4a 
It is clear that under Patriarch Sfeir, the patriarchate has been re-established as the main 
legitimate representative of the Maronite community and also as a respected national 
institution. The traditional leadership role of the patriarch and the significant part played by 
the church in Maronite identity provides the legitimacy to pursue this path. In times of 
hardship, it is natural that the community will turn to the patriarch for leadership. The 
patriarchy of Nasrallah Sfeir has been deeply affected by the conditions in Lebanon. The 
effects of the conclusion of the civil war have provided an environment where the church can 
maximise its role as the representative of the community, enjoying almost exclusive authority. 
However, this has been developed according to the vision of Patriarch Sfeir. In rebuilding 
the church and the community, he has concentrated on three aspects - spiritual, social and 
political renewal. All three are interdependent, reinforcing the notion of the church as the 
focal point for Maronites concerning all issues. The patriarch has addressed the main 
Maronite grievances - political participation, discrimination, security and the economy. 
While the political role of the church has attracted the most attention, the patriarch has 
followed a clear policy of defending the interests of all Lebanese, whether regarding 
sovereignty, political representation or economic issues. Thus, in the majority of cases, the 
response to these activities has avoided drifting into mutual suspicions and instead, often 
acknowledged the concerns raised by the patriarch. 
In this case study, the involvement of a religious leader in national affairs appears to have 
aided intercommunal relations as the patriarch has shown his sensitivity to the complex 
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concerns of each community without diluting his demands for a free and independent 
Lebanon. Yet, his position as a religious leader has left him open to attacks by other actors 
who wish to manipulate the fragile reconciliation process in Lebanon in order to further their 
own aims. Compared to the situation of the Maronite church and community in the late 
1980s, a major achievement has been the ability of the patriarch to unite the Maronites and act 
as a rallying point. His ability to alter political strategies according to the changing political 
situation in Lebanon has meant that to a certain extent, he has remained representative of the 
dominant opinions in the Maronite community without greatly risking the security of the 
community. However, it is evident that the church has enjoyed few actual successes in 
attaining its goal. 
Patriarch Sfeir has understood that the political role of the head of the Maronite Church in 
contemporary Lebanon must concentrate on providing guidance to the community and the 
country at large rather than advocating radical measures to achieve these aims. As ýVith any 
advice, it is precisely that - the giver cannot force the questioner to act upon it. Although 
Patriarch Sfeir has tried to exert his authority over the community, following Maronite 
tradition, this has not led to his domination of the community to the same extent as other 
religious leaders have achieved e. g. the Coptic Orthodox Patriarch. Instead, there is still a 
general consensus amongst the Maronite community that political representation should be 
performed by bodies other than the church. Thus, the return of "secular"politicians could 
reduce the impact of the patriarch's pronouncements. However, this political role will 
remain constant even if other political actors emerge to fill the Maronite leadership vacuum, 
precisely because it is part of the duty of the patriarch as his dual position as head of the 
church and the people. To conclude, as the figurehead of the community, reinforced by 
centuries of civil leadership, the patriarch has retained his traditional predominant role but this 
has not been transformed into credible temporal authority as exercised by previous patriarchs. 
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Chapter Six- The Implications of Global Expansion on the 
Political Role of the Patriarch 
Introduction 
A study of the contemporary Middle Eastern Christian communities has to take into account 
the issue of migration and the impact this has had on the respective churches. Although the 
church hierarchies have tried to prevent this trend as it negatively affects the community left 
in the Middle East, they have also sought to reinforce their authority among the faithful in 
their new places of residence. Due to this expansion, the churches in the Middle East can 
now be perceived as global "universal" churches. This chapter commences with a general 
model of diaspora activity in relation to the homeland and the host. 
The discussion turns to the validity of religious diasporas arguing that the theories 
encountered in Chapter One can provide insight into the role of the church abroad. Firstly, 
the fruits of the globalization process, namely communications technology and transport 
advances have allowed the church hierarchy in the Middle East to retain close links with the 
communities in the diaspora, proving that distance is no longer an impediment to church 
authority. Secondly, as the migrants are leaving a society where religion retains social and 
political influence, it is likely that they will try to replicate these relations. Thirdly, aspects 
of the secularization thesis suggest that church leaders can act as a bridge between the 
traditional culture of migrants and their new society. Religious institutions are usually one of 
the first communal groups to be established and help the newcomers to settle into a different 
country. However, once integration has occurred, this influence is likely to decline. Finally, 
a rational choice approach would presume that if the church in the new countries remains the 
actor best placed to provide the services required by migrants, it will survive challenges to its 
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position. Consequently, the role of the Coptic Orthodox and the Maronite churches in the 
diaspora, will be examined in the above context. After outlining the church response to 
emigration, the discussion will then focus on the expansion of the churches and the role taken 
by the hierarchies, especially the patriarchs. The additional challenges facing the church 
leadership will also be examined including the activities of 6migr6 groups and the complex 
issue of communal identity. 
A Theoretical Framework of the Diaspora 
The Historical Formation of the Diao-Ora 
The term diaspora comes from the Greek diaspeiro meaning to sow or scatter from one end 
toanother. 1 Historically, it related to three distinct groups -the Jews, Greeks and 
Armenians. Recently, there has been substantial interest in the notion of diaspora. Esman 
states that the term has been "generalized to refer to any population which has migrated from 
its country of origin and settled in a foreign land, but maintains its continuity as a 
92 community'. This causes confusion when distinguishing a diaspora from other groups such 
as expatriate communities. In order to qualify as a diaspora, it would be expected that the 
group must be significantly large enough to potentially influence the host society. There has 
been difficulty in reaching consensus concerning the criteria needed to be rightfully 
categorised as a diaspora. Van Hear suggests three basic requirements must be met; the 
population is dispersed from the homeland to other lands, there is a continual presence abroad 
and there is an exchange between the dispersed populations. 3 Safran adds that the group 
must retain a collective memory of the homeland and desire an eventual return. A belief that 
they are not fully accepted by the host society also adds to feelings of alienation. 4 While a 
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sense of exile is likely to increase solidarity among the diaspora, diasporas can be formed as a 
result of both forced and voluntary migration. 
Two main causes can be identified for the increase in the number of diasporas since the late 
twentieth century. Firstly, in the post-Cold War era, there has clearly been a resurgence of 
ethnic nationalism, accompanied by what van Hear terms the "rights revolution". 5 This 
means that many ethnic groups are now placing their demands within the diaspora context as 
they believe that this presents a stronger claim to recognition as a distinct group (and often 
political settlements including self-govemancc, autonomy), than merely being a minority. 6 
Secondly, as explored earlier, the globalization process tends to accentuate different identities. 
While migration is certainly not a new trend, advances in transport and communication 
technology have aided individuals to retain links with their homeland. 
The Political Activities of a Diaspora 
Diasporas are formed once immigrants who share a specific identity find host countries 
which are perceived as welcoming and decide to settle permanently. Sheffer suggests that 
migrants tend to drift into diasporas almost accidentally rather than arriving in a host country 
with the establishment of a diaspora as a main aim. The notion of a separate identity is 
reinforced by links with the homeland through visits, remittances and a constant stream of 
new arrivals. 7 Communal organisations are established to help members adjust into the host 
society. These include not only maintaining their identity e. g. fundraising, administering 
schools, establishing community centres and providing religious, health and social services 
but also acting in defence of the community. 8 In this context, the diaspora is likely to 
become politically active only to gain and preserve basic rights for the community. 
Concerning their relationship with the host country, Sheffer cites several options available to 
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the diaspora. Firstly, they can adopt an integrationist approach where they fully participate in 
society but maintain their interest in their own culture. Secondly, they can preserve their 
identity while remaining active in society either through a loose framework or gaining formal 
recognition. Thirdly, they can seek special rights e. g. schools, media and religious 
institutions. 9 One difficulty for the diaspora is overcoming internal disunity such as class or 
ideological differences as well as disagreements over aims and methods of the group. 
There is more scope for political activity in the international arena. A diaspora may try to 
represent the interests of the homeland government. However, many of these states tend to 
be suspicious of their diasporas in other countries and are wary of co-operation. In cases 
where a sense of exile is strong, a diaspora may campaign against the present regime and urge 
host governments to intervene. Some seek to establish their own homeland and attempt to 
lobby other governments and global institutions to gain support. Belonging to a diaspora also 
raises the sensitive issue of loyalty. While many state that allegiance to both homeland and 
host is compatible, there is often concern among the host society that emotional attachment to 
the homeland would supersede any notion of loyalty to the state where the immigrants rcside. 
Thus, the diaspora can often find its loyalty doubted by both homeland and host. 
The Existence of a Religious Diaspo 
The above discussion, as does the majority of the literature on diasporas, concentrates on 
ethnic nationalist diasporas. Concerning the topic of this study - two religious communities 
- can these criteria be applied to a group which identifies solely through their religious 
identity? There would appear to be a dilemma for both case studies. Are they part of the 
Egyptian/Lebanese diaspora or can they be more accurately described as the Coptic/Maronite 
diaspora? Can membership of the second group be complemented by also joining the 
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national diaspora? Just as these questions have not been fully addressed in the respective 
homelands, it is unsurprising that such issues have not been resolved in host countries. 
Diasporas identified by religious affiliation are not unusual. After all, religious communities 
can be regarded as one of the oldest types of transnational communities. However, in the 
existing literature, discussion on religious diasporas tends to be limited to either global faiths 
e. g. Islam or Catholicism or else to those which overlap with a distinctive ethnic identity e. g. 
the Armenians. 
Both the Coptic and Maronite communities abroad would appear to satisfy the basic criteria 
to be categorised as a diaspora. A distinct homeland exists and collective identity has been 
kept especially though not exclusively through the church. Communal organisations have 
been formed and frequent contact maintained both with the homeland and between the 
migrant communities in different host countries. The activities of the diaspora also have an 
impact on both the community and wider society in the homeland. Clearly, religion can play 
an important role in helping migrants adjust to their new life. As a faith often provides core 
values of a specific culture, it can reinforce identity. Members of the religious community 
tend to worship collectively which accentuates communal tics. Spiritual leaders can 
accompany the migrants or arc sent to minister to their needs, thus maintaining links with the 
homeland. In fact, Vertovec states that religious adherence can become stronger in the 
diaspora than at home because it ensures that collective memories remain relevant to the 
community. Similarly, once the community has settled in the host country, religion can have 
less influence especially among the younger generations. 10 
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Theories Conceming the Political Role of Religion and the Diaspora 
Referring to the theories explored earlier regarding the politicised role of religion, these also 
offer insight into the likely activities, strengths and future of a religious diaspora. In the past, 
religious institutions were in danger of losing contact with followers who migrated to other 
lands. Advances in transport and communications technology, due to the globalization 
process allows migrants and the religious hierarchy in the homeland to maintain links and 
ensure that the faith remains strong within the community. Many migrants have left the 
Middle East due to various crises of state. As explored earlier, this region has experienced 
less modernization than most and consequently, in contrast to the West, secularization has not 
been widespread. If an environment is said to shape public opinion, it is possible that 
migrants would wish to recreate similar relations in the diaspora as in the homeland. Thus, 
the active role of religious institutions in all aspects of life would be widely accepted. Bruce 
provides another reason for the continued presence of religious institutions among the 
diaspora. The institutions can act as a bridge from the homeland to the host by reminding 
migrants of their shared identity and heritage while simultaneously, helping surmount 
obstacles in the new society. " They also provide practical help including social and 
educational services, employment assistance and access to other successful migrants. In this 
context, once integration has been achieved, it would be expected that the influence of 
religious leaders would decrease among the migrant communities. Although the group may 
still wish to act as a collective, this could be assigned to secular organisations which would 
act independently of the religious hierarchy. 
Under the rational choice model, the strength of the presence of religious institutions 
encourages migrants to maintain religious adherence. This is due to a combination of factors 
explored above - reinforcing identity, collective remembrance and enactment of homeland 
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culture, welfare programmes and social networks. As long as the religious institution is 
perceived as being the best actor to perform these services, they will enjoy religious vitality. 
Consequently, it is now necessary to examine these propositions concerning the contemporary 
Coptic and Maronite diasporas to ascertain firstly what role religious institutions can play 
among a diaspora. which is identified primarily through religious affiliation and secondly, 
what impact these activities will have on the homeland. 
The Response of the Churches to Emigation 
Emigration has been identified as one of the key reasons for the steady decline of Christians 
in the entire Middle East region and the situation in Egypt and Lebanon is no different. 
Significant Coptic migration coincided with the Nasser era. As a consequence of the 
nationalisation policies pursued by the state, members of the wealthy Coptic families began to 
emigrate. They were soon followed by other members of the community, leading to a brain 
drain as the majority were young professionals e. g. doctors, lawyers and engineers. This by 
no means only affected Copts - many young Egyptian Muslims also sought to fulfil their 
ambitions abroad. Social, economic and political factors continue to encourage this trend. 
As many Copts are well-educated, skilled and proficient in foreign languages, emigration to 
the West proves to be an attractive proposition. Furthermore, they tend to have relatives in 
the diaspora and do not regard the West as alien. With each new group of 6migr6s, a growing 
network was established to help the latest newcomers, thus providing another reason to leave. 
In contrast, Lebanon has long been regarded as a country of emigration. Since the latter 
half of the nineteenth century, hundreds of thousands of Lebanese have lcft their country, 
tending to favour North and South America - the latter especially when the United States 
imposed strict immigration quotas in the post World War One era. ' 2 Factors for this 
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emigration include population pressures, the educational role of mission schools as well as 
political and economic instability. In the early period, the vast majority of migrants were 
Christians. While many historically conformed to the stereotype of the Lebanese peddler, 
recent migrants are more likely to be skilled professionals. Furthermore, by the 1940s, a 
significant number of Muslims had also migrated, especially the Shia to West Africa. Due to 
the oil boom in the Gulf and then the civil war, migration continued throughout the remainder 
of the twentieth century. Although Lebanese of all confessions left during this turbulent 
period, it is estimated that over half were Christian and significantly, unlike other groups, few 
return, especially among the Maronites. 
As explored earlier, both the Coptic Orthodox and Maronite hierarchies are concerned at the 
decline in the size of their community in comparison to other sections of the population. As 
in any situation, the larger a group is, the more likely its demands will be heard. Thus, an 
ever decreasing community would appear to negatively affect the political role of the 
patriarch. The fact that many of the migrants are young professionals accentuates this 
problem as the church in the homeland is not only deprived of their involvement but also a 
substantial proportion of the new generation. Consequently, church leaders have tried to 
offer encouragement as well as practical measures to convince their members to remain in the 
region. Through the Bishopric of Youth, the Coptic Orthodox Church attempts to use its 
traditions and history to address the concerns of the youth regarding their future. For 
example, Bishop Musa stresses that God chooses the poorest and humblest for his work, and 
while they may be poorly paid, they are in fact rich because they have God's blessing. 13 
Similarly, Patriarch Sfeir urges the Maronite youth to resist the pull of emigration, "the 
attachment to the homeland, especially in times of trial, is one of your first dutics". 
14 The 
hierarchies have also recognised that practical aid is required. Through the Coptic Orthodox 
Bishopric of Public, Ecumenical and Social Services, social services and job training 
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programmes are provided. The Maronite Church, through the monastic orders, has continued 
to offer educational and health services and attempted to provide land for affordable 
housing. 15 Yet despite these efforts, there has been little success in combating the emigration 
challenge. Instead, in the twenty-first century, it is clear that church leaders have adapted to 
these changes and concentrated resources on the church in the diaspora. 
The Global Enansion of the Coptic Orthodox and Maronite Churches 
The initial response of both churches to the global expansion of their adherents can be 
characterised as slow, reactive and haphazard. Yet in the early years, no-one, especially the 
migrants, could be certain that this would be a long-lasting presence. Although aware of the 
need to minister to these communities, the church hierarchies struggled to implement cohesive 
policies. Once it became clear that Coptic emigration was a permanent trend, Pope Kyrillos 
VI added the responsibility of establishing churches in the diaspora to the already 
overburdened Bishop Samuel. 16 In 1964, Father Marcos Marcos was appointed as the first 
priest to minister to the Copts in North America. 17 Initially the liturgy was celebrated in 
homes but through the efforts of the laity and the small but growing number of priests, church 
buildings were acquired. 
Although the Maronite diaspora was established many decades before Coptic emigration 
became widespread, they still faced similar problems. While substantial Maronitc emigration 
had taken place since the mid-nineteenth century, the church response lagged behind these 
developments. Unlike the Coptic Orthodox Patriarch, the Maronite Patriarch is not the 
supreme head of the church and in matters outside of the patriarchal territory, during this cra, 
the Holy See alone had the authority to make decisions. Thus, in 1889, the Maronite 
Patriarch requested permission from the Vatican to provide services for the immigrants. This 
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was granted on condition that they confined their work to Maronite emigrants and gained 
approval from the Latin hierarchy in the area. Consequently, in 1890, the first Maronite 
priest arrived in the United States. 18 Maronite priests travelled throughout the diaspora to 
perform ceremonies and sacraments. However, as the migrants tended to be scattered 
throughout these lands, it was difficult to build churches and many attended local Latin rite 
churches. This has been seen as a great setback as at least one generation was lost to the 
Maronite church. 19 Clearly, the distance between the different communities meant that while 
these early attempts of both the Coptic Orthodox and Maronite churches to meet the needs of 
migrants were welcome, more was required in order to retain links with all adherents 
regardless of location. 
By far the older 6migr6 community, it is unsurprising that the first to rcorganise services to 
the diaspora were the Maronites. Patriarch Meouchi who had served as a priest in the United 
States was keenly aware of the importance of maintaining links with the diaspora. The laity 
also campaigned for closer connections with the church in Lebanon. Petitions by the 
patriarch, combined with these laity campaigns in the diaspora as well as the changed climate 
after Vatican II, led to the appointment of a bishop in Brazil (1962), United States (1966) and 
Australia (1973). 20 Once these dioceses were established, there was a significant increase in 
church building especially in the United States and Australia. Patriarch Meouchi was 
receptive to laity requests for providing training for the priesthood in the diaspora and 
21 founded the Our Lady of Lebanon Maronite Seminary in New York in 1961. Through 
these developments, the foundations were laid to ensure a vibrant church in the diaspora 
which could act as encouragement to Maronites in the homeland. 
Turning to the role of the two patriarchs studied in this work, it is clear that both have been 
influential in the expansion of the church abroad. Under Pope Shenouda, the Coptic 
Orthodox Church in the lands of immigration has increased dramatically. Increasing the 
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number of priests sent abroad, he encouraged local communities to acquire their own church 
building rather than continuing to worship in houses. This was partly due to the growth of 
congregations but also influenced by the public witness dimension of having a consecrated 
building. From only seven churches in 1971, there are now over seventy churches in the 
United States, thirty in Canada, over forty in Europe and over twenty-two in Australia and 
New Zealand. 22 The church has expanded in other areas where there are Coptic expatriates 
e. g. Latin American, Africa and other parts of the Middle East. Clearly, it is church policy 
that wherever Coptic migrants locate to, the church will follow. The Coptic community 
outside of Egypt is now estimated to have between 3-400,000 members. 23 Theological 
seminaries have been built to ensure that members of the next generations have the 
opportunity to become part of the clerical ranks. Monasteries have also been founded 
including three in Europe and one each in Australia and the United States. Constant church 
building and regular requests for more priests illustrates the vibrancy of the church. 
Patriarch Shenouda has striven to ensure full control over the churches outside of Egypt. 
Until the 1990s, the churches were administered from the patriarchate in Cairo. 
Overburdened general bishops such as Bishop Musa of the Bishopric of Youth and Bishop 
Serapion of the Bishopric of Public, Ecumenical and Social Services were also responsible for 
overseas churches. Aware of the needs of these churches, a change in administrative control 
occurred. Since the 1990s, several dioceses have been established including Southern United 
States (1993), Los Angeles, Southern California and Hawaii (1995), Melbourne (1999) and 
Sydney (2002). However, the patriarch personally selects clergy who are sent abroad. They 
tend to be dynamic, well-educated and have experience of working in other countries. Most 
of the bishops appointed to the diaspora can be regarded as his prot6g6s. However, there 
have been some cases of disagreements between the clergy and their congregations - 
especially over pastoral appointments. While the majority are sent from Egypt, some come 
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from the 6migr6 communities e. g. Bishop Suriel of Melbourne. The clergy are encouraged to 
learn the language of the country where they are ministering to help their pastoral work with 
the youth who are not always fluent in Arabic. Clergy are sent from Egypt to conduct 
services at Christmas and Easter in each 6migr6 community. Bishops are often requested to 
attend meetings with the patriarch in Egypt in addition to the annual Synod of Bishops. 
Under Patriarch Sfeir, the Maronite Church in the diaspora has also undergone significant 
expansion. It is estimated that around 4-5 million Maronitcs reside outside of the Middle 
East. As explored earlier, initial dioceses abroad were established during the reign of 
Patriarch Meouchi. However, several more have been added including Canada, Europe, 
Argentina, Mexico, and a second one in the United States based in Los Angeles. With over 
seventy churches, the diaspora appear to be most active in the United States. There arc also 
over eleven churches and one monastery in Australia, fourteen churches in Canada and 
several in Latin American and Europe. 24 Control over the Maronitc churches abroad is less 
clear cut than in the Coptic Orthodox Church because it is an Eastern Catholic rite which 
regards the Pope as the supreme head of the church. The growth of the diaspora - outside of 
the existing patriarchal territory - has forced the church to address the issue of patriarchal 
authority. During the drafting of the 1990 Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches, it was 
suggested that patriarchal authority could extend outside of the historical territory. However, 
the finished Code confirmed that patriarchal territory would be defined in a geographic 
sense. 25 The historical Maronite patriarchal territory is considered to cover Lebanon, Syria, 
the Holy Land, Egypt and the rest of the Middle East. While decisions regarding the 
appointment of Maronite bishops and the creation of eparchics outside the historical 
patriarchal territory rest with the Holy See, under the Code of Canons, the Synod of Bishops 
proposes the shortlist of candidates. 26 Unlike in the past when appointments could be made 
without any patriarchal involvement, in the majority of cases, the Maronite hierarchy now has 
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significant influence. At present, most bishops abroad are Lebanese. However, the heads of 
the two dioceses in the United States are Americans of Lebanese descent. Similar to the 
Coptic Orthodox, bishops of overseas dioceses are in regular contact with the patriarch and 
return to Lebanon for the annual Synod of Bishops. 
Both churches have emphasised the role of the patriarch as head and father of the entire 
community in order to strengthen relations between the 6migr6s and the church in the 
homeland. Patriarchal visits provide an opportunity for 6migr6s to participate in events and 
gain a sense of belonging in the wider church. The patriarchal itinerary of these visits tends 
to include consecrating new churches, conducting mass, youth meetings, question and answer 
sessions, studies and conferences with the clergy and generally meeting members of the 
congregations. Pope Shenouda regularly visits different communities including an annual 
visit to North America. While Patriarch Sfeir's visits are not as frequent, he also travels to 
areas where large sections of the diaspora have settled. Communications technology is 
employed to emphasise links between the diaspora and the homeland. The patriarchates have 
developed an Arabic/English website which allows those abroad to participate in church 
activities and be aware of issues concerning the wider church . 
27 In addition, al-Keraza, the 
Coptic Orthodox Church magazine is available in English both in print and online. 
Through the above measures, it is evident that the policy of both churches is to avoid 
divisions between the church in the homeland and those residing outside. This has proven 
easier for the Coptic Orthodox in the sense that there is no canonical difference. The 
preferred phrase among Copts for these communities is "lands of immigration" as it illustrates 
that the entire community is united around the patriarch. The term "diaspora! ' is rejected 
because it has connotations of a separate group from the body of the church. As outlined 
above, relations between the Maronite patriarchate and diaspora are more complex due to the 
issue of patriarchal territory. A Maronite priest from the diaspora summariscs the problem 
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by stating that although the patriarch is supposed to be regarded as the father of the entire 
Maronite Church, those outside the patriarchal territory feel more like stepchildren. 28 Aware 
of these concerns, Patriarch Sfeir has frequently addressed these issues. At the 2003 
Maronite Synod and the two subsequent sessions (2004 and 2005), the role of the church in 
the countries of expansion and Maronite identity were major themes. Patriarch Sfcirasscrted 
that all who follow the Maronite rite and tradition are Maronites - no matter where they were 
bom or reside. 29 Like the Copts, the term diaspora tends also to be replaced, usually by 
referring to "the countries of expansion". 
It is evident that under the present patriarchs, interest in the diaspora has been maintained 
and in fact strengthened. The work of the dioceses abroad is crucial in ensuring that migrants 
retain attachment to the church in the homeland. One way this can be done is to preserve 
their unique identity and heritage. The majority of dioceses in both traditions publish their 
own newsletters and magazines with information relevant to both life in the diaspora and in 
the homeland . 
30 The churches also support projects including schools, language classes, 
spiritual retreats and convention centres to allow the community to learn about their heritage. 
Many activities focus on the youth due to the importance of the younger generation for the 
survival of the church, including Sunday School, youth associations, involvement in services 
and trips to the homeland. For the Maronites, there is still concern at the rate of assimilation 
into the Latin Catholic church partly due to the lack of Maronite schools. Regarding the 
United States, Labaki asserts, "absorption into the Latin Church is a very real danger in 
America". 31 Consequently, at the second session of the patriarchal synod, it was decided to 
establish an office in the patriarchate dedicated to relations with diaspora parishes. 
32 There 
has also been a concerted effort to conduct a census of all Maronites living abroad. 
Both churches have developed the capacity to provide material aid for migrants and offer 
services for the young (childcare) and the old (homes for the elderly). Combined with the 
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provision of a support network for new arrivals, these services increase the likelihood that 
migrants will remain faithful to the church as indicated by the rational choice approach. 
Furthermore, the ability and willingness of each church to cater for all the needs of the 
migrants has stifled competitors. To a certain extent, the church alone has fulfilled the 
function of aiding members of the diaspora in adjusting to a new society rather than the 
migrant community establishing its own communal organizations - independent of the church 
- to achieve this particular aim. The churches also encourage links with the homeland by 
organising voluntary work and collecting financial aid. Donations sent to the patriarchates 
from often wealthy 6migr6 communities also aid the work of the churches. Evidently, both 
churches have great potential in ensuring that migrants retain links to their homeland. 
Examining these two case studies, it is clear that both patriarchs have attempted to retain their 
position as the predominant communal actor in the diaspora, just as in the homeland and 
through the church, have the resources to be a lasting presence in the community regardless of 
location. 
The Challenge of tmigr6 Groups to the Political -Role of 
the Pat-narch 
Although the main church response to the challenge of emigration has been to transform it 
into a positive outcome through global expansion, this development has had other 
repercussions, notably the formation of different communal groups which threaten the 
position of the patriarch as the spokesman of the community. As noted earlier, once migrants 
have settled into their new homelands, they tend to establish communal organisations. 
Members of the different Christian denominations represented in the Middle East have been 
proactive in these activities. With the obvious historic exceptions of the Armenians and 
Assyrians, few have arrived in the diaspora as a result of involuntary migration. Ilowcvcr, 
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some believe that due to discrimination in the homeland, they can only find true equality 
abroad. This type of attitude tends to shape the most vocal organisations. Furthermore, they 
are able to maximise the opportunities offered in societies where freedom of expression is 
cherished as a right for all. 
In general, both Coptic and Maronite migrants have been able to integrate into their new 
societies while preserving their own identity and heritage. For most, there are few realistic 
threats to their presence in the host country, especially in Western states where equality is 
more or less guaranteed. Hence, the main focus of political activity is centrcd on the 
homeland. Few groups connected with the Coptic or Maronite diaspora are perceived as 
representing the interests of the Egyptian/Lebanese governments. Unsurprisingly, these 
states tend to be suspicious of 6migr6 groups that campaign against the regimes and urge host 
governments to intervene. Although they may not represent the majority of 6migrds, the 
lobby groups which receive substantial media attention tend to be those which are perceived 
as challenging the status quo in the homeland. 
In the Coptic case, the main emphasis is on protecting Coptic rights in Egypt. Campaigns 
run during the turbulent Sadat years illustrated the potential impact that expatriates could have 
on Egyptian domestic politics. For example, 6migre lobbying was a factor in forcing the 
government to abandon the 1977 apostasy bill while street demonstrations and newspaper 
adverts during Sadat's 1980 visit to the United States colourcd his opinion of the church 
especially Pope Shenouda. 33 By categorising the problems facing the Copts as a human 
rights issue, groups such as the US Copts Association, hope to persuade Western governments 
to pressurise the Egyptian state into combating discrimination against Christians and securing 
the rights of the Coptic community. These groups argue that aid, particularly from the US, 
should be conditional on respecting the human rights of Christians in Egypt. 34 Some activists 
were strong supporters of the 1998 United States Congress International Religious Freedom 
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Act, met with Congress committees and placed newspaper adverts during the hearing of the 
bill, alleging systematic oppression of the Copts. 35 At present, these activities have had little 
impact on US administrations but as they have developed close relations with individual 
senators and congressmen, the activists are in a position to take advantage of any changes in 
US policy which may benefit their aims. tmigr6 groups have benefited from 
communications technology, using the Internet as a means to instantly publicise information. 
However, some of these organisations view any incident within a persecution framework and 
are prone to exaggeration, use inflammatory language and often fail to verify details. 36 
In comparison, the majority of Maronite 6migr6 groups tend to be more politiciscd than 
their Coptic counterparts. Some groups are closely connected to Lebanese political parties 
which adversely affects their ability to agree on policies. 37 Others advocate alliances with 
Israel. 38 With memories of the civil war still vivid, the problems of Maronite internal 
disunity so prevalent in the homeland appear to have been replicated in the diaspora. 
Particularly since the end of the conflict, the main priority for Maronite groups was to end 
what they regarded as Syrian occupation of Lebanon. Using similar methods as the Coptic 
groups described above, some 6migr6 activists tried to engage the support of the United 
States. In the post-September I Ith era, they were quick to perceive that American political 
actors were likely to be more favourable towards efforts to secure Lebanese independence 
from Syrian influence than in the past. For example, groups such as the Council of Lebanese 
American Organizations (CLAO) lobbied in favour of the Syria Accountability and Lebanese 
Sovereignty Restoration Act (SALSRA) passed by Congress in 2003. GcneralAoun, oneof 
the leading 6migr6 figures during this period testified to a Congress committee. 
39 Allthesc 
groups have also benefited from communications technology allowing them to monitor the 
situation in Lebanon and co-ordinate campaigns both with their own supporters and with 
other groups in the diaspora. 
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While the impact of the contribution of these lobby groups on Western states is debatable, it 
cannot be denied that one of their primary aims was achieved in September 2004 when the 
American and French cosponsored United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 
1559 was passed. As explored earlier, this resolution called for the withdrawal of Syrian 
troops from Lebanon and an end to external interference in Lebanese domestic affairs. In the 
immediate aftermath of the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri in February 2005, they 
demonstrated their solidarity with protests in Beirut by organising marches in Western 
capitals. However, this changed environment is likely to affect groups in the diaspora. 
Firstly, the main goal of attaining Syrian withdrawal has taken place and Syria is no longer 
regarded as having full control of the Lebanese state. Since this was the sole issue which 
united the different groups, it would be expected that relations between the Maronite 
organisations will become more strained, thus hindering their ability to promote Maronite 
interests. Secondly, some activists have returned home, notably former Prime Minister 
General Aoun who was elected to the Lebanese parliament in the June 2005 elections. The 
changed environment also allowed some 6migr6s to participate in these elections. Although 
the Lebanese electoral system does not allow expatriates to vote, many visited Lebanon solely 
for this purpose. 40 The future paths of the different Maronite 6migr6 groups depend on the 
type of issues that become prioritised. For some, these will continue to be closely connected 
to political developments in Lebanon whilst others may choose to concentrate on issues which 
directly affect the diaspora. 
Political activities undertaken by diaspora organizations can raise questions concerning the 
loyalty of the group. In the post-September I Ith world, the Christian identity of the two 
communities detailed above has helped to avoid any accusations of divided loyalty in the 
west. This is particularly true of some groups which portray themselves as friends of the 
west in the region e. g. relations between Maronite lobby groups and the United States 
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government during the turbulent period of regime change in Lebanon. In contrast, it is 
unsurprising that the type of activities described above have had a more significant and 
adverse impact on relations at home. Due to the methods used by some Coptic 6migr6 
groups, their campaigns to safeguard Coptic rights can in fact, serve only to endanger the 
Coptic community. This is primarily because the loyalty of all Copts is called into question. 
Among the Egyptian elite, there is a general acceptance that such activists represent only a 
small minority of the expatriate Coptic community. This does not prevent angry 
denunciations, especially at attempts by expatriates to involve the United States in what is 
perceived as internal Egyptian matters. For example, a statement signed in 1998 by over 
2000 prominent Coptic figures in Egypt, bitterly attacked "continued attempts made by 
94 enemy hostile forces in rumoring false claims of Coptic repressioW. 1 Furthennorc, as the 
activities of such groups are often reported in the Egyptian media, some segments of die 
population do assume that these views are shared by most Copts. This type of action by 
some expatriates can adversely affect communal relations. The patriotism of Copts can be 
doubted as there is suspicion that once they migrate abroad, they are likely to bccomc critical 
of the regime. 
This issue of loyalty is also relevant to the Maronite case. The pro-Syrian regime was 
understandably hostile to the lobby groups described above as they rcprcscntcd a threat to 
their position and authority. Members of different confessions were also concerned that 
some Maronite groups were willing to contemplate an alliance with the Israeli government. 
Few groups succeeded in convincing their compatriots that they promoted the intcrcsts of all 
Lebanese rather than just those of the Maronites. The distrust that lingercd from the civil war 
remained prominent. Consequently, the actions of those abroad affected Maronites still 
residing in Lebanon as their loyalty to the state continued to be questioned. Since the Syrian 
withdrawal, there is now concern amongst other confessions that the Maronites; will try to re. 
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establish hegemony over the state even although they are no longer the largest scct. The fact 
that the Christian, especially Maronite, lobby is rccognised as being the most developed can 
be seen as a contributory factor to the decision to continue to exclude expatriate voters from 
the 2005 elections as this would greatly swell the Maronite vote. 
The existence of the type of 6migr6 groups described above requires a response from the 
patriarch not only to safeguard communal harmony but also to defend the position of 
predominant spokesperson for the community. In the Coptic Orthodox example, Patriarch 
Shenouda has frequently stressed that such activists are a small minority of the Coptic 
diaspora and not representative of the views of the church and the wider Coptic community. 
In fact, he adds that such associations have sometimes denounced the patriarch and the Coptic 
Orthodox Church. 42 He has constantly rejected foreign intervention and states that any 
problems will be solved internally with the Egyptian authorities. This can be seen through 
his lukewarm response to the US International Religious Freedom Commission delegations. 
The patriarch has also addressed his response to the Coptic diaspora. As explored above, 
there has been a concerted effort to ensure that the church remains the focus point among 
migrants as it is in Egypt. The centralization process can be seen as cmphasising the 
authority of the patriarch at the expense of lay movements operating independently from the 
church. The patriarch has publicly called for Coptic 6migr6s to become widely involved in 
pressure groups which seek to promote the Egyptian national interest. 43 Responding to 
claims of persecution, he has asked Coptic migrants to take heed of all the opinions voiced by 
Copts living in Egypt and if possible, to visit Egypt in order to have personal experience of 
the Coptic situation in contemporary Egypt. 44 The patriarch has also urged his adherents in 
the West to be proud of their Egyptian roots. For example, it is made clear that the church 
hierarchy disapproves of demonstrations during the annual visit of President Mubarak to the 
United States. During pastoral visits to Coptic communities abroad, Patriarch Shcnouda 
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frequently meets Egyptian officials and attends receptions at the Egyptian Embassy. Thus, 
the authority of the patriarch can actually be enhanced by the existence of lobby groups. The 
government response has focused on Patriarch Shenouda as a moderate leader, able to 
influence his community against what they perceive as extremist tendencies. 
Yet, there is clearly an ambivalent relationship between the church and the 6migr6 groups. 
Firstly, in this matter the church cannot be regarded as a monolith. Thus, there are some 
members - both clergy and lay - who are quick to contact lobby groups abroad once an 
incident occurs. This is not only to ensure that Coptic problems in Egypt arc widely 
publicised but also to prove that they have external supporters campaigning on their behalf. 
Action is rarely taken by the hierarchy either against anyone who appeals to such 
organisations or indeed those in the diaspora who are actively involved. Instead, Patriarch 
Shenouda states that as the patriarch of Alexandria, he is the head and father of all Copts, 
regardless of their political beliefs. It must also be noted that financial contributions from the 
diaspora allow the church to fulfil many of its services. Hence, it would be surprising if steps 
were taken which would endanger this valuable income source. This approach allows the 
patriarch to criticise actions which have a negative impact on communal relations in Egypt 
without necessarily distancing himself from such activists. 
Similarly, although Patriarch Sfeir is keen to unite the diaspora, he is wary of being 
connected with groups which are perceived in Lebanon as supporting the interests of other 
countries such as the United States and Israel. This dilemma has placed the hierarchy in a 
delicate position. An illustration of this problem is provided by the 2002 Los Angeles 
International Maronite Congress which attracted delegates from Lebanon and abroad 
representing a wide range of political views. The patriarch endorsed the conference which 
sought to maximise the potential of the diaspora and sent personal representatives. However, 
the disputed final resolutions of the congress stated support for aspects of the US legislation 
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45 SALSRA which referred to Lebanon. This meant that notable personalities from Lebanon 
who had participated in the conference whether in person or by sending a delegation had to 
defend their involvement. Although the patriarch denounced the endorsement of this law, the 
issue proved controversial in Lebanon. His wariness of United States policies and their 
potential impact on Lebanon, has also driven his concern to avoid being identified with 
Lebanese activists (mainly Christian) who are perceived by some in the region as being anti- 
Arab. In contrast to his public stance on SALSRA, the patriarch was an ardent supporter of 
46 UNSCR1559 which aimed to halt Syrian interference in Lebanese internal matters. One 
major difference was that this demand by the highest international authority on world affairs 
was perceived as more legitimate than any acts passed by one country, even if that state was 
the global superpower. Thus, Patriarch Sfeir felt able to reject accusations of welcoming 
foreign intervention. 
Patriarch Sfeir has also tried to consolidate his authority over the diaspora. Whilc this was 
resisted by many groups, the changed environment since the Syrian withdrawal is likely to be 
more favourable to these attempts. The patriarch has directly appealed to his community 
abroad, urging them to support efforts in Lebanon which seek to re-establish the country as an 
independent and democratic state. The personal status of the patriarch has been enhanced by 
high-level visits abroad including audiences with the French President Chirac and US 
President George W Bush. 47 Furthermore, local politicians and notable figures also meet 
with the patriarch in the knowledge that he can use his authority as head of the church to 
attempt to influence Maronite public opinion. 
There is also awareness amongst the hierarchy that the church is associated with any group 
that has the word Maronite in the title regardless of any actual involvement. Aware of the 
harm which can be done to the church and its attempts to foster national reconciliation, efforts 
are being made to ensure that such groups agree to guidelines proposed by the patriarch. 
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Again, there is still an element of ambiguity regarding relations between the church and the 
Maronite diaspora. As in the Coptic example, the financial contributions of adherents abroad 
are welcome to the church and the position of the patriarch as the father of all Maronitcs tends 
to be emphasised, ensuring that the patriarch can remain in contact with all the flock. In 
conclusion, it would appear that emigre groups have the potential to be a sterner challenge to 
the temporal role of the patriarch than any competitors in the homeland. However, 
significant influence over the diaspora has remained in the hands of the patriarch. At present, 
communal organizations independent of the church have not been successful in usurping the 
dominant position of the patriarch. No group appears able to rival the authority and prestige 
of the patriarch. Thus, both patriarchs have used these elements to safeguard their status as 
the civil representative of the community both in the domestic and international arcna. 
The Impact of Global Expansion on Identity 
The global expansion of the churches also raises the question of identity. As discussed in 
earlier chapters, while faith is central to both Coptic and Maronite identity, it also tends to be 
closely connected to an identifiable homeland i. e. Egypt or Lebanon respectively. There are 
elements in both churches who believe that in order to be a true member of the community, an 
individual must either be born in the homeland or share this licritagc e. g. the next generation 
bom in the areas of expansion. Thus, in the twenty-first century, the churches have had to 
address this issue of identity. For the Coptic Orthodox Church, the acceptance of the Coptic 
Orthodox faith and worship allows an individual to rightfully enter the community. Tile 
church can no longer be categorised solely as an Egyptian one. It is clear that Pope Shenouda 
regards himself as the head of a universal church which is open to all who profess the Coptic 
Orthodox faith. It is not necessary to have prior links with the land of Egypt. However as a 
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Copt, this land of the desert monasteries will be revered as the spiritual homeland. 
Furthermore, the office of the patriarch also serves to unite adherents whether from Egypt or 
elsewhere. Similarly, at the recent Maronite Synods, it was proclaimed that as long as an 
individual follows the Maronite faith and tradition, they can be termed a Maronite. Maronite 
identity is regarded as ecclesiastical not national or ethniC. 48 Yet, Lebanon enjoys 
considerable status as the spiritual homeland of the community. Again, the patriarch acts as 
the link between the scattered congregations. Clearly in both cases, attachment to the 
figurehead of the church is the main factor which bonds and unites the spiritual community 
regardless of nationality or cultural background. 
Both churches now perceive themselves as global churches due to the existence of adherents 
throughout the world. As detailed above, historically the churches abroad catered primarily 
for expatriates and their descendants. Converts tend to be spouses of existing mcmbcrs. 
There is awareness that mission is a central part of the Christian faith. However, the 
Maronites are constrained by the fact that they are members of the universal Catholic church. 
Thus, there are already churches undertaking mission work in the areas where Maronitcs now 
reside. Ministering solely to their own congregations was the key condition to Vatican 
approval of Maronite dioceses outside of the historical patriarchal territory. Consequently, it 
is highly likely that the indigenous Catholic churches would be extrcmcly hostile to any 
evangelism by Maronitcs. While individuals may be attracted to the Maronitc rite on account 
of its heritage and distinct liturgy, there would appear to be little chance of significant growth 
in the diaspora as a result of proselytism rather than constant immigration. 
In contrast, the Coptic Orthodox Church is autonomous from other Christian denominations 
and the decision to undertake missionary activities rests with the hierarchy. The main 
mission field especially in the post-colonial area has been Africa. Portraying itself as the 
oldest indigenous church, the Coptic faith has spread on this contincnt. Under Pope 
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Shenouda, interest in Africa has grown. In 1973, the title of the Patriarch of Alexandria was 
amended to include "All of AfriCa". 49 There is now a significant Coptic presence in Africa 
with thirty-three churches in nine countries and the appointment of a bishop for African 
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affairs. In the developing world, the chances of acceptance of the Coptic Orthodox Church 
are increased as in contrast to the majority of denominations working in these regions, the 
church does not have a colonial past or connections with Western powers. At present, the 
main focus is on countries in close proximity to the two Australian Coptic dioceses. Initially 
ministering to expatriates, new churches established by the Diocese of Sydney and AfTiliatcd 
Regions in Thailand and Japan have attracted indigenous converts. For example, the 
Christmas 2005 service was attended by over 100 baptiscd Thais while in Japan, a convert 
was consecrated as priest in 2004 .51 The Diocese of Melbourne and Affiliated Regions 
has 
founded a voluntary unit entitled the Coptic Orthodox Church Mission (COCM) which has 
concentrated its work on Fiji, providing both spiritual care and material assistancC. 52 In the 
twenty-first century, it is clear that the role of mission as a central element of the Christian 
faith has been addressed with renewed vigour by members of the Coptic Orthodox Church 
working in the developing world. Consequently, due to this expansion, its credentials as a 
universal church would appear to be genuine. Yet, like the Maronitcs, this has not been 
achieved at the expense of its traditional heritage and identity. 
Summ 
The discussion has illustrated that a religious diaspora in the shape of the two Eastcrn 
Christian denominations examined above, clearly exists and is likely to remain a significant 
dimension of the Coptic Orthodox and Maronite communities. While this does not nccd to 
be at the expense of their membership of the national diaspora (in some ways, their religious 
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identity serves to strengthen this attachment), it is evident that both the Coptic Orthodox and 
Maronite communities possess many of the characteristics used to identify an ethnic 
nationalist diaspora. This helps to reinforce communal identity. In both cases, the church 
hierarchy have maximised the benefits of cheap and widespread travel as well as 
communications technology, especially the internet in order to retain links with their scattered 
adherents. Without these developments, one would suspect that more generations would be 
lost to the respective faiths as occurred in the Maronitc case. A significant proportion of 
migrants regard the church as the most effective means to retain their identity and faith. 
However, equally important are the services provided by the church. By maintaining their 
dominant position, it is likely that religious leaders will continue to influence the communities 
abroad. While it is too early to determine if this situation will be a short-lived phenomenon, 
clearly significant numbers of the younger generation have integrated into their new society 
without losing their religious identity. 
One method used by both churches to retain support has been to emphasise the role of the 
patriarch as the father of all the faithful. This has served to co-opt the community into 
activities run and sanctioned by the church, limiting opportunities to develop alternatives. 
The 6migr6 groups prove that there are attempts to work independently from the church 
hierarchy. While these groups may be vocal, few have managed to attract and retain 
widespread support from migrants. In general, the views of the patriarch remain significant 
to the communities abroad. However, the activities of lobby groups do affect communal and 
church-state relations in the homeland. In the majority of cases, this has had a negative 
impact by accentuating the dilemma of religious and national identity and forcing the 
patriarch to emphasise the loyalty of the faithful to the nation state. Yet, the presence of 
external groups campaigning for Coptic/Maronite rights also elevates the office of the 
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patriarch. Both patriarchs are perceived by their governments as leaders with considerable 
authority over their community, which can be used to combat the influence of other actors. 
The status of the patriarch at home and abroad is also enhanced as the leader of a universal 
rather than national church with adherents in many countries. The challenge of the diaspora 
has illustrated that the church hierarchy and institutions, just as in the past, can adapt to 
changes in circumstances. Under the present patriarchs, both churches have witnessed 
widespread expansion in the lands of immigration and resolved potentially damaging issues, 
especially concerning identity and the criteria required to belong to the religious community. 
In conclusion, it is evident that the church leadership has transformed a potent challenge - the 
decline of the community in the homeland due to migration - into a substantial strength - the 
formation of a global community and a universal church. 
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Chapter Seven - Conclusion 
Summ 
In order to provide an accurate summary of the preceding pages, it is helpful to return to the 
variables listed in the introductory chapter. This will allow a comparison to be made of the 
two patriarchs and traditions covered in this study - Patriarch Shenouda III of the Coptic 
Orthodox and Patriarch Sfeir of the Maronites. Furthermore, this will also identify the 
factors which influence the type of political role a Christian religious leader is likely to have 
in the Middle East region and the impact this will have on the community, state and wider 
society. 
1) The tradition and authority invested in the patriarch of a specific tradition 
Historically, in the Coptic Orthodox and Maronite traditions, the holder of the office of 
patriarch has been the leader of the community. The position has always had this temporal 
aspect. In the Coptic Orthodox Case, this was reinforced by the millet system where the 
religious leader retained civil authority over his community in exchange for ensuring the 
collection of taxes. For the Maronites, the patriarch was defined as a tribal chief who was the 
spiritual and civil head of the community. The patriarchs have also used their authority to 
consolidate power in the community and this provides a base for building political power. 
Once elected, the Coptic Orthodox Patriarch exercises almost complete control over the 
church. This has been especially true under Patriarch Shenouda whose policies of 
centralization have ensured that he enjoys a near monopoly over church and communal 
affairs. Any dissent has been treated with contempt and critics have often faced severe 
consequences. In comparison, Patriarch Sfeir does not enjoy that extent of power. Yet 
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although the Holy See takes precedence in canon law, it is clear that the Maronite patriarch is 
regarded, as not only the spiritual head of the church but also the leader of the community. 
Clearly, tradition combined with the authority associated with the office of patriarch has 
allowed the heads of the churches to be regarded as legitimate representatives of their 
communities. As the above criteria is not exclusive to the Coptic Orthodox or Maronite 
traditions, it would be expected that this would be relevant to all heads of the patriarchal 
churches found in the Middle East. However, it is imperative to note that the two churches 
used in this study can be described as amongst the most powerful communities in the region. 
It is clear that patriarchal authority alone is not necessarily indicative of an active political 
role. Even although the head of any patriarchal church is generally recognised as the spiritual 
leader of a community, it would be difficult for the patriarch of a church with relatively few 
adherents and members scattered throughout the region, to act effectively as the representative 
of the community. 
2) The identity of the community 
Both groups studied in this thesis have a distinct established identity. The main defining 
feature of each group is its religious affiliation. In essence, this is what makes them different 
from other groups. They clearly regard themselves as indigenous communities, to the extent 
that they claim exclusive connections to the ancient inhabitants of the land (Pharaohs and 
Phoenicians respectively). The church tends to be the only communal institution which 
includes the entire community and enjoys legitimacy partly because it is a living symbol of 
the survival of their distinct identity. Members of both the Coptic Orthodox and Maronite 
communities state that this strong communal identity is not incompatible with national 
identity. Yet, it is clear that the disappointments experienced during the ongoing struggle to 
achieve and retain full participation and equality, have served to emphasise communal 
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identity and led to a more exclusive approach. In turn, this has allowed the churches to 
maximise their position as the leading communal institution, which has led to the patriarchs 
exercising the temporal dimension of the office. However, this method of church civil 
representation has also led to the politicisation of communal identity and left the groups 
vulnerable to accusations of disloyalty to the nation state. When religious and communal 
identity overlap to the extent described in the Coptic Orthodox and Maronite traditions, it 
would be expected that the religious institution could fulfil its potential as a political actor. 
3) The existence ofa distinct homelandfor the community 
Leading from the second factor discussed above, the existence of a distinct homeland also 
aids the ability of the church to develop a political role. Both the Coptic Orthodox and 
Maronites identify a specific territory as their ancestral homeland. However, they do not 
claim exclusive ownership of this land, acknowledging that it is shared with other groups. In 
this way, a homeland can actually accentuate a sense of belonging to the larger nation state. 
The Coptic Orthodox can be regarded as the Egyptian national church. Due to the historic 
importance of the Maronites in the formation of Lebanon, the Maronite church performs a 
similar function, although other churches based in the country also have a substantial amount 
of adherents. 
In these two case studies, the homeland overlaps with national identity. The concentration 
of adherents in the same territory as the patriarchate ensures a direct link with the head of the 
church. This would appear to encourage acceptance of the patriarch undertaking political 
activities, especially the civil representation of the community to the state. In contrast, the 
patriarch of a community which does not have a recognised homeland and has adherents 
located throughout the region is likely to pursue a passive political strategy. A notable 
example of this type of community would be the Greek Orthodox. There may be tension 
249 
within the group due to different national identities. The needs of adherents are likely to vary 
within each state, hindering the ability of the patriarch to adopt one set of policies applicable 
to all. Furthermore, the patriarch requires the good will of several governments and is less 
likely to intervene in political affairs of one country. Hence, the existence of a recognised 
homeland which corresponds with the national identity of the majority of the adherents would 
appear to significantly increase the likelihood of the patriarch undertaking a pronounced 
political role. 
4) Yhe willingness of church leaders to utilise their own institutions to cater to the needs of 
their community 
The case studies of Patriarchs Shenouda and Sfeir have illustrated that this has been an 
influential trend during their reigns. The needs of the community can be divided into three 
areas - spiritual, social and political. Both communities have experienced a period of 
spiritual renewal. The Coptic renewal process commenced several decades before the 
patriarchy of Patriarch Shenouda. Yet as a leading activist in the movement, he can take 
credit (with other reformers) for its success. The Maronite spiritual renewal has occurred 
under Patriarch Sfeir as a response to the catastrophe of the civil war. There have been 
efforts to ensure that the clergy are responsive to their parishioners. Church activities have 
also been prioritised such as prayer groups and pilgrimages. One prominent feature of the 
Coptic Orthodox renewal process is the Sunday School Movement which illustrates the 
significance attached to youth ministry. For the Maronites, the Maronite Synod has proved 
to be the main venue for church reform. Both renewals have focused on the key elements 
and traditions of each faith. This emphasises the distinct heritage of the community and 
fulfils the need for belonging which many in both communities feel cannot be obtained within 
the national framework. Church teachings are also used to address the situation faced by the 
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groups and help provide both meaning and comfort to adherents. A consequence of the 
revitalisation of the spiritual life of the two churches is increased attention on the hierarchies 
especially the patriarchs. 
The second category covers the social needs of the community. As discussed, the two 
groups reside in a region with inherent socioeconomic problems. Although this has always 
been an element of Christian ministry, the recent decline in the standard of living has made 
this imperative during the reigns of the present two patriarchs. This has been more prominent 
and successful under Patriarch Shenouda. As patriarch, he was able to build on the work 
undertaken by the general bishopric of Public, Ecumenical and Social Services which had 
been established by his predecessor. The provision of social services is clearly a priority in 
the contemporary Coptic Orthodox Church. As well as the programmes sponsored by the 
bishopric, each individual bishop devotes significant resources to this work in his diocese. 
Through his centralization policies, Patriarch Shenouda has been able to retain control over 
this aspect of church ministry. This contrasts with the situation of Patriarch Sfeir. The 
monastic orders have long been responsible for providing social care in the Maronite church. 
While these activities have increased in the post-war period, some members of the community 
criticise this response, believing that the church should use more of its wealth (particularly 
through land ownership) to alleviate the living conditions of its members. Unlike the Coptic 
Orthodox, the Maronite church does not have a centralized body to co-ordinate these activities 
and although Patriarch Sfeir may desire to increase his authority on this issue, the independent 
nature of the Lebanese monastic orders limits his influence. By providing these services, 
both churches have taken on many of the social responsibilities normally associated with the 
state. Consequently, support for the churches and their respective patriarchs has grown in 
accordance with the fulfilment of these material needs. 
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The third area addressed by the patriarchs concentrates on the political concerns of the 
community. As illustrated, both leaders have been able to articulate the aspirations and 
grievances of their respective community. They have interpreted their position as head of the 
church to enable them to become the voice of their community. Aware of the authority 
vested in their office, they have attempted to use their prestige to influence government 
policies towards the Christian communities. The case studies demonstrate that the three 
aspects - spiritual, social and political - are intertwined and impact on each other. However, 
it would appear that if the first two are not attained, the patriarch is unlikely to be accepted by 
the community as its civil representative. Therefore in order to retain legitimacy as the 
political spokesman of his people, each patriarch must utilise the institutions of the church to 
satisfy all needs of the community. 
5) The historical background andpresent political situation of the country ofresidence 
In the two countries examined in this study, religion has retained its social significance. 
Throughout the ages, religious leaders have been able to influence the decisions of the ruling 
authorities. In the twentieth century, secular nationalist regimes were established which 
proclaimed that citizenship would be based on national identity rather than religious 
affiliation. However, in reality, the separation of religion from the state has only occurred to 
a certain extent. While religious leaders are not active members of the government in either 
country, their views are still respected by the regimes and considered relevant by many 
sectors of society. Concerning the two Christian communities, traditionally both the Coptic 
Orthodox and Maronite patriarch have always enjoyed an element of civil authority and long 
been recognised as the spokesman for their respective group. Without major changes 
affecting the social significance of religion in the region, it would be natural that the spiritual 
leader of the community also continues to act as the civil representative. 
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The present political environment in the country where the patriarch resides also influences 
the approach taken by a group regarding political representation. Few Egyptians or Lebanese 
(regardless of religious affiliation) consider that their opinions are taken into account by the 
ruling elite. For the Coptic Orthodox, the disillusionment with the nationalist state is 
magnified because they had hoped that nationalism would allow them to obtain full 
citizenship which had not been possible under previous regimes. Instead, the perception of 
discrimination has remained, especially regarding conversions, church building and the 
government response to communal unrest. Concerning the Maronites, in contrast to their 
unique position where they were able to enjoy substantial power, in the post-war period, some 
of their privileges have been eroded, particularly in terms of political representation. The rise 
of political Islam as the main alternative to the nationalist regimes has also increased 
Christian unease. Thus while in general, Copts and Maronites still identify themselves as 
Egyptians or Lebanese respectively, many believe that at present, they are unlikely to be 
granted their full entitlement of rights as citizens. 
This insecurity has been heightened by other factors. Firstly, both countries suffer from 
severe socioeconomic problems. Uneven modernization has contributed to the 
inequality of wealth, high unemployment and deteriorating living conditions for much of the 
population that are common in Egypt and Lebanon. Secondly, security issues remain 
important. In Egypt, sporadic violent outbursts often claim Coptic victims whilst in 
Lebanon, Christian areas and political figures have been the target of bomb attacks. Finally, 
the demographic context is also important. In numerical terms, both groups are minorities 
and in proportion to the size of the Muslim population, their percentage of the population is in 
decline. This adds to the perception of vulnerability. The groups have found refuge in their 
exclusive communal identity which by emphasising their religious affiliation (the main 
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characteristic which distinguished the group from others), has provided an opportunity for the 
religious leader to undertake a proactive political role. 
The absence of a challenge from the lay leadership of each community can also be 
connected to national political developments. In Egypt, the loss of political influence of the 
traditional Coptic elite can be traced to the nationalization policies pursued from the 1952 
revolution onwards. In Lebanon, the consequences of the civil war, especially Syrian 
influence in the Taif era, severely curtailed the ability of popular Maronite leaders to 
participate in the post-war state. In this crisis of state environment, there would appear to be 
little choice but to turn inward to the traditional system of political representation through the 
office of the spiritual head of the community. In contrast, the political role of the patriarch is 
likely to decrease if the crisis of state conditions ease. In an environment of relative stability, 
economic growth and political reforms, Christians would be more inclined to believe that they 
could fully participate within the existing framework. Thus, lay leadership of the community 
at the expense of religious actors, would be expected to become predominant. However, 
until these criteria are satisfied, it would appear evident that the patriarch is likely to remain 
the political spokesman of the community. 
6) Yhe personality and views of the patriarch 
The two subjects of this study - Patriarch Shenouda and Patriarch Sfeir - have had an 
astounding impact on their respective churches. Both are charismatic personalities who have 
managed to revitalise not only their church but also their community. Success on the 
political level depends on the strategies pursued by the spiritual chiefs. The two leaders 
believe that it is the duty of the patriarch to voice his opinion on national affairs. However, 
sensitivity to national events is important in order to avoid hostile reactions from other 
groups. The political statements of Patriarch Shenouda have a more communal perspective 
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than those issued by Patriarch Sfeir. Thus, the Coptic Orthodox Patriarch is perceived to 
represent solely Coptic interests whilst the Maronite Patriarch has been termed the patriarch 
of Lebanon as many of his views reflect concerns of ordinary Lebanese from all confessions. 
This perhaps reflects the different situation in the two countries. In Egypt, there is a clear 
majority and small Coptic minority. As the only Christian leader whose remarks are 
guaranteed to be publicised, Patriarch Shenouda tends to use his position to concentrate on 
issues affecting the Coptic community. This could lead to the perception that his comments 
are only relevant to this small sector of the Egyptian population. During tense periods, this 
aspect can raise doubt on the ability of the patriarch and the Coptic community to be loyal 
citizens. The Copts are singled out precisely because they are the only significant group that 
differs from the large majority. In contrast, Lebanon consists of various communities of 
which the Maronites are only one of the major confessional groups. Unlike the Copts, the 
Maronites are not facing an overwhelming majority with distinctly different policies. Several 
groups share some of the Maronite concerns which allows some inter-communal co-operation 
and lessens the impression that the Maronite patriarch caters solely for the needs of his 
community. This also leads to a more positive response from other political actors than is 
usually experienced by the Coptic patriarch. 
The views of both patriarchs mostly correspond to the concerns cited by their communities. 
Although the details vary, the topics covered are similar - political participation, 
discrimination, security and the economy. In general, Patriarch Sfeir is more outspoken and 
issues precise, detailed comments on key issues. He is also consistent in his views although 
certain issues are prioritised depending on the political situation at the time. For example, 
calls to end the Syrian presence increased when the patriarch judged that attitudes had 
changed in 2000 and again from late 2004 onwards when Western powers renewed their 
interest in supporting the restoration of Lebanese independence. In contrast, Patriarch 
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Shenouda does not address all the grievances listed by the community. In particular, he 
rarely mentions one of the main obstacles in harmonious communal relations - church 
building. On this and similar contentious issues e. g. conversions and communal violence, he 
only becomes involved in response to a specific incident. This tends to lack the consistency 
achieved by the Maronite patriarch. Furthermore, these views are usually stated either in the 
midst of an incident or in the immediate aftermath and contain emotional language which may 
not help ease the situation. Consequently, it is apparent that Patriarch Sfeir has been more 
successful than Patriarch Shenouda in balancing his position as defender of his community 
with sensitivity to the views of other groups. However, it must be acknowledged that in this 
respect, Patriarch Shenouda as the leader of the only main minority group, operates in a more 
difficult environment than his Maronite counterpart. 
The two case studies have demonstrated that the personality and views of the patriarch is 
extremely important in determining not only the type of political role but also the impact this 
will have on wider society. Any religious leader who becomes involved in political affairs 
has to walk a tightrope in order to satisfy the demands of an aggrieved community without 
causing strife between the church/community and the government and/or society. Yet, it is 
imperative to achieve and maintain this balancing act, otherwise, communal support for the 
position of the patriarch as its civil representative will ebb while simultaneously, the 
credibility accorded to the patriarch by the government will recede. On the one hand, if a 
patriarch is too forceful in defending the rights of the community, this is likely to have an 
adverse effect as the rest of society including the authorities, may react with hostility. The 
obvious example of this scenario is the consequences of Patriarch Shenouda's assertive 
strategy during the Sadat era. On the other hand, if a patriarch is too timid, this may lead to a 
revolt within the community and allow other actors to challenge the political role of the 
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patriarch as occurred under the leadership of Maronite Patriarch Khreish during the civil war 
years. 
The views articulated by the patriarch are also important. In order to retain support, he 
must be seen to reflect the concerns of the entire community. As the case studies have 
illustrated, religious leaders are also prone to modifying their political strategies in accordance 
with developments both in the country and the wider region. The present strategies adopted 
by Patriarchs Shenouda and Sfeir highlight the difficulties encountered by Christian spiritual 
leaders in their quest to balance the conflicting demands of the different actors, most 
importantly the community and the government. Yet, they also demonstrate that this task is 
not impossible. 
7) The challenges to patriarchal authority 
While this study has shown that the Coptic Orthodox and Maronite patriarchs enjoy a 
temporal dimension to their office, it is clear that they face several challenges to this position. 
From the community, this tends to be over the strategies followed by their leader. Neither 
Patriarch Shenouda nor Patriarch Sfeir encounter much resistance from the clergy. In the 
Coptic case, critics certainly exist but by a combination of patronage and sanctions, these 
voices have mostly been rendered ineffective. The calm and measured approach adopted by 
Patriarch Sfeir has won support from the Synod regardless of the political views held by 
individual bishops. The main rivals to the political role of the Maronite patriarch are the 
secular political elite. As they also wish to be the civil representatives of the community, 
they clearly challenge the present position of Patriarch Sfeir. The events which occurred in 
Lebanon during 2005 have left Maronite politicians in their strongest position since the end of 
the civil war. Currently, they are still divided and hindered by the ongoing political and 
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security instability but are the group most likely to gain from the easing of the crisis of state 
conditions. 
In contrast, Coptic secular leadership remains weak, and is mostly treated with contempt by 
the community. The main challenge to the political authority of Patriarch Shenouda is likely 
to come from the so-called "Coptic street". The main support base of the patriarch comes 
from poor and middle class Copts. Just as they helped the patriarch become their legitimate 
political representative, they could also engineer his downfall. In recent years, elements of 
the community have become radicalised and are increasingly willing to defend their church 
and faith from insults or threats. At present, the patriarch has accommodated these activities. 
It is unclear the extent of control that Patriarch Shenouda has over these groups, particularly if 
he withdrew his support from them. However, any return to the assertive policies of the 
Sadat era could have severe repercussions for both the patriarch and the community. 
Therefore, other members would be fearful of the consequences of such activities. While this 
must be regarded as a potential challenge for the future, increased activism could split the 
community and damage the claim of the patriarch to represent the entire community. At 
present, this type of challenge does not appear to be relevant to the Maronite community. 
Thus, with few credible challengers to their position as communal leader, both patriarchs are 
likely to continue this role. 
The state authorities also have the resources to curb the political role of the patriarch. In 
Egypt, the government has lent legitimacy to the position of Patriarch Shenouda as the official 
spokesman for the Copts by choosing to address communal issues through the millet system. 
It would be expected that this will continue only as long as it is serving state interests. In 
Lebanon, governments can encourage campaigns against the patriarch. This will lead to two 
outcomes - either the strengthening or shattering of communal solidarity. Both patriarchs do 
co-operate to a certain extent with the ruling regimes. This can curb excesses from the 
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community but possibly at the expense of voicing legitimate grievances. The response of 
Muslim communities to the involvement of the patriarch in political affairs can also challenge 
patriarchal authority. On the whole, there is acquiescence to the idea of a religious leader 
undertaking civil representation but on the understanding that the patriarch does not actually 
participate in the decision making process. However, in some cases, the political activities of 
the patriarch can be perceived as acting above his dhimmi status, leading to tense Muslim- 
Christian relations. This is more likely in Egypt than in Lebanon due to the demographic 
situation. Consequently, the patriarchs clearly occupy an influential position but their ability 
to continue to do so depends on events outside their control. In this sense, they are 
vulnerable to challenges both from within the community and also from wider society. 
The extent of challenges to patriarchal authority have an important impact on the political 
role of the patriarch. The two examples used in this study can be described as weak 
communities with a leadership vacuum which has been filled by the religious hierarchy. The 
patriarch of a community which enjoyed various communal institutions and an active and 
respected elite, is unlikely to exercise significant political influence. Regardless of the 
internal dynamics of the community, the policies followed by both the government and wider 
society are also important. In order to articulate the concerns of the community, the patriarch 
must operate in an environment which allows relative freedom, otherwise his activities and 
hence, political significance will be greatly curtailed. Yet, an open environment could also 
have an adverse effect on the political influence of the patriarch as it is likely to encourage 
rival actors within the community to participate in national affairs. In contrast, if the view of 
the majority society is primarily based on the dhimmi system, this could lead to restrictions. 
In order for the patriarch to successfully perform this function, he must not only enjoy the 
support of the majority of the community but also convince the authorities that it is worth 
accommodating his demands. 
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8) The existence and activities ofa diaspora 
Both communities examined in this thesis have a vibrant and growing diaspora. Although 
their predecessors helped establish churches for the migrants, expansion abroad has multiplied 
during the patriarchies of the present heads of the churches. Both have instigated major 
initiatives to maintain ties with the migrants and the next generations. The increase in 
dioceses abroad also serves to ensure that these churches remain under the control of the 
patriarchate. This applies even to the Maronite dioceses although they are legally under the 
direct authority of the Vatican. There has been a distinct trend to emphasise the unity of the 
church by focusing on the role of the patriarch as the spiritual head of all adherents regardless 
of their geographical location. The expansion abroad has also revitalised the churches due to 
financial support and the sense of belonging to a global community. There has been an 
ambiguous response to the activities of emigre lobby groups. These movements have 
become another actor that must be balanced by the patriarchs. On the one hand, they 
accentuate differences in the homeland and often force the patriarchs to reiterate the loyalty of 
the community to the state. However, on the other hand, they can act as a restraint on the 
home government who wish to avoid poor publicity abroad especially in the United States. 
The existence of groups outside the traditional homeland also creates other potential rivals to 
the authority of the patriarch. In the Coptic case, Patriarch Shenouda has had to react to the 
persecution campaigns run by some groups but at present, it is apparent that he still exercises 
substantial control over the entire Coptic community. Maronite 6migr6 groups also posed a 
challenge to Patriarch Sfeir but with the changes which have occurred in 2005, the most 
potent of these rivals have returned to Lebanon and can now be classified as internal 
challengers. 
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Following the importance of the diaspora to the two communities discussed in this study, it 
is clear that this can now be added as a factor in determining the extent of the political role of 
the patriarch. If a Middle Eastern Christian community does not have an organised diaspora, 
it risks losing valuable resources from the region without gaining any benefits abroad as 
migrants will scatter, attend other churches and lose links with the homeland and the church. 
In order to create this diaspora, it is vital to have a strong church in the homeland which is 
willing to use its resources to cater for migrants. In particular, this must include sending 
dynamic priests and maintaining direct links with the patriarchate. If 6migr6 groups are well- 
organised and refrain from radical policies, they have the potential not only to supersede the 
leadership role of the church in the new countries but also to influence policies in the 
homeland. However, the Coptic Orthodox and Maronite cases would suggest that such 
groups will be divided and struggle to attract widespread support from the community, thus 
allowing the church to retain its authority by focusing on the position of the patriarch as the 
father of the entire community. 
The variables discussed above have been used to examine the different factors which enable 
a religious leader to exercise both spiritual and civil authority over their community. This 
study would suggest that it is difficult for a patriarch to enjoy a political role if these criteria 
are not satisfied. Furthermore, the eight variables are not of equal weight. The tradition and 
authority invested in the patriarch, the identity of the community, the existence of a homeland 
and the formation of a diaspora all assist religious institutions in their quest to undertake 
political representation of the community. These factors highlight that the main 
distinguishing feature of the group is their affiliation to a specific religion. In maintaining 
the cohesiveness of the community, it is natural that the leader of the institution that provides 
this identity would be given the opportunity to act as both the spiritual and civil leader of the 
261 
group. It is clear that these four variables help determine the type of political role exercised 
by the patriarch. If they are not satisfied, it certainly hinders the ability of the patriarch to 
exercise temporal authority. However, even if these conditions were fulfilled in a manner 
that would suggest an active political role, this would not necessarily be the case unless the 
other conditions were also met. 
Firstly, it has been demonstrated that each individual patriarch determines to a large extent 
the political role that he will play. He decides if the church institutions will be used to fulfil 
the needs of the community. It is his opinion of the duties expected of the head of the church 
which are taken into account. Furthermore, it is his political views and understanding of the 
environment in which the community live, which will be made public. Thus, even if the 
community have a distinct identity and homeland, without the willingness of the patriarch to 
undertake a political role, this is unlikely to occur. Similarly, if the views of the patriarch are 
not shared by his community, this also prevents him from exercising temporal authority over 
the group. 
Secondly, this study has shown that the political situation of the country where the patriarch 
resides, is crucial in determining whether a patriarch will have an active or passive political 
role. In fact, the involvement of the patriarch in political matters often tends to be a reaction 
to developments in the particular country. Relations between the different communities and 
government policies towards the group, influence both the view and response of the patriarch. 
If the group is content with its treatment by both the government and society, the need for the 
patriarch to intervene in political affairs is less likely. Yet, in other circumstances where the 
community perceives itself to be threatened, this may also ensure that the patriarch does not 
adopt an active political role because the risk to the patriarch as an individual and the 
community as a whole is considered to be too great. This would be true regardless of how 
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many of the other conditions were satisfied which would be expected to lead to a strong 
political role. 
In addition, the challenges to patriarchal authority also affect the type of political role 
enjoyed by the patriarch. As has been illustrated, these tend to be closely linked to the 
internal situation of the country. The position of the secular elite of the community in both 
case studies has been clearly connected to national events, including ongoing problems 
concerning political participation. Similarly, government policies towards the Christian 
communities are often shaped by wider political and economic issues as well as awareness of 
the attitudes of the Muslim majority in the country regarding communal relations. Therefore, 
the other variables highlight the circumstances that are more likely to result in an active 
political role by a religious leader. However, it is the present political situation that 
determines the environment that the patriarch operates in and limits the options available to 
him. Consequently, the importance of the political and cultural context must be highlighted 
in relation to the theoretical approaches concerning the relationship between religion and 
politics. 
Theojy One - The Secularization Thesis 
Using the secularization thesis, it might be expected that the political role of the patriarch 
would decline with a corresponding increase in the benefits of the modernization process. 
these benefits have not been widely experienced, the secularising impact is likely to be 
minimal, thus allowing the patriarch to retain his historical role as the spiritual and civil 
representative of the community. 
if 
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The secularization thesis suggests that one of the consequences of modernization is the 
decline of the social significance of religion on society. It has been argued that the Middle 
East, similar to many other areas in the developing world, has experienced an uneven, rapid 
and selective modernization process. Few members of society in the Middle East region 
have experienced the full benefits of modernization. As a consequence of the different 
process from that experienced in the West, one would not expect secularization to be 
widespread in this region. Instead, the social significance of religion is likely to remain 
strong. As a result of the historical experience of Christians in the Middle East (firstly 
categorised as dhimmi and then later under the millet system), patriarchal authority over the 
community as spiritual leader and civil representative has been widely accepted by each 
group. Thus, the patriarch would be expected to continue his traditional political role. In the 
late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there have been several attempts by Christians to 
develop other means of representation which do not rely on the church hierarchy. In Egypt, 
this includes the al-majlis al-milli and the WafJ whilst in Lebanon, the main method was the 
creation of the post of presidency in the mandate and independence era. Yet even when these 
alternatives were popular within the community, the patriarchs of both churches continued to 
enjoy influence as the spiritual leader of each community and still issued statements on 
national issues. Consequently, when the modernization process faltered, they were in a 
strong position to reclaim their political role. 
When the level of secularization in a society is low, a religious leader is more likely to be 
able to exercise temporal authority. This likelihood would be increased if other conditions 
were also met e. g. strong communal identity, distinct homeland and the use of church 
institutions to aid the community. In contrast, if all aspects of the modernization process 
were experienced to the extent that Egypt and Lebanon could be categorised as post-industrial 
societies, the level of secularization would be expected to be high. In this situation, the 
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patriarch would be less able to act as the civil representative of the community. Although the 
church hierarchies would continue to issue statements on national affairs, these would 
possibly not enjoy the same significance. Even if several of the criteria discussed above were 
satisfied and one would expect the patriarch to have an active political role, in a highly 
secularized society, these would not necessarily be enough to retain temporal authority. In 
short, the situation could resemble the declining influence on political affairs of Christian 
spiritual leaders in the West. Thus, using this theoretical framework, the developments 
within society and challenges to patriarchal authority would be the main determining factors 
regarding the political role of the patriarch. However, the strong acceptance of the dual 
spiritual and civil role of the patriarch in these two case studies suggests that even if 
widespread modernization were to occur in the region and lead to the secularization of 
society, the patriarchs would still potentially have the resources to retain this position. In 
order to explain accurately the political role of Christianity in this region at present, the 
secularization thesis would need to be revised to take into account both the historical 
background and the contemporary political context. 
Theojy Two - The "Crisis of State" Thesis 
According to the crisis ofstate approach, in this context ofa 'failed environment", it would 
be expected that Christian institutions wouldfill the vacuum left by the state by addressing 
spiritual andpractical concerns through theirpositions as protectors of Christian identity 
and providers ofservices. Yhe easing of the multiple political, socioeconomic and security 
crises affecting the region would be likely to create an environment where secular lay 
leadership could re-emerge at the expense of thepatriarch. 
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This study has proposed that the crisis of state environment, which can be found throughout 
the Middle East region, offers a useful insight into the present political role of the patriarch. 
This approach can be described as a revised secularization theory. Norris and Inglehart stress 
that states in the developing world have struggled to provide human security (absence of 
immediate risk to personal safety). While some aspects of modernization have occurred in 
the region, the inability of the regimes to provide for the material needs of the population, has 
allowed religion to retain its social significance. As has been demonstrated, both Egypt and 
Lebanon fulfil crisis of state conditions. The failure to deliver development and democracy 
has affected all the citizens of these countries. However, this has added resonance for the 
Christian communities who had relied on the nationalist movements to guarantee their full 
participation in society. Instead, political participation is minimal and discrimination 
common. Their perception of vulnerability is also heightened by sporadic attacks, especially 
in Egypt. Desperately requiring strong leadership, both communities have been plagued with 
weak and divided laity representatives who often lack legitimacy within the community. 
Consequently, the church hierarchy has sought to fill this vacuum. They have used their 
position as the leading communal institution to offer a refuge from the uncertainty of daily 
life. In doing so, they have preserved the group identity, provided for the material needs of 
the community and articulated their political concerns. When the level of state crisis is high, 
the political situation of the country where the patriarch resides, becomes the most important 
variable. The other factors, especially communal identity and the personality and views of 
the patriarch help determine what type of political role the patriarch will undertake within this 
context. Where these are strong, the patriarch is likely to enjoy an active role as communal 
representative. In this situation, the church offers stability and security in sharp contrast to 
the state. Thus, members of the group are willing to delegate political representation to the 
church leaders who have attempted to provide their spiritual and material needs. 
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If the level of state crisis were to decline, it would be expected that the diminished threats 
would lead to a situation where religious institutions were less likely to have a major role in 
society. According to Norris and Inglehart, the lack of immediate danger would mean that 
individuals would be more inclined to rely on their own resources in dealing with particular 
situations rather than depending on religious institutions. However, it is possible that church 
leaders would try to resist these changes in order to preserve their power over the community. 
The Coptic Orthodox Church is more likely to be successful at this. The millet system 
appears to be accepted by many Egyptians (both Muslim and Christian) as the natural method 
to manage communal relations. Importantly, this is especially true of the ruling regime. 
Furthermore, there are few serious challengers to patriarchal authority. In contrast, the 
Maronite Church has had more experience of operating in an environment characterised by 
strong secular leadership. Church leaders are aware that the community perceives its present 
political role as a temporary situation due to the challenges faced by Lebanon since the civil 
war. Thus, there is likely to be less resistance from the institution itself to the loss of its role 
as the political representative of the Maronites. This can also be attributed to the recognition 
of the support which could be obtained by the populist Maronite political leaders who have re- 
entered the Lebanese political system as a consequence of the changes which occurred in 
2005. 
However, even if these crisis conditions eased, both churches are likely to continue their 
efforts to represent the community. The difference would be that no longer would they enjoy 
the extent of influence as exercised at present. While patriarchal authority, communal 
identity and the use of institutions to assist the community, would help them remain an 
important voice in the community, these factors alone would not guarantee that the religious 
leader would enjoy an active political role. The crisis of state thesis provides a useful 
explanation of the political activities of the patriarch in the Middle East. It shows that while 
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the basic premise of the secularization thesis (the modernization process leads to the decline 
of the social significance of religion) may still be relevant to this region, other factors have to 
be taken into account to explain why religion still continues to enjoy an important role in 
society and consequently, in political affairs. 
Theory Three - The Globalization Thesis 
Using the above approach, it would be expected that the backlash to the globalization process 
would allow the church to lead the response of the community as it is thefocalpoint of 
communal identity. The tools of the communications revolution would also serve to revitalise 
the church, allowing the patriarch to retain control of the entire community regardless of 
geographical location. Accordingly, the identification of the church with the indigenous 
culture of the community would enable the patriarch to sustain a durable temporal dimension 
to his position. 
The third approach examined proposed that the backlash to the effects of the globalization 
process in the developing world, has allowed the church to lead this response as it is the focal 
point for the community. The two Christian communities tend to identify economic 
problems primarily with the failings of the ruling regimes rather than the globalization 
process. However, this would be true of many citizens of the Middle East regardless of their 
religious affiliation. The desire for full participation and equal status is important and may 
explain why it is the main communal institution - the church - which has been at the forefront 
of this campaign. It would appear that domestic reasons are a more accurate cause for the 
church being involved in political matters rather than as a backlash to globalization. 
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It is true that the tools of the technology revolution have helped revitalise both churches. In 
the homeland, they have helped link remote areas to the patriarchate and served to encourage 
the adherence of the younger generations. The internet and global travel have proved vital in 
combating the challenge of emigration. Close ties have been maintained with the 
congregations abroad through sending clergy to the new churches, patriarchal visits to these 
churches and return trips to Egypt by immigrants. Thus, the churches have tackled the 
challenge of emigration and ensured that this global expansion has become a positive 
development for each group. This aspect of globalization has allowed the churches to 
accentuate their significance to the community, thus acting as a foundation for any future 
political role. Clearly, the careful management of the expansion of the church (as has 
occurred in both the case studies) can help to raise the profile of the patriarch as the head of 
all adherents of the community and consequently, lend credibility to his political activities. 
The globalization approach to religion and politics suggests that the church will become 
active in the political arena as the defender of the particularist culture because it is identified 
with the indigenous culture of the community. Clearly, an impact of globalization has been 
to increase the importance of communal identity, the identification of a homeland and the 
existence of a diaspora. Yet, this has led to a different reaction from Christians than that of 
Muslims in the region. It is evident that both churches can be categorised as the main 
defender of their specific identity. However, this is not the indigenous culture of the society 
in which they reside. This has several important repercussions. Firstly, they do not see the 
"West" as an alien culture to the same extent as Islamic institutions. While the Islamic 
civilization has shaped their historical experiences, throughout the ages, their religious 
identity tends to have allowed Middle East Christians to act as a bridge between the two 
worlds. Secondly, they do not perceive themselves as under attack from Western culture. 
Although the Oriental and Orthodox churches are certainly wary of Western influence, this 
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tends to be directed towards the motives of Western churches for their involvement in the 
region than an indication of wider anti-Western sentiment. Christians in the Middle East are 
more likely to agree that the main threat to their particular identity comes from the dominant 
religion and culture of the region - Islam. Thus, while cultural identity is important, the 
political role of the patriarch in the Middle East is not adequately explained by the 
globalization hypothesis. This approach does not take into account the historical and 
political context of each country, the personal attributes of the patriarch nor the challenges to 
patriarchal authority - variables which have been identified in this study as crucial in 
understanding the role of the patriarch. 
Theojy Four - The Rational Choice Thesis 
Firstly, religious institutions offer rewards and compensators which in this context, could 
strengthen the identity and cohesiveness ofthe community. This could lead to their 
willingness to delegate political representation to thepatriarch. 
Secondly, the existence ofa monopoly would suggest that the religious institution benefited 
from a privileged relation with the state. While it would be expected that this situation would 
lead to a decline in members, it would be counterbalanced by the potentialfor the patriarch 
to use this relationship to secure his position as civil head of the community. 
Yhirdly, it would be expected that the attitudes of the ruling authorities and society influence 
the political strategy pursued by the religious leader, resulting in a more assertive approach 
when the community is perceived as endangered, 
The first proposition suggests that strong religious adherence and the willingness to delegate 
political authority to church leaders can be explained by the existence of rewards and 
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compensators. The rewards of the afterlife perform the function ofjustifying the hardships 
associated with being members of a faith community in an environment dominated by another 
religion. Several compensators can be identified - sense of belonging (which has not been 
obtained within the national framework), distinct identity, material services and leisure 
networks. By taking the lead role in the community, the church reinforces comniunal identity 
(potentially at the expense of national identity). By successfully using church resources to 
provide the spiritual and social needs of its members, the religious leader can place himself in 
a position to develop a political dimension with the support of the community. In order to 
realise this potential, the personality and views of the patriarch are crucial in determining the 
type of political role that will be undertaken. While religious vitality may have been 
intensified by other "non-religious" factors in the two case studies, one cannot ascribe the 
strong adherence in the region solely to these. Culture remains extremely important. In the 
Middle East, religion still retains strong social significance. Thus, deeply-held spiritual 
beliefs are still important in understanding the role that religious institutions have in society. 
The second hypothesis proposed by rational choice theorists suggests that when a religious 
institution operates as a monopoly, it enjoys privileged relations with the state but at the 
expense of a declining membership. Both the Coptic Orthodox and Maronite churches can 
be defined as monopolies within their communities. However, the cultural environment is 
important as both are located in a Muslim dominant area where cultural factors are extremely 
significant in choosing religious affiliation. The Coptic Orthodox Church is by far the largest 
Christian denomination in Egypt. The church hierarchy is recogniscd by the government as 
the leading Coptic institution and in particular, the patriarch is acknowledged as the head of 
the community. In Lebanon, the Maronite church is accepted as the main denomination for 
the community. In the confessional system, the Maronite patriarch is recogniscd as the 
spiritual head of the community in the same manner as the other leaders of the different 
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groups. However, as a consequence of the historical connections between the Maronites and 
the Lebanese state as well as the size of the community, the patriarch certainly enjoys a 
privileged position in Lebanon. 
In both cases, the rational choice approach would suggest that these churches have 
experienced a decline in membership. Yet, they have enjoyed significant and ongoing 
periods of religious renewal. These cases illustrate that connections to the ruling regime are 
likely to be detrimental to a religious institution only if there is a shared history between the 
two. Even in Lebanon, the church leaders have never experienced temporal authority to the 
extent that was witnessed in Europe. Thus, recognition from the respective governments has 
not harmed the popularity of either church. Furthermore, if religion remains important in the 
life of a community, the leader of a religious institution which enjoys a monopoly can in fact 
find itself in a position where it is possible to undertake an active political role, especially if 
there are few challenges to this authority. 
In examining the third strand, it is clear that the strategies pursued by the patriarchs do alter 
depending on the particular national/regional situation. For example, the patriarchs examined 
in the case studies had different reasons for adopting a more assertive stance. Patriarch 
Shenouda has undertaken this change when there is a perception of increased threats to the 
wellbeing of the community. However, Patriarch Sfeir adopted similar strategies in 2000 
primarily because it was less likely that the community would be targeted (physically at least) 
due to its political views. Certainly, both patriarchs have taken into account the situation in 
the country when determining their response to specific issues. They are aware of the 
attitudes of the ruling authorities. The regimes not only have the power to affect the daily 
conditions of the community but their policies can also impact on the position of the 
individual patriarch. Similarly, the state of communal relations is also closely watched as the 
patriarchs are aware that the Christian communities are an easy target for a discontented 
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majority. Thus, once more, the political situation of the country and the views of the 
patriarch are crucial factors in determining the type of political activities undertaken by the 
patriarch. 
The rational choice model offers a different approach to the study of the relationship 
between religion and politics. In one sense, it can help explain the reasons why people turn 
to religious institutions and in the Middle East context, why this may lead to the religious 
leaders becoming involved in political affairs. However, it is evident that the importance of 
culture cannot be overstated. In this study, the historical background and political situation 
of the relevant country, the personality and views of the patriarch and the challenges to 
patriarchal authority have been identified as crucial in determining the political role of the 
patriarch. Yet, on the whole, these are not discussed in the rational choice model, especially 
concerning the first two strands. Furthermore, certain parts of the model i. e. the link between 
a competitive pluralist market and religious vitality are not relevant to the Christian churches 
examined. Consequently, the rational choice approach used on its own, does not accurately 
explain the continual political role of the patriarch. 
Conclusion and Suizizestions for Future Study 
This study has examined the political role of the present patriarchs of the Coptic Orthodox 
and Maronite churches. Both gained control of relatively weak churches (in political terms) 
and through a combination of policies which focused on spiritual, social and political 
dimensions, have presided over revitalised institutions and have consolidated their position as 
the spokesman for their community. It is important to note that this is not a new policy 
which they developed once in office. Their careers as bishops give a clear indication of these 
strategies. Traditionally, the Coptic Orthodox Patriarch is not regarded as a political actor. 
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Yet, there is a general consensus that one of the duties of the patriarch is to act as the civil 
representative of the community. The continued use of the millet system has meant that 
Egyptians generally regard such activities as acceptable. Due to the centralization measures 
adopted by Patriarch Shenouda, the Coptic Orthodox Patriarch now enjoys almost complete 
control of the community. At present, there are few influential rivals to his role as leader of 
the Coptic community. In contrast, the office of the Maronite patriarch has historically had a 
temporal dimension and is generally accepted by the community. Yet at the same time, there 
has always been fierce competition with the secular elite over the leadership of the 
community. The collapse of this leadership as a consequence of the civil war allowed 
Patriarch Sfeir alone to exercise his political authority. Yet, due to the history of the office, 
the Maronite patriarch is unlikely to enjoy full control of the community to the extent attained 
by Patriarch Shenouda. Consequently, while on paper, the Maronite patriarch appears to 
enjoy a more political dimension, in practice, this has actually been fulfilled by the Coptic 
Orthodox Patriarch Shenouda who has successfully translated his spiritual control over the 
church into recognition of his role as the undisputed political leader of the community. 
This thesis has argued that the crisis of state conditions found in Egypt and Lebanon allow 
the two patriarchs to utilise their institution to provide all the needs of their community - 
spiritual, social and political. The findings of this study must now be applied to patriarchs of 
other Christian communities in the Middle East. Using the crisis of state approach and the 
intervening variables as a guideline, it would be expected that the present spiritual heads of 
churches whose leaders have historically enjoyed a temporal dimension, would be more 
inclined to act as a civil representative of the community. An interesting case study would be 
an examination of the Chaldean Patriarch, especially in the context of the turbulent 
environment of post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. Another patriarch who is usually described as 
politically active is the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem. Previously, holders of this office did not 
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exercise a strong political role due to various factors including the small number of adherents 
and the concentration of several Christian religious leaders in Jerusalem. With the patriarchy 
of Michel Sabbah, the first Palestinian to take this position, the Latin Patriarchate has 
assumed a more powerful role amongst the Palestinian Christian communities. Again, the 
variables should help indicate the reasons for the passive response of patriarchs of other 
communities, particularly those of the Greek Orthodox tradition. Another avenue to explore 
would be the significance of the Islamic environment on both the political activities of the 
patriarchs and the response to this role. This could be achieved by examining the role of the 
patriarchs of Eastern Christian communities in the former Soviet Union states. 
In examining the relationship between religion and politics, this study aimed to add a new 
subtopic to this debate. The political role of Christianity in the Western world and that of 
Islam in the Muslim world has been widely researched. Yet few scholars have explored the 
political role of one religion in a region dominated by another one. This study has 
demonstrated that the political involvement of Christian communities in the Middle East is 
much wider than the traditional interest in the Holy Places in Jerusalem. The patriarch - the 
spiritual leader of the community - has become a political actor in his own right. The case 
studies have demonstrated that in certain situations in the developing world, religious leaders 
have been able to retain a temporal dimension to their office. The crisis of state conditions 
common to many poorer countries have left a leadership vacuum for people seeking 
fulfilment of both material and emotional needs, in particular, a sense of belonging. In the 
examples studied in this thesis, these opportunities have been grasped by the church 
leadership, an indication that this could happen elsewhere. Each church found itself in a 
strong position because of the extent of patriarchal authority traditionally ascribed to the 
religious head of the community. Similar to the lay elite of the past, the patriarchs have 
struggled to achieve tangible results in their efforts to improve the conditions faced by the 
275 
community. Yet, by interpreting their role as being the communal spokesman rather than 
political activist, they have been able to retain communal support for their position. At 
present, the political situation in the region remains in flux. Certainly in Lebanon, major 
changes have occurred. Yet, it is clear, as in Egypt, that the political role of the patriarch 
remains relevant both to the respective communities and also to wider society. 
This study has also demonstrated that religious identity has retained social significance in 
the Middle East. For Christians, this has presented a dilemma. By accentuating their 
communal identity, the church has provided a refuge from a difficult environment where the 
majority of the population belong to another religion. Yet at the same time, this strategy 
emphasises the differences between the groups and leaves the Christian communities more 
vulnerable to accusations and attacks. Both churches have attempted to perform a balancing 
act to prove that Christians can be proud of their faith without being disloyal to the state. The 
case studies have demonstrated that they do not desire to be treated as a minority with special 
rights but instead as citizens who can freely participate in national affairs. 
It is also vital to study the Christian communities in the Middle East in order to gain 
awareness of the root causes of the communal unrest which sporadically occurs in the region. 
The extent of harmonious relations between the communities greatly affects the stability and 
security of both Egypt and Lebanon. Furthermore, international interest in the region means 
that these events can have wider repercussions. The situation continues to be unstable, with 
each new incident (especially in Egypt) challenging the ability of political actors to contain 
communal unrest. At present, the Christian communities have chosen to delegate civil 
authority to the patriarch. Consequently, his views and response to Christian-Muslim 
relations are extremely significant in determining church-state relations. The patriarch and 
his community are also affected by wider developments in the Middle East. For example, the 
rise of political Islam and anti-Western sentiment could have an adverse impact on the 
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Christian communities in the region. In conclusion, this study has sought to demonstrate the 
strategies used by two religious communities in their quest to gain credible political 
representation in a difficult environment characterised by crisis of state conditions and 
dominated by another religion. It is hoped that this thesis has fulfilled its dual aims - to 
provide a detailed examination of the role of Christian communities in the Middle East and to 
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Maronite Eparchy of St. Maron. Brookl 
www. stmaron. org 
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www. maronitesyLiod. org 
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Opus Libani 
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www. opuslibani. org. lb 
Oriental Orthodox News Service 
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US Col2ts Association 
www. coT)ts. net 
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interviews and informal conversations. Interviews were conducted in both formal and 
informal environments. 
On the Coptic Orthodox Church 
Clergy and members of the Coptic Orthodox Church in the United Kingdom, July 2003 - 
October 2005 
Monks and priests of the Coptic Orthodox Church, Egypt, October-November 2003 
Bishop Mouneer Anis, Bishop in Egypt, Episcopal Church, Cairo, October 2003 
Bishop Yohanna Qolta, Coptic Catholic Church, Cairo, November 2003 
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Cleric, Coptic Evangelical Organisation for Social Services, Cairo, October 2003 
Father Christiaan van Nispen tot Sevenaer, Jesuit Priest, Cairo, November 2003 
Dr. Cornelis Hulsman, Editor Arab-West Rgo , Cairo, October 2003 
Academic Expert on the Coptic Orthodox Church, London, May 2004 
Representatives of the Middle East Council of Churches, Cairo, October-November 2003 
Dr. Ali el-Samman, Advisor to the Grand Imam and Vice President of the Permanent 
Committee of al-Azhar for Dialogue with the Monotheistic Religions, Cairo, November 2003 
Members of the Coptic Orthodox Church covering a wide range of occupations, age groups, 
social class and place of residence, Egypt, October-November 2003 
On the Maronite Church 
His Beatitude, Patriarch Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir, Patriarch of Antioch and All The East of the 
Maronites, Bkerke, April 2004 
Bishop Youssef Bchare, Head of the Maronite Qomet Shehwan Monastery, Beirut, April 
2004 
Priests and nuns of the Maronite Church, Lebanon, March-April 2004 
Bishop George Khodr, Orthodox Bishop of Mount Lebanon, Lebanon, April 2004 
Jesuit Priest, Beirut, March 2004 
Dory Chamoun, Leader, National Liberal Party, Beirut, April 2004 
George Hawi, former Leader, Communist Party, Beirut, April 2004 
Representative of the Maronite League, Beirut, April 2004 
Academics from several Lebanese institutions including The American University in Beirut, 
Notre Dame University, University of St. Joseph, Near East School of Theology, Hagazian 
University, Lebanon, March-April 2004 
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Dr. Nadirn Shehadi, Former Director of the Centre for Lebanese Studies at Oxford, London, 
May 2004 
Gibran Tueni, Publisher, annahar, Beirut, April 2004 
Economist, Research Department of a major Lebanese bank, Beirut, April 2004 
Human Rights activists, Beirut, March-April 2004 
Figures involved in interfaith dialogue including members of the Islamic-Christian Dialogue 
Committee, Beirut, March-April 2004 
Representatives of the Middle East Council of Churches, Beirut, March-April 2004 
Members of the Maronite Church covering a wide range of occupations, age groups, place of 
residence and social class, Lebanon, March-April 2004 
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Appendix I The Effect of the Variables on the Case Studies 
Variable Coptic Orthodox Patriarch Maronite Patriarch 
Tradition and authority 
invested in the patriarch of a 
specific tradition. 
Identity of the community 
Existence of a distinct 
homeland for the community 
Willingness of church leaders 
to utilise their own 
institutions to cater to the 
needs of the community 
Historical background and 
present political situation of 
the country of residence 
Strong authority through 
canon law. Reinforced by 
millet system. Exercises 
almost complete control over 
community once elected. 
Religious affiliation provides 
distinct identity. Indigenous 
to Egypt as "descendants of 
Pharaohs". Not 
incompatible with national 
identity but role of church 
can lead to alienation from 
national framework. 
Identify Egypt as homeland. 
Not exclusive claim. Helps 
to reinforce sense of 
belonging to Egyptian nation 
due to position as Egyptian 
national church. Majority of 
adherents live in homeland 
which accentuates ties to the 
patriarch. 
Coptic Revival since 1940s 
allowed church to become 
focal point of community. 
Patriarch highly involved. 
Draw on traditions of faith to 
emphasise distinct heritage. 
Centralized and successful 
provision of social services. 
Uses position to become 
voice of community. 
Views of religious leaders 
respected. Millet system 
accepted by all. Coptic 
disappointment at failure of 
nationalist movement to fulfil 
its promises of equality and 
participation. Combined 
with adverse effect on secular 
elite, rise of political Islam 
and demographic change, has 
led to heightened sense of 
insecurity. 
Strong authority from 
historical role as tribal chief 
of community. Tempered by 
superior position of Holy 
See. 
Distinct communal identity. 
Due to faith but also overlaps 
with Lebanese national 
identity. Attempt to trace 
ancient links with original 
groups resident in the region 
to advance sovereignty 
claims e. g. Phoenicians. 
Identify Lebanon as 
homeland. Close connection 
between Maronite church and 
formation of Lebanese state 
allows it to be seen as a 
national church. Homeland 
overlaps with national 
identity. 
Maronite spiritual renewal as 
response to civil war. Led 
by patriarch. Provision of 
social services through 
monastic orders. Lack of 
centralized body diminishes 
ability of patriarch to respond 
to criticism of the social role 
of the church. Provides 
conditions to become 
spokesman of community. 
Political system based on 
religious identity. Post civil 
war era marked decline of 
Maronite power and erosion 
of privileges. Curtailed 
ability of popular Maronite 
leaders to represent their 
community. Insecurity also 
due to demographic changes 
and precarious political 
situation in a vulnerable and 
volatile region. 
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Personality and views of the 
patriarch 
Challenges to patriarchal 
authority 
Existence and Activities of a 
Diaspora 
Charismatic and dynamic. 
Representing Copts seen as 
part of patriarchal duty. 
Deals primarily with Coptic 
rather than Egyptian 
interests. Not publicly 
address all grievances. 
Reflects demographic 
context. Modified approach 
from assertive stance during 
Sadat years. Occasional use 
of emotional and 
inflammatory language can 
escalate a tense situation. 
Dissent from clergy rare due 
to centralization policies 
pursued by the patriarch. 
Secular elite remains weak. 
Threat from "Coptic street". 
Become more radicalised and 
demand action to be taken by 
patriarch to defend their faith. 
Position tempered by external 
actors. Government 
provides legitimacy through 
millet system but will only 
continue if serving state 
interests. Muslim society 
hostile reaction if perceived 
as acting above dhimmi 
status. 
Reacted to global expansion 
by extending centralization 
policies to the churches 
abroad. Close links through 
dioceses, visits and 
communication networks. 
Stress unity through 
ýigurehead of patriarch. 
Emigr6 groups provide 
publicity and financial 
contributions but risk 
escalating communal tension 
in Egypt and challenge the 
position of the patriarch as 
the sole influential Coptic 
political actor. 
Hugely influential in reviving 
church as important and 
credible communal 
institution. Believes that he 
has duty to voice opinion on 
national affairs. Holds 
consistent views on Lebanese 
political situation. 
Addresses issues raised by 
community but also attempts 
to reflect concerns of all 
Lebanese. 
Main rivals are Maronite 
secular political elite. 
Return to active politics in 
2005 as a result of the 
changes that occurred after 
the assassination of al-Hariri. 
Enjoy communal support and 
pose major threat to political 
role of patriarch. 
Periodically, governments 
challenge the political 
opinion of the patriarch but 
has decreased since 2005. 
Friction with the Vatican 
over authority of church 
outside the traditional 
patriarchal territory. Led to 
lost generations. 
Rediscovering links by 
establishing dioceses. 
Provide numerical and 
financial support. Political 
activities of some members 
can raise questions in 
Lebanon concerning loyalty. 
Dilemma for patriarch to 
safeguard community yet 
support all members. 
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